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THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
INVESTMENT IN WATER AND IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE
Charles J.G Hove
ABSTRACT
The study examines and analyses the Government of Zimbabwe's 
investment policy in water and irrigation agriculture between 1980 
and 1985 from an economic and policy approach. The approach 
emphasises both the economic and policy implications that result 
from such public investment. The major objective of the study is 
to assess whether or not public investment in water and irrigation 
has satisfied Government economic and policy objectives of 'growth 
and equity'.
The cost-benefit framework has been adopted in the assessment of 
the performance of the commercial irrigation sector. Using this 
framework, the study seeks to show whether chosen policies have 
optimized such economic benefits as economic growth, profitability, 
foreign exchange earnings, and employment creation, for the costs 
incurred.
Small-scale peasant schemes are assessed using cost-effective 
analysis framework. On the basis of this method, the study 
examines the extent to which chosen policy strategies and projects 
have maximized equity objectives such as the increase in food 
production, improvement in standard of living, and increase in 
income earnings etc, at least cost of production.
Throughout the analysis of the two sectors, the role played by 
public subsidies in all the cost structures is examined. In the 
case of peasant schemes the costs are compared with those of the 
rain-fed peasant agriculture in order to assess the incremental 
equity, or lack of it, due to irrigation.
Social and environmental effects of these policies and their impact 
on costs and benefits are also discussed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.
The whole analysis takes place against the background of national 
economic decline, rising investment costs and rising public debt. 
The question of the economy's ability to support a subsidy-based 
investment policy is central in the whole study as this raises 
serious implications for future investment. Alternative investment 
strategies and future research areas are suggested.
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2CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to evaluate irrigation policy in 
Zimbabwe; assessing both investment in bulk water storage 
capacity and the allocation of available supplies between 
consumers. Although attention will be focussed on activities 
during the first six years of the post independence period, 
current policy cannot be evaluated meaningfully without a 
clear understanding of the historic development of irrigation 
and agricultural land use, the legacies of which are still 
critically important today. Nor can irrigation be assessed as 
a purely technical or economic exercise? it must be firmly 
placed in its political context.
Throughout, it will be necessary to make a distinction 
between irrigation designed to serve peasant farmers and that 
developed for commercial agriculture. In the former case, 
irrigation was first developed as a reaction to land hunger 
following the removal of African peasant farmers from land 
that had been designated as 1European Areas'.
During the 193Osf the then Government of Southern Rhodesia, 
through the Native Agriculture Department, became involved in 
irrigation in a way which can only be viewed as an attempt to 
politically control potentially violent landless peasants. 
The forced settlement of peasants in dry and edaphically 
marginal lands, in numbers exceeding the basic carrying 
capacity of the land, that followed, produced a situation in 
which irrigation was seen as the obvious solution to the 
resultant food shortages. This process continued after the 
passing of the infamous 19 3o Land Apportionment Act, with 
irrigation being expanded for political reasons at high cost 
to the Government, at the neglect of economic considerations. 
Only after all the best agricultural land had been 
consolidated in European hands, and the African peasants had 
been shifted to the so called 'Tribal Trust Lands' did the 
Government begin to demand that small scale (peasant)
3irrigation schemes were only to be developed if they could be 
justified economically. Thus during the 1960s,' and in the 
early years after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965, support was withdrawn from peasant irrigation 
agriculture development. High production costs and an 
unfavourable product pricing system brought insolvency to 
many farmers and set in motion the gradual abandonment of the 
existing irrigation schemes; a process which was accelerated 
by the disruptive war of independence. As a result by 1980 
virtually all small-scale irrigation projects had become 
inoperative.
By way of contrast, the development of commercial irrigation 
projects escalated during the 1960s. 'European' farmers 
were attracted into irrigation by the potentially high profit 
margins from crops such as sugar-cane, coffee and winter 
wheat. Profitability was high not only because c>9 low input 
costs, with cheap labour and highly subsidized water rates, 
but also lack of competition from the peasant sector
and the existence of a racially determined crop pricing 
system which favoured 'European' farmers. As a result 
commercial large scale irrigation expanded rapidly until by 
the early 198Osv when it accounted for 93% of all irrigation 
activity in the country (World Bank 1983).
After independence, the present Government adopted, as its 
overall policy objectives, the concept of 'Growth with 
Equity'. To serve this objective it has revived the 
development of small scale (peasant) irrigation schemes, 
embarking on new projects and resuscitating the old abandoned 
ones. However, this expansion is occurring only with heavy 
public subsidy; thus compounding the financial problems of an 
exchequer already heavily burdened by the costs of 
subsidizing commercial irrigation and other sectors of the 
economy. A key theme of this study is that irrigation 
development has taken on a life of its own, with little 
assessment of its effectiveness in meeting the ultimate 
policy objectives set out by the state and with little 
evaluation of the opportunity costs of the resources 
involved.
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A second major problem addressed in the thesis is the 
potentially contradictory nature of the "Growth with Equity" 
concept as it relates to irrigated agriculture. Maximization 
of economic growth may not be compatible with distributive 
equity. Indeed as the study will attempt to show, given the 
inherited racially divided dual agricultural system, the 
pursuit of growth may be a force for greater inequality, as 
the already relatively rich farmers are better able to take 
advantage of loans and subsidized inputs, including water, to 
expand their production. Thus the major question running 
through the thesis is; whether investment in irrigation can 
be the best way to promote equity objectives and whether 
other alternative measures would be more cost-effective 
methods of achieving the Government's policy goals.
The Hypothesis
The main hypothesis of the study is to determine whether, for 
both private commercial and small-scale peasant schemes, 
public investment in water and irrigation agriculture in 
Zimbabwe, has been the most cost effective and beneficial way 
of achieving the public objective of 'growth' and income 
equity, as defined in the Government's "Growth with Equity" 
policy guide-lines of 1980.
The study will attempt to assess whether irrigation 
development has the capacity to fulfill these policy 
objectives given the constrains inherent in the structure of 
the irrigation industry itself, its investment strategies and 
operating practices. The study will also attempt to identify 
sources of inefficiency within the industry and the extent 
to which the following feature in the case of Zimbabwe:-
a. The tendency to over invest, that is, the extent to which 
capacity has typically been developed prematurely on an 
over-ambitious scale before the farmers were prepared or 
were able to pay the full costs involved;
b. The over reliance on water supply capacity extension to 
solve water shortage problems instead of the adoption of
water management techniques that would improve the use 
of existing water resources by farmers, and the extent 
to which use has been made of the price mechanism to 
help solve short-term water shortages and to control 
demand for water over time?
Whether the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
Development (MEWRD) has developed excessive supply
safety margins, indicating the Ministry's extreme
aversion to the risk of supply shortfalls. In the
pursuit of supply safety margins, has capacity
construction normally taken place well ahead of
farmers' needs, to meet uncontrolled needs; and to guard
against infrequent (location- specific) drought 
?occurrences. In the establishment of safety margins, 
has attempt been made to evaluate the costs of this high 
level of security against the derived benefits?
Do existing pricing policy arrangements encourage the 
tendency to over investment in supplies and wasteful 
and low value water usage. In addition, does the 
likelihood therefore, exist that supplies are
misallocated between farmers and does the pricing system 
typically operate to the disadvantage of those farmers 
drawing water from costly new dams; ,
To what extent is the water and irrigation industry
characterised by constant miscalculations of the costs
7and benefits of investment. Are the benefits from
. . ? water supply and from irrigation over estimated: If
there is an over estimation of benefits, to what
extent is that based on the assumption that, as some
units of water are essential for plant growth, all
supplies to irrigation agriculture are equally
valuable, and that as irrigation water supply can help
solve crop failure problems, all irrigation projects
will act to remove the dangers of crop failure: In the
benefit/cost calculations is the assumption also that
water for irrigation alone can produce the expected
benefits, ignoring the plethora of other inputs (farm
credit, extension services, fertilizers and so forth) 
which are crucial to the success of projects? Is the 
assumption by MEWRD, and by government true, that water 
and irrigation projects can induce economic development; 
and is there evidence to suggest that irrigation has 
been the force for growth?
Have the operations of MEWRD and the Regional Water 
Authority been characterised by deficiencies in demand 
forecasting procedures? To what extent have estimates of 
demand for water been based mostly on unresearched and 
uncoordinated statements from farmers' organisations 
(who have a high propensity to overstate the demand) , or 
on extrapolation of past trends at existing prices and 
water management practices? Is it possible that such 
forecasts tend to be made on a once-only basis, when the 
need for further large scale investments is perceived. 
Has any attempt been made to revise demand projections in 
line with increased water charges or with other 
determinants of demand such as product prices? Has the 
relationship between water use, farmers behaviour and the 
determining physical and socio-economic variables been 
assessed?
Extrapolation is often based on the assumption that the 
demand determinants will continue to operate in the same 
way as they have done in the past. Clearly, misleading 
projections will result if this assumption is not valid;
To what extent has cost-benefit analysis been used as a 
project selection procedure? Is it assumed that the 
development of all physically and technically feasible 
schemes is desirable and that these will therefore be 
constructed over time. Where cost-benefit analysis has 
been employed, was it used to lend supposed objectivity 
to preconceived notions or decisions;
To what extent is the existence of uneconomic management 
practices linked to the dominance of, on the one hand, 
engineers who see physical capacity extension as the
7answer to all water supply problems, and on the other 
hand, the agronomists with a fervent mission to push 
irrigation agriculture to every corner of the country, 
regardless of the costs?
i. Finally, can it be argued that the pursuit of irrigation 
agriculture has affected the mix of crops produced and 
what implications, does the dominance of export crops 
(sugar-cane, coffee, tea and cotton) has for development 
planning, and on the development of crop production 
technologies? To what extent the technological
changes and developments to improve the productivity of 
rainfed agriculture been neglected? Can it be argued 
that an alternative to full-scale irrigation agriculture 
development must be sought in the expansion and 
improvement of less costly rainfed agriculture to its 
full potential?
While the study does not argue for the removal of 
irrigation agriculture per se, its continued existence in 
Zimbabwe*s agriculture system, must be justified (like 
all other investment activities), in terms of its ability 
to fulfill the set objectives of Growth with Equity* 
through the most optimal use of scarce investment 
resources.
Development of Research Interest
There has been a growing concern in the Less Developed 
Countries (LDC$ ) and among donor agencies that massive 
investments in water for irrigation have not produced the 
expected benefits. This concern is taking place against the 
background of heavy Third World indebtedness to international 
banks and donor agencies, and of the cry for greater 
efficiency in the use of scarce investment resources. In the 
irrigation sector it has become evident that despite heavy 
investment in numerous irrigation schemes, hunger and poverty 
^as well as high levels of individual indebtedness) have 
tended to grow instead of decline and that most schemes have 
tended to increase social income differences instead of
narrowing this gap as evidence from The Green Revolution 
shows. In addition, there is growing evidence of the 
increase in water-based diseases around most schemes. In 
some countries, the disease infested schemes have become the 
source point for the resurgence of such vectors as mosquitoes 
and snails in areas that had hither-to been declared safe 
(Biswass 1978).
Early studies of water development tended to be uncritical 
inventories of man's achievements in controlling the physical 
system. It was simply accepted that irrigation brought major 
beneficial gains and acted to generate regional economical 
development. Little critical analysis occurred of the costs 
of irrigation, the way the water was allocated between uses 
and users, and of the distribution of the resultant benefits. 
However, during the 1950's this unthinking acceptance of the 
assumed benefits of irrigation began to be challenged, first 
by economists and later by environmentalists. This more 
critical appraisal was started in the USA by a number of 
outstanding economists (Otto Eckstein, 1958; John Krutilla, 
1955; Roland Mckean, 1958; Haveman, 1965; Margolis, 1957; 
Moreel, 1956 and Hirschleifer et al 1960) . Most of their 
work resulted from an outrage, both within academic circles 
and the political arena, over the massive scale of 
investments undertaken by the Federal Government, the State 
and Local supply agencies, in the water sector.
Investment in water for irrigation and flood control had 
escalated until water development was the largest single item 
in the whole Federal non-defence expenditure budget. In all, 
expenditure was spread among 25 agencies (Eckstein 1958), but 
by far the largest spenders were the Corps of Engineers and 
the Bureau of Reclamation. Individual states, especially the 
dry southern and western states were also taking keen 
interest in water projects for irrigation. However, the low 
returns on capital invested in water construction projects 
became a matter of great public and political concern. 
Eckstein and McKean (1958) noted that the political 
justification for irrigation was to increase the income of 
poor farmers and to encourage the occupation of the drier
9lands in the west as part of the frontier policy. These 
political objectives submerged discussion on the economics of 
irrigation, and it was established by the Hoover Commission 
in 1955 that irrigation projects and schemes were only 
repaying between one quarter and a third of the total capital 
costs. Eckstein, McKean (1958) and Morrell (1955) in their 
analysis of water investment programmes, criticized the 
objectives adopted by the agencies, particularly by the Corps 
of Engineers for the construction bias in their development. 
They also criticized the investment appraisal techniques that 
were employed to evaluate projects. The techniques were 
found to be defective from the view point of economic 
efficiency, a criterion that was increasingly being adopted 
by Congress. Investment analysis had thus been abused, as an 
evaluative tool, to justify the construction of non-economic 
irrigation projects (Renshaw, 1957).
Studies on the efficiency of Federal irrigation schemes 
concentrated on correct procedures of evaluation aimed at 
achieving economic efficiency. However, these early analysts 
were aware that all irrigation projects were designed to 
serve multiple objectives, and they developed techniques 
which allowed consideration of regional development as a 
measure of the worth of an irrigation scheme, as well as the 
assessment of the income redistributive effects of projects. 
Haveman (1965) gave detailed analysis, as to why, despite 
public and political concern over the construction of 
uneconomic and inefficient projects, Federal expenditure 
continued to be poured into those projects. The following 
were some of the major reasons he cited for the continued 
expenditure and these are equally relevant to this study:-
a) Delay in Plan Implementation
The time taken for project acceptance and the allocation 
of appropriation funds tended to be so long, that given 
the cost escalation in the construction industry, the 
final cost far exceeded the original estimates. There 
was furthermore, - no political commitment to pull-out 
once the project was accepted.
10
b) Favourable Water Charges to Farmers
Given the political objective of increasing the income 
of poor farmers, water charges were based on 
affordability criteria and the rates were therefore set 
low enough to leave enough income in the hands of the 
farmers. The period of repayment of capital costs 
extended over many years, starting only after 40 years. 
Low water rates allowed the misuse of water to continue 
and created problems associated with over application of 
irrigation water.
c) Political Log-rolling
The committees that looked after irrigation projects were 
headed by irrigation advocates, who supported projects in 
constituencies of fellow politicians, in the hope of 
receiving similar favourable treatment for their own 
areas.
d) The Bureaucratic Impediment
The bureaucratic chain through which a project had to 
pass through before permission to construct was granted 
was time consuming, costly and sometimes wasteful as
a process of scrutiny. Moreover, it did not stop 
politicians proposing uneconomic schemes.
e) Multi-purpose Objectives and over Investment
The arguments for investment in water resources had been 
articulated politically in terms of multi purpose 
objectives such as irrigation, electricity, domestic 
water supply, regional development, conservation etc. 
Given this range of objectives, it was possible to load 
the capital repayment costs onto electricity generation 
and domestic water supply while irrigation, though taking 
the largest share of the water (two thirds) was often 
exempted from paying such overheads. The multi-purpose 
argument had been used to justify investment with little 
or no study of the cost allocation to prospective users 
or of the benefits derived by each user class. In the 
absence of optimal pricing policies for irrigation water, 
problems of over investment, salinity and water
11
wastefulness, were the result, with considerable 
misallocation of water both between irrigation and other 
water uses and within the irrigation sector itself.
f) Erroneous Calculation of benefits and costs:
The benefits derived from irrigation had typically been 
over estimated primarily on the assumption that water 
alone was the key constraining factor, and all other 
inputs were treated as either cheaply plentiful or 
available. The farmers were assumed to possess the same 
high standards of agricultural competence, and that they 
would automatically adjust their cropping practices to 
maximize the profits from irrigation. It was also 
assumed that water could induce economic and agricultural 
development, although studies suggested that water was a 
passive factor allowing but not stimulating growth.
Sometime has been spent outlining the factors promoting 
uneconomic irrigation projects in the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s because it is striking how similar they are 
to the experience of the less developed countries today. 
Little has been learnt from the United States case or from 
the pioneering cost benefit appraisals of the 1950s . 
Numerous studies have shown that irrigation far from being 
the often assumed panacea can be an economic disaster, 
yielding minimal returns on capital (see for example Davidson 
1969 - Australia, Carruthers 1981 - Pakistan, Hazelwood 1978 
- Tanzania, Hagen 1967 - India, Baron 1975 - Afghanistan, 
Biggs 1977 - Bangladesh).
Clearly the problems of uneconomic investment are critically 
important for poor nations where resources are scarce, rates 
of capital formation are low and where there is limited 
managerial capacity to make the most effective use of the 
water resulting from such investments. Although it will be 
argued that a more economically efficient approach to 
irrigation investment is crucial in Zimbabwe and other LDCg^
. the current
study will depart from earlier assessments which took 
efficiency as the sole objective of management by attempting
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to appraise government investment strategies for water and 
irrigation as policy tools for the achievement of both 
economic growth objectives and the social welfare objectives 
of distributive equity. In order to achieve this goal the 
study will investigate not only the costs of producing water 
and of irrigation development, but also investigate the full 
range of inputs required, as well as the human and 
institutional changes that have taken place, the role of the
to co U’>Ch
state and the extent A these have contributed to or hindered 
irrigation development.
The need to evaluate public investment in water and in 
irrigation agriculture in Zimbabwe was due to a number of 
observations made by the researcher as an employee of the 
Government, responsible for the approval of most investments 
in water and irrigation agriculture. It had become clear 
that:
a) Appropriations for dam construction had continued to 
grow, and that no attempt was being made to assess the 
opportunity cost of these resources?
b) No assessment was being made of the cost to the economy 
of an open ended subsidy policy?
c) Uneconomic small scale peasant schemes were being 
embarked upon without questioning their viability, or 
capacity to sustain themselves?
d) Government was experiencing financial constraints and 
this had raised questions of efficiency in investment?
e) Zimbabwe's irrigation based export crops were being sold 
in a price-depressed international primary commodity 
market, but very little diversification had been 
attempted ?
f) Irrigation increased social and environmental costs which 
warranted research?
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g) The benefits and costs of irrigation agriculture had not 
been systematically studied before,and in the absence of 
any research, it had become accepted that irrigation was 
beneficial? a belief that required verification.
In strict financial terms, investment in water for irrigation 
is no longer a minor item of expenditure in Zimbabwe's 
national appropriation accounts. The costs are even more 
significant when consideration is also given to the fact that 
the irrigation industry is a heavy user of machinery, spare 
parts, fertilizers and insecticides, all of which are 
imported at very high cost, requiring scarce foreign exchange 
resources. For example, in the 1983-1986 National Plan, the
Government of Zimbabwe committed itself to spend over
Zimbabwean Dollars 500 million over a three year period on 
the water industry, and this was 20% of the total national 
budget of Z$2.5 billion over the same period. While the 
worry over the ever increasing capital cost could be assuaged 
by borrowings from international donors, it had become clear 
that the heavy burden of operation and maintenance costs 
could only be met by the developing countries themselves. 
Available evidence (Carruthers 1977, Clark 1971, Blackie 
1984, and Palmer-Jones 1976) showed that operation and 
maintenance costs involved a massive commitment of resources
which very few poor countries had been able to provide.
Their scarcity had resulted in large scale abandonment of 
schemes, so allowing costly canal and dam infrastructure to 
lie idle, or to remain under utilized and thus unable to 
repay the loans used for construction. No donor agencies or 
banks lent for operation and maintenance costs, and the 
recipient farmers were unlikely to be able to meet the full 
costs involved. Clearly, implied in this is the fact that 
irrigation could not on its own meet all the operation and 
maintenance costs, and that LDC countries had to accept the 
choice and responsibility of either having to continuously 
subsidize irrigation agriculture, or scrap irrigation 
agriculture altogether.
It also has not escaped expert notice that despite the 
massive resources that have been injected into irrigation,
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poverty and malnutrition had continued to exist among the 
irrigators. In some countries like India and Bangladesh, the 
poor farmers had become heavily indebted to both rich farmers 
and the banks, and in certain cases, had actually lost their 
lands to their lenders. In Kenya, Swaziland and Sudan, 
irrigation agriculture, because of the need to repay the 
loans, had become wholly commercial, export crop based, with 
little or no link to the food supply problems of the 
countries, even during years of drought. In addition, all 
countries of tropical Africa that had embarked on irrigation, 
had experienced a wide range of environmental effects such as 
the widespread incidence of water-borne diseases such as 
malaria and bilharzia. Clearly, irrigation agriculture could 
worsen both social and environmental effects in the LDC1s.
It has therefore been essential, given the foregoing 
background, to ask in this study the question? can irrigation 
as practiced in Zimbabwe be any different?
In attempting to answer this and many other questions the 
study has been restricted to the period 1980 to 1985. The 
choice of the period has been influenced largely by political 
events, which have a strong bearing on policy formulation and 
the economic development of the country. Zimbabwe became 
constitutionally independent from the British Government in 
1980? and saw the assumption of power by a socialist 
government. The timing for this study on investment 
efficiency in irrigation has been opportune in that it allows 
for an in depth assessment of the post 1980 policy 
formulation process against the background of the pre 1980 
policies and investment activities. The new government 
embraced a humanistic philosophy of 'growth with equity' as 
the main framework for public and private investment. The 
period of six years is adequate in that it allows the study 
to follow the policy from its initiation through adoption and 
implementation, and allows the results of most schemes 
started and rehabilitated from 1980 on, to be assessed at 
least preliminarily.
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Above all else, the study is the product of the researcher's 
eight years interest in the area of efficiency in 
government's investment policies, an interest that developed 
as a student of development economics at Aberdeen University 
in Scotland and was strengthened by the first few years of 
experience as an employee of the government of Zimbabwe in a 
ministry responsible for public investments. The study is 
therefore raising more questions than answers. But before 
the questions so far raised can be addressed, it is essential 
that data sources consulted are reviewed, as they have a 
strong bearing on the quality and authenticity of the 
conclusions reached.
Data Sources
This study is not about irrigation as seen by an agronomist 
or water as seen by an engineer. The study's interest in 
water is not limited to its acquisition and storage only. 
Water is essentially a passive flow resource, that acquires 
usefulness only in its functional role. Benefits from any 
investment in water, will therefore accrue outside the water 
industry itself, that is, in the major water consuming 
sectors of the economy. It is therefore necessary to attempt 
to evaluate what role water plays in increasing the 
productive output of water consuming sectors. However, this 
is not an easy task since it is difficult to isolate the 
benefits from water taken alone? a range of other inputs are 
also necessary before water use can yield returns. Moreover, 
it is always difficult to address what is essentially a 
contingent question: What returns would have been produced if 
the investment in water and irrigation had not taken place, 
and funds used for other purposes?
In order to fully address all the issues raised above, a 
considerable amount of data cn-e required. The task of 
collecting such data was never underestimated right from the 
beginning. The difficulties involved in data collection were 
considerable, and inevitably there were major deficiencies in 
the quality of available information. Among the many 
problems, the most crucial were;
1. The absence of any statistical data on small scale
schemes?
2. Discontinuity in the recordings of the activities of most
crop producers due largely to the 15 years of civil war.
In the commercial crop production sector data collected 
and records are not disaggregated between rainfed and the 
irrigated part of agriculture, and the picture is further 
distorted by the prevalence of supplementary irrigation 
for most rainfed cereals. Even crop export figures are 
not disaggregated between irrigation and rainfed except 
for perenials like sugar and coffee, and as such it had 
been difficult to visualize the singular contribution of 
irrigation both to economic growth and to foreign 
exchange earnings. At the end of UDI rule most 
historical records contained in government files were 
destroyed by the outgoing government together with all 
records considered secret or damaging.
Perhaps most discouraging has been the unwillingness of the 
corporate agribusiness to provide any detailed information 
about their operations other than the information contained 
in their annual reports. Although this information is useful 
as a general pointer to the activities of the corporations, 
it however provides a very partial picture. Discussions with 
the major corporations in the irrigation sector bordered more 
on the generalities and less on the specifics.
At the start of the field work, a number of data collection 
methods were adopted? namely the use of postal 
questionnaires, consultation of existing records, interviews 
with various organisations and individuals in the water and 
irrigation industry, written and telephone communication with 
individuals and organisations, and through a number of visits 
to schemes, dams and canals for on-the-spot evaluation and 
assessment. The questionnaire method was largely abandoned 
when it became clear that? issues involved were complex and 
could not be recorded on the rigid frame of the 
questionnaire, without losing the critical parts of the total 
picture. For example, in the case of the small scale schemes
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the fact that their produce, mostly green mealies and 
vegetables, were sold in small unmeasured quantities at 
irregular and unmonitored times, meant that yields volumes 
could not be easily recorded on the questionnaire designed on 
standard measurements.
Among the consulted records were the following:-
a) Central Statistics Organisation: various crop production 
records for both the commercial and communal sectors for 
the period 1980 to 1985, where such data existed;
b) Quarterly Reports of Government Statistics: information 
on crop exports, imports, balance of payments and gross 
domestic product up to 1985?
c) Medical Research Report from Blair Research Centre: data
on the incidence of malaria and bilharzia, and on the 
cost and attempt at control;
d) Feasibility Study Reports on Irrigation: as part of
normal duties in the Ministry of Finance reading through 
all feasibility study reports on irrigation and water 
projects ?
e) Data collected as part of the project appraisal exercise 
of water and irrigation projects for the Department of 
Irrigation (AGRITEX)?
f) Data from Seminars, symposia and conference reports on 
topical issues in the irrigation sector?
g) Agricultural Marketing Authority: annual reports on crop 
deliveries and sales and on crop exports (1980-1985)?
h) Hippo Valley Estate; annual reports and budget statements 
1980 to 1985?
i) Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA)
18
Annual Reports: budget statements and production
statistics 1980-1985?
j) Regional Water Authority annual reports: end of year 
reports and budget statements and problems (1980-1985);
k) The Zimbabwe Herald: occasional reports on the water and 
irrigation sector;
1) The World Bank Sector Studies: irrigation agriculture 
1983-1984?
The range of issues involved is so vast that many areas were 
inevitably left out, and it is doubtful whether any effort 
for a comprehensive coverage could have altered the 
conclusions that have been reached on the basis of the data 
used. Because of the absence of important items of data, 
certain conclusions will border on speculation and in some
O. -*'G-
casesA based on the author's personal experiences and 
j udgement.
Research objectives
As a result of UDI, Zimbabwe was locked out of the 
International community for over 20 years. Over that period, 
little or no research was conducted on various aspects of the 
economy. Outside research interest in the country's 
irrigation agriculture stopped in 1965, with Roder's work on 
the Sabi Valley. At the same time, internal research within 
Zimbabwe was curtailed physically by the turbulent political 
situation, and institutionally by the racial policies of the 
Government of the day. In the absence of any socio-economic 
studies, the expansion of irrigation was left to the 
politicians, and to the engineering and soil scientist 
dominated institutions. What little research and
investigation has been done is heavily biased towards the 
physical aspects of the industry? a lot of attention has 
been directed towards studying river catchment behaviour, 
soil erosion, sedimentation and plant-soil and water 
relationships. The emphasis throughout these studies is on
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the increase of crop yield, and on further expansion of water 
capacity, a situation exasperated by the recurrent cyclical 
droughts. Studies of a critical nature have been conspicuous 
by their absence until recent work by the World Bank, 
especially the work on Chisumbanje Irrigation Scheme.
In view of the absence of previous comprehensive critical 
work, there is a need first to review past policies and 
practices and to establish the historical causal 
relationships behind the development of both water and 
irrigation agriculture. The aim is to draw conclusions from 
the past that may have a bearing on present policy and 
investment strategies and direction.
In this essentially descriptive part of the study, special 
attention is focussed on the historical reasons behind, on 
the one hand, the demise of the small scale peasant 
irrigation schemes, and on the other, the rapid growth of the 
large scale commercial irrigation sector. This assessment 
will be carried out against the background of the economic 
fortunes of the country.
The next objective will be to review current investment 
practices in the field of water and the expansion of 
irrigation, especially the revival and the rehabilitation of 
the small scale subsistence sector. The aim is to assess the 
extent to which recent investment policies, and levels of 
resources invested, can achieve economic growth and 
distributive equity. In the process of fulfilling this 
objective, uneconomic water and irrigation practices, 
especially those unlikely to meet the political aims of 
growth and of equity, will be assessed.
Before such an assessment is possible, it is clearly 
essential to establish the nature of benefits that are 
associated with this type of investment, to whom they will 
accrue, the politically optimal way of distributing them and 
their effect on further investment policies. It is also 
essential to establish the costs involved, the allocation of 
responsibility for meeting the costs and their effect on
20
policies for the further expansion of irrigation. The 
negative aspects (intangibles) inevitably associated with 
investment in water and irrigation agriculture will also have 
to be assessed, so as to bring into full view the total range 
of social and environmental costs that have to be paid and by 
whom.
And further, the most central objective is to assess the 
institutional organisations that have been put in place for 
plan formulation and implementation. It is important to 
establish how these institutions are structured, work, and 
formulate plans and projects, what criteria they use in 
project appraisal and how they achieve the set goals of 
growth and equity. During the analysis problems that impede 
implementation and the realisation of set goals, will be 
explored. Of interest is the role of public subsidies in the 
industry and the effect of this on investment patterns and on 
policy implementation especially with regards to 
self-sustaining investments. The question of subsidization 
is closely associated with water pricing and capital cost 
recovery policies, both of which have a direct effect on 
investment resource outlays.
The last objective of the study will be to look at the 
physical and economic limits to the expansion of irrigation 
in Zimbabwe, and to suggest alternative ways of achieving 
economic growth and distributive equity, through either land 
reform aimed at making land accessible to every able-bodied 
rural person, or through greater exploitation of rainfed 
agriculture to its fullest capacity, as well as recommending 
for future study the assessment of the possibility of using 
inter-regional food transfers. None of these alternatives 
have been fully investigated in this study or tried, and 
their consideration here is an attempt to point out that 
alternatives to irrigation do exist, that they need to be 
assessed and that they could offer greater benefits to the 
majority of the peasants, at present overcrowded on 
climatically marginal lands.
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Before embarking on the evaluation of policy and practice it 
is necessary to establish an analytical framework. An 
attempt will be made to do this in Chapter 2. In it the 
theoretically optimal evaluative and analytical tools will 
be considered. Throughout, the twin policy objectives of 
growth and equity* are employed as the criteria against which 
investments in water and irrigation are judged. Growth 
implies increased output and high levels of reinvestment of 
returns to promote a rapid expansion in the size of the 
national economic cake. To achieve this, the Government of 
Zimbabwe, in its choice of investment areas, will have to 
select those areas of the economy where it can pursue an 
* economic efficiency' policy. Scarce resources will be 
invested to produce maximum financial and economic returns. 
The chosen evaluative tools for this study are cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effective analysis, these will be employed 
as frameworks to find out whether investments in water and 
irrigation have been maximizing output, or financial and 
economic returns. Equity, and in this case, distributive 
equity, is more of a consumption policy objective, whereas a 
growth policy emphasizes savings and investment. 
Government's commitment to equity means the achievement of a 
more equal distribution of the rewards from investments for 
the purposes of consumption. This consumption is measured in 
terms of the size of the income of every consumer, which in 
turn is a measure of the standard of living attained as a 
result of the redistributive policy.
Public investment can be used to deliberately influence 
either growth or equity, depending on the priorities of 
government. But growth with equity, as a policy objective, 
guiding national investment efforts, can be both 
contradictory and arguably unachievable. It is clear that a 
policy designed to promote growth must limit current 
consumption.
This makes it essential that more attention be paid to 
ensuring that scarce resources are used effectively. It may 
be politically and ethically desirable for government to 
diverge from an economically optimal investment strategy, as
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seems to be the case in irrigation, but if this is so, the 
economic and financial costs of such departures should be 
established, so as to be taken into account when policies are 
formulated.
Chapter 3 traces briefly the causal factors behind the 
history of development of the water and irrigation industry, 
placing emphasis more on the shift of the policy frame and on 
the practical fortunes of the schemes. This fairly narrative 
part of the study also looks closely at the institutional and 
political arrangements that have had lasting effect on the 
industry. The aim is to elucidate from history, the origins 
of the current investment policy. The chapter ends by giving 
background to the economy during the period of the study 
against which investment plans and programmes in water and 
irrigation are evaluated.
Chapter 4 attempts to bring together all the cost outlays 
involved in the commercial sector? namely the capital outlay 
for the construction of water storage facilities for 
commercial irrigation, canals and other relevant 
infrastructure. But because water is not the only input 
required for irrigation agriculture to produce benefits, the 
cost of a range of other inputs, and their availability are 
also assessed. This assessment takes into account allocation 
of responsibility in meeting the costs involved, and 
inevitably, the question of subsidies is addressed. The 
organisational structures and their operations are also 
analysed so as to understand the role they play in the losses 
and or gains of irrigation agriculture. Most of the evidence 
and reference in this chapter is drawn from the commercial 
irrigation sector.
Following this discussion on the cost outlays, Chapter 5 
assess the benefits arising from that expenditure. This is 
done through the assessment of the agribusiness's financial 
return for the period of the study, and the yields that the 
use of irrigation has enabled to be realised. Since 
commercial irrigation is expected to fulfil more the policy 
objective of growth than of equity, the chapter will not only 
concentrate on the profit margins accruing to the producers,
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but on the economic benefits or the linkage effects with the 
rest of the economy. But since commercial irrigation is 
export-crop based, the chapter will assess the international 
market price behaviour for these crops , as this will 
indicate the level of foreign exchange Zimbabwe has been 
earning from exporting the crops as well as the 
self-financing capacity of the schemes.
Whereas Chapter 5 will discuss issues relating to growth 
maximization, chapter 6 focuses on the small scale peasantry 
sector. The central theme of the chapter is the extent to 
which small scale irrigation agriculture has acted as an 
effective system of producing equity benefits, compared to, 
say, rainfed agriculture or any other system operating in the 
economy. The question to be addressed is of the relationship 
between public expenditure (mostly subsidies) in support of 
small scale irrigation schemes and the nature and level of 
benefits obtained. Since the Government expects small scale 
irrigation to fulfil a multitude of objectives within the 
peasantry sector, the chapter attempts to assess the degree 
to which these are fulfilled.
Although almost all cost outlays are discussed in Chapter 4, 
a set of peculiar costs are not discussed there. These costs 
are collectively referred to as the intangibles' and in some 
cases they also include benefits. Intangible costs and 
benefits are the unplanned for outcomes concomitant on the 
planned investments. Chapter 7 discusses the range of the 
observed intangibles associated with irrigation agriculture 
in Zimbabwe.
The aim is to assess the effect, the addition of these 
intangibles to the appraisal and evaluation of irrigation 
agriculture, will have on both the benefits and cost outlays, 
and indeed on the justification for irrigation agriculture. 
By their nature, most of these intangibles defy 
quantification, and as such, they are qualitatively 
discussed.
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Lastly, Chapter 8 attempts to draw together major conclusions 
arising from the discussions in the previous chapters, and 
also makes recommendations intended to point the way forward 
in the light of the experiences discussed in the main text of 
the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF PROJECT ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
INTRODUCTION
The Government of Zimbabwe, like any other government 
invests scarce material and human resources to meet or
realise set policy objectives.
It does not necessarily follow, that in the process of
investing these resources, the employment of the resources 
would be effective. As McKean (1958) has already shown in 
the experience of the United States of America, governments 
are not necessarily guided by the economic ethos of
efficiency in resource employment. Resource 
under-utilization, in opportunity cost terms, has been found 
to be very wide spread (McKean 1958) . However, this must 
not be taken to mean that governments do not wish to realise 
value for their resources, especially in the Third World 
where resource scarcity is rampart.
It follows therefore that in the assessment of how the 
Government of Zimbabwe has used scarce resources in the 
water and irrigation sector to meet its objectives of
economic growth and of income equity, the key questions to 
be asked are those pertaining to how the resources have been 
used and whether this was the best way of using these 
resources in relation to the benefits realised. Answers to 
these central questions can not be arrived at easily. There 
is therefore a need to employ some analytical tools that 
would indicate whether the set objectives were being met and 
at what price.
In attempting to assess the role of irrigation in meeting 
government policy objectives, two analytical criteria have 
been used as frameworks for analysis. No new criteria has 
been developed for this study, and the criteria adopted here 
have largely been employed as they are theoretically 
developed by other researchers with minor modifications 
where the absence of data did not allow for full adoption. 
For the large-scale commercial sector, cost-benefit analysis
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(CBA), and the normal criterion of maximizing net benefits, 
is adopted as a framework for assessment. However, 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), as the criterion of cost 
minimization, is used as a framework to assess performance 
and goal achievement in the small scale irrigation sector. 
The difference between the two methodologies is a matter of 
degree. They are both rooted in the notion of economic 
efficiency, but the latter is more suited to projects 
designed to meet,the political objectives of equity.
In the small scale irrigation sector, production is mainly 
geared towards meeting subsistence requirements of individual 
families, and any sales of the surplus are also for the same 
purpose. The main characteristic of the sector is that 
output is unquantified in money terms as no real measurement 
takes place. It is however possible to estimate the level 
of yield realised, and to apply some sort of monetary value 
to it, although this is not done as a matter of procedure. 
What perhaps is important in the assessment is not the yield 
per se, but the level of output of consumables which can be 
realised by irrigators from a given set of resource inputs. 
In other words, the study is interested in finding out 
whether small scale irrigation is the most cost-effective or 
least cost method of fulfilling consumption requirements on 
a self-sustaining basis for the peasantry sector. There is, 
therefore, a comparative element to the assessment. In 
Zimbabwe the small scale irrigation sector comprises, those 
farmers both in the communal and resettlement areas with 
land holdings of less than 5 hectares. The widespread use 
of public subsidies in this sector could distort the 
economic choices to be made.
It is important to note that these two methodological 
techniques are not actually employed by the government in 
the selection of projects, even when donor agencies have 
insisted on these as part of the pre-condition for financing 
and implementing a project. Most of the nearly 183 small 
scale projects and many large scale commercial projects have 
already been selected on other grounds. By taking a sample 
of these projects and assessing them using cost benefit 
analysis and cost-effective techniques, it should be
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possible to establish how far the chosen projects have or 
are likely to fulfil the objectives of 'growth' and 
'equity'. In some cases the assessment can be reduced to 
the hectare level using generalised costs and benefits for 
any given crop. In addition, since one of the objectives of 
the thesis has been to consider alternative methods of 
achieving 'growth and equity' it has also been necessary to 
consider the effectiveness of the Land Resettlement 
Programme which is designed to develop dry land cultivation 
and to promote an equitable share of production inputs such 
as land, finance, capital and human capital. Equally 
important is the consideration of intra-regional food 
transfers, in so far as this concept recognizes the essence 
of respecting climatic and edaphic characteristics in crop 
production.
Cost-Benefit Analysis and its role in Commercial Irrigation 
Development
Commercial irrigation comprises 93% of all irrigation 
activity in Zimbabwe. The justification for the use of Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA) for this sector lies in the fact that 
the sector employs resources with the aim of maximizing 
profit, that resources used are recorded in money values and 
output is mostly for sale? the inputs and outputs are 
therefore quantifiable in monetary values. The sector 
therefore can appropriately be evaluated by employing the 
economic efficiency criterion in the allocation of 
resources. In the process of pursuing profit, high crop 
productivity should be achieved, and hence economic growth 
should be realised. However, whether growth maximization 
actually occurs will depend on whether profits are actually 
re-invested within the economy. This is a very important 
consideration, especially when it is considered that the 
dominant factor in Zimbabwe's commercial irrigation is the 
existence of corporate multinational agribusinesses 
producing high value export crops, and the high possibility 
of externalisation of dividends.
As an investment assessment criterion, the notion of 
economic efficiency is basic to neo-classical economics and
28
provides one of the key rationales for the free market 
system (Rees 1985). For this reason, it is chosen here in 
the assessment of commercial irrigation, a sector still 
strongly linked to the free market system. The assumption 
is that private farmers and agribusiness have a 
predisposition towards efficiency, ci<-betfc - with some
recognized imperfections, which could, at least in theory, 
be corrected. Furthermore, it is increasingly becoming 
common for the government to require public sector agencies 
to work to the same objectives and to do so by adopting more 
'commercial1 attitudes. All parastatal bodies and state
farms in Zimbabwe have, at least at the level of rhetoric, 
been encouraged to operate on private sector lines and to 
show evidence of profitability (Zimbabwe Herald, February 
1986). The Commission of Inquiry into Parastatals set up in 
1984/85 was conceived within this vein of thinking.
Although the results of parastatal operations have fallen 
far below policy expectations, this does not however negate 
the spirit of the intention.
Before cost-benefit analysis can be employed in the 
assessment of Zimbabwe's commercial irrigation, it is 
important to appraise the theoretical basis of the
methodology, so as to understand both its limitations and 
strengths, and their implications for the present study.
The Theoretical Basis
Cost-Benefit Analysis is an application of the theory of 
resource allocation. The rationale for such an analysis, 
along with the allocation theory, can only be understood and 
vindicated by reference to propositions at the centre of 
welfare economics. Traditional welfare economics is 
concerned with the maximization of social welfare, assuming 
that individuals are the best judges of their own personal 
utility functions. The concern is with the realization of 
total welfare (present value) irrespective of the 
distribution between people. Theoretically, changes in 
people's welfare should be measured by their willingness to 
pay for the benefits of a project. These benefits and costs 
borne by individuals are aggregated into benefits and costs
29
by simple addition. However, because of the existence of 
externality costs, governments intervene in order to attempt 
to socialise the costs as well as the benefits, at national 
level. Accordingly, a project is to be undertaken if its 
social benefits exceeded its social costs, that is if its 
'net social benefit' is positive.
However, public and private investments do not always seek 
to maximise efficiency. There are problems of equity, the 
solutions of which cannot be realized within the limitations 
of this criterion. It is clearly evident, therefore, that 
the limitations of the theory have rendered Cost Benefit 
Analysis unable to fully address the equity issue, and these 
have become very central to every investment process. Hence 
the criterion is used in this study as a framework only 
where key objectives of government, like equity, are less 
important.
The Assumptions
The major theoretical assumption upon which Cost-Benefit 
Analysis is built is that of a perfect competitive market. 
For market mechanisms to automatically produce welfare 
maximization, the following conditions must hold:-
1. Consumers of goods and services must be rational beings
and consistent in their pursuit of maximizing individual 
utility from their consumption.
2. The consumers' (of project benefits) preference must be 
such that their willingness to substitute one commodity 
or benefit for another in response to price changes, 
diminishes as more and more is substituted.
3. Consumers' preferences (reflected by their willingness 
pay) must be independent of the purchasing activities of 
others, for otherwise the consumption of one household 
may violate Pareto Optimality rule, by leading to a loss
of satisfaction in another; an aspect which will not be
reflected in the prices of goods.
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4. The producers, on the other hand, must pursue 
consistently the principle of profit maximization in 
project implementation and general investment.
5. Production must be carried out under conditions of 
decreasing returns so that there is no threat to 
competition by large monopolistic corporations.
6. There must be no physical interdependence among the 
production processes of different agencies, that is, 
there should be no externalities resulting from 
production.
7. The market where goods and services are exchanged must 
be perfect. This means that all participants in the 
market must have complete information about prices and 
commodities, and that all of them, on both sides of the 
market, are so small that they c a n f n o  influence 
on the prevailing prices.
8. In order for exchange to be possible, commodities must 
be of a form which is marketable, that is the sellers 
must be able to withhold the product from individual 
buyers, and thus forcing the buyers to pay the market 
price if they are to obtain goods and services.
9. The Pareto basis of the CBA model also pre-supposes 
that the resultant distribution of income is 
appropriate, and that exchange is taking place in a 
state of economic stability or equilibrium.
10. The resources in the economy are assumed to be fairly 
mobile, and moving to optimal uses. Such a movement is 
regarded as a natural consequence of profit 
maximization, which allows owners to sell to the 
highest bidder. The cost of transport enters profit 
maximization calculus in an optimal spatial flow of 
resources.
11. There should be full employment of both human and 
material resources.
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12. Most crucial of all, the price in the market is taken 
to represent the value of the commodities, and 
therefore consumer preference (expressed by their 
willingness to pay) reflects consumer sovereignty, in 
the pursuit of individual welfare. Prices therefore 
are regarded as a measure of the marginal social cost 
and marginal social value.
While these assumptions are necessary for the theoretical 
development of the CBA model, in practice none of these 
assumptions can ever be fully met. Does this nullify the 
usefulness of the model in the analysis of practical 
situations? Not necessarily. Although the assumptions are 
inapplicable, and can in some cases cause methodological 
confusions and problems, it has to be accepted that the 
assumptions play an important role which must be taken into 
account in any practical Cost-Benefit Analysis. For 
example, since all investors, public and private, would seem 
to be concerned with the efficient use of resources 
regardless of the objectives being maximized, the 
assumptions would help by establishing conceptual frameworks 
within which such thinking or concern could find 
expression. The real world operates under imperfect market 
conditions where there is prevalence of monopoly, massive 
unemployment of both material and human resources, political 
interference in optimal decision processes, and acute 
poverty and unequal distribution of incomes as well as 
numerous unstable, inflation ridden economies. The 
existence of all these factors that negate the theoretical 
requirements for a CBA model, have not stopped the search 
for the improvement of the CBA as a tool to aid efficiency 
in decision making.
Recent Advances
Recent modifications of the CBA model, started as far back 
as 1968 and are largely associated with developments in the 
Less Developed Countries (LDCs) . The use of CBA in these 
countries has been associated with the activities of donor 
agencies from the developed countries, such as the World 
Bank (IBRD) , Oxfam, IMF, UNDP, FAO, as well as bilateral aid
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agencies like the Overseas Development Administration (UK), 
United States Aid for International Development (USAID) and 
many others. The modifications and additions are nearly all 
due to the fact that the basic Paretian assumption of the 
perfect market upon which the CBA mode is founded, although 
not fully applicable in developed countries, are 
non-existent and inapplicable in all LDCs. In the LDCs 
there is universal absence of economic stability, and all 
governments, without exception, are heavily involved in the 
economic activities through either a chain of fiscal 
controls affecting domestic price fixing, export controls, 
import restrictions, subsidies on domestic consumption and 
various taxation measures, or through direct participation 
in the production process using parastatal organisations.
Given that the criterion uses large sets of data, the 
absence, in some countries of correct sets of data, and the
a.
complete absence in others ofAdata collection tradition, has 
meant that some modification of the model is inevitable. 
Part of the drive behind the modification has been the need 
to embrace the equity issues neglected by the classical 
theoretical CBA, given the massive poverty in most LDCs and 
chronic inequalities between the urban and the rural 
communities. Because of this new concern for the poor, 
donor agencies have sought to load CBA with tools to 
interpret this bias.
Perhaps the most important factor has been the insistence by 
donors for some mathematical logic and accounting system in 
project formulation, planning financing and implementation. 
Modifications have been carried out by economists and 
analysts, working singly or for aid agencies as indicated on 
Table 1.
These contemporary methods focus attention upon questions of 
relative valuations, timing and the incidence of costs and 
benefits. The values of factor prices and outputs of 
projections have been estimated by determining shadow rates 
which represents the social opportunity cost of resources. 
There has been less emphasis in LDCs upon simulating the 
values of unpriced items. Analytical procedures have tended
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to cope with distorted market prices and have dominated the 
rural planning literature at the neglect of risk assessment, 
and hence there has been considerable divergence between 
project expectations and outcomes.
TABLE 1
RECENT ADDITIONS TO PROJECT APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY
Main Little and Dasgupta Gittinger Squire and
Authors
Sponsoring
Mirrless Sen and 
Marrglin
Van Der Tak
Organisation OECD UNIDO IBRD IBRD
Year 1968 1970-72 1972 1975
Main Research UN World IBRD
Users ODA (UK) 
KFW 
(West/ 
Germany)
Agencies Bank
FAO
Research
Numeraire Foreign Consump­ Value Public
Exchange tion added Income
At In In In
Disposal
of
Domestic Domestic Foreign
Government Currency Currency Exchange
Main Consump­ Consump­ Economic
Thrust tion
VS
Investment
tion
VS
Investment
Efficiency Income
Distribu­
tion
Evaluation of development experience in the LDCs since 
Second World War has shown that although laudable increases 
in Gross National Product (GNP) have been achieved in many 
countries, the benefits from this economic growth have 
failed to trickle-down to the poorest, and that the 
differentials in real income between the richest groups and 
the poorest have widened (I D Carruthers, 1978). There has 
therefore been a shift from the preoccupation with growth as 
depicted by the efficiency criteria, of the 1950's and 
1960's. The most recent writings on project appraisal 
(especially the work by Squire and Van der Tak 1975) focus 
on the dilemma of project income distribution, and suggests 
ways, in which the project selection procedure itself, by 
weighting benefits received by the poorest, can help
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mitigate or eliminate the existence and growth of abject 
poverty.
Since the late 1960's CBA has been developed as a tool to 
obtain a better distribution in resource disposition between 
savings (investment) and consumption. Most of these recent 
additions associated with LDCs have been developed by 
welfare economists from developed nations and therefore 
there is an implied internationalization of standard 
procedures. Gitternger (1972) is primarily concerned with 
the importance of distribution between financial and 
economic returns, that is, with establishing the value added 
to national wealth from a project, but still ignores income 
redistribution. Little and Mirrless (1968,1974) concentrate 
on the fact that in LDCs, savings necessary for investment 
are suboptimal. They therefore propose a scheme for 
creating shadow prices which indicate the opportunity cost 
of consumption rather than investment. Squire and Van der 
Tak (1975) recognizing the inabilities of the LDC 
governments to determine the distinction between savings and 
consumption, advocate a greater income redistribution,
through weighting of income, in favour of the poor. They 
believe that the best way of effecting income redistribution 
is at the project design and appraisal stages. They call 
shadow prices for the calculation of growth, efficiency 
prices, and those for income distribution, as social prices. 
This trend of assessment has given birth to the currently 
fashionable policy of 'Growth with Equity' adopted by many 
LDCs, and is currently the subject of assessment in this 
study on Zimbabwe.
By putting greater emphasis on the use of shadow prices, 
(international prices) all these additions have one common 
fault. They require huge sets of data that very often are 
not available in the LDCs, and they are mathematically 
involved requiring skills that are not always available and 
are therefore very, very costly. These advances have 
clearly expanded the practical horizon and scope of project 
assessment beyond the limitations of the Paretian frame.
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The Practice of Cost-Benefit Analysis
All forms of Cost-Benefit appraisal are exercises, using 
limited information, to make predictions about future 'with' 
or 1without* situations. They are therefore always subject 
to uncertainty and are critically dependent on the quality 
of the basic data. Moreover, the analysis is complicated by 
the need to identify all relevant costs and benefits. The 
selection of the relevant parameters is always a matter of 
j udgement.
In this ex-post evaluation of the water and irrigation 
sector, costs and benefits are divided into two categories: 
Primary costs incurred and benefits received refer to direct 
project inputs and outputs, immediate to the project? 
Secondary cost and benefits assessed in this study are those 
which projects under review may have caused elsewhere in the 
economy. These costs and benefits exist where a project 
enables resources to be used more efficiently in the economy 
or leads to extra claims on resources elsewhere. Tracing 
the total impact of a project can be very difficult either 
because the impact cannot be readily identified or cannot be 
easily priced.
Ex-post evaluations of this nature are particularly 
affected, in addition to the above, by the absence of data 
collection traditions, and by the fact that all impacts 
concomitant to the project are not necessarily the result of 
the project, but of other activities that are external to 
the project. There is therefore an obvious problem of 
project delineation or boundary, that any practical CBA has 
t<3 tackle. For example, it is not very clear whether the 
impacts of irrigation projects under review could be 
restricted to the schemes themselves, or should be broadened 
to include the credit banks, the input suppliers, 
transporters of inputs and the consumer. Although all these 
have links to the projects, to include them would result in 
claiming unfairly to the projects, activities that would 
still exist in the absence of irrigation because of the 
universality of these activities. Unless it can be proven 
that an activity would not be there in the absence of
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irrigation, the study will otherwise not include all other 
impacts remote from the project; other than as 
externalities. Valuation of these is the next problem.
The difficulties which arise in any CBA are particularly 
pertinent in the present study, since major data 
deficiencies were encountered and there were also problems 
in calculating the true opportunity cost of inputs used by 
most projects in a society where subsidies, unemployment and 
product price fixing are all endemic. The problems that are 
faced by the present evaluation can be demonstrated by 
looking in detail at the steps that are taken in any CBA. 
As this is a sort of ‘hindsight' evaluation of projects that 
have long been implemented, and not the normal ex-ante 
appraisal of the projects-to-be, it has particularly, been 
difficult to have an appreciation of the 'with' and 
'without' project situations, and the relative values of 
resources used.
Theoretically, CBA calculation in an ex-ante appraisal 
situation would follow the following steps;
Step 1:
The undertaking of any project can only be justified in 
relation to some normative objectives. Therefore the first 
step is the identification of all the sets of objectives to 
be fulfilled by the projects. In Paretian terms, the main 
objective would be economic efficiency. All projects would 
be expected to optimise resource use in order to achieve 
this. However, in the real world, and in the Third World, 
it is not uncommon for government to expect a lot more out 
of the projects. As a result of these expectations, 
problems arise due to a multiplicity of objectives, most of 
which can not be measured quantitatively. Although these 
objectives are important in their own right, to require that 
every project undertaken should fulfil them raises problems 
relating to calculations. It is also conceivable that the 
apparent lack of focus on one or two objectives would lead 
to considerable sacrifices of important aspects of the 
projects.
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Clearly, issues of regional balance, or any other objective 
for that matter, can only be achieved at the expense of 
other, equally valuable objectives. The analyst's problem, 
is that it remains unclear as to who will decide on the 
relative importance or weight of each objective. The 
analysts cannot prioritize, without appearing to be usurping 
from the politicians their right as elected representatives 
of the people, to take decisions. To trust the politicians 
assumes that they have no biases and personal interests in 
the projects, a situation that is highly unlikely, given 
constituency interests.
Step 2:
If the multiplicity of objectives is a problem, the 
identification and calculation of cost streams is not always 
easy. Project costs represent any direct and/or indirect 
consequences arising from the decision to invest. The cost 
of a project can be divided into variable and fixed costs 
(quantified in money terms) and intangible costs (not easily 
quantifiable). Tracing of the streams of variable costs of 
a project, namely the inputs of raw materials; labour, etc 
and the fixed costs (maintenance, administration etc) is 
usually relatively easy. The intangible costs present both 
methodological and practical problems, in that on the one 
hand the boundary of costs related specifically to the 
project are not easily identifiable, and on the other hand 
most of the costs associated with the project cannot be 
expressed in money terms or quantified in any conventional 
unit of measurement. Theoretically pecuniary externality 
costs have been excluded from any CBA exercise, because they 
have traditionally been regarded as transfers of resources 
and not reflecting total real gains or losses, so they were 
simply ignored.
However, in the real world and in LDCs in particular, where 
the absence of a perfectly competitive market is exaggerated 
and price formations distorted by an array of public policy 
regulations, the valuation of the cost of inputs to a 
project represent major problems. Almost all CBA 
practitioners, in particular Little and Mirrless (1968-1974)
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and Squire and Van der Tak (1975) have advocated the use of 
shadow prices that approximate the pareto-efficient prices 
as a way out. For example, in an economy where there is 
less than full employment like Zimbabwe, the current price 
of labour will overstate the social case of employing an 
unemployed person, whose opportunity cost can be regarded as 
minimal. However, if labour is priced at zero but has 
actually to be paid for, then the project might loose money. 
The problem with this solution, is that there is often no 
data that can be used to estimate the opportunity cost of 
resources used in a project, and where non-traded goods 
constitute a larger part of the input, the problem becomes 
more complicated.
Step 3:
In any practical CBA, there is a problem of tracing the 
stream of benefits (quantitatively) arising from a project, 
especially since most of the benefits accrue at a future 
time. A lot of unforseen interferences could hinder the 
future realisation of planned benefits in the intervening 
period. Apart from the problem of tracing the stream of 
benefits, there is also the problem of valuing and 
quantifying as well as distributing these benefits. Today, 
decision makers are no longer interested in output 
maximization per se, but in influencing the distribution and 
consumption patterns of the benefits produced. In the LDCs 
where disparities in income and accumulated wealth very 
wide between social groups, with the majority of the people 
in the category of low income, the achievement of equitable 
income distribution has become a forceful objective to be 
addressed by every investment project. Squire and Van der 
Tak (1975) have attempted to approach these issues through 
their Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, which lays greater 
emphasis on the selection of projects for investment, on 
those that would specifically reduce income inequality, 
ameliorate famine conditions and eradicate poverty, or those 
that increase the standard of living of the poorest in the 
society. Except for huge data sets required, this method 
would be appropriate for evaluating projects for the poor, 
including small scale irrigation.
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Several methods (MacAllister 1980) have also been proposed
for determining weights that would be applied to the
benefits received by people at different income levels. One
method advocated is to determine the weight from the
schedule of income tax rates by income level. The basis of
this approach is the notion that society takes a smaller
percentage of the last dollar earned by the low income
earner than from the high income person, because the dollar
is judged to be more valuable to the poor person than to the
rich person. There are many variations of the weighting
are
method that have been tried? and all of themAattempting to 
put some objective rationality to the question of 
distribution instead of relying on the politicians and the 
market to do so.
Whatever methods are used, the distribution of the benefits 
of any projects will always be unequal. The equity issue is 
addressed at length separately.
Step 4: Time value of money and discount rate decision
When the streams of costs and benefits have been identified 
for every project, the common practice in CBA is to 
discount the cost and benefit streams to their present 
values. This is done by the use of discount tables. The 
reason why discounting is necessary is because costs and 
benefits take place in different time periods and are 
therefore not directly comparable over the project's 
lifespan. The total discounted benefits are added up and 
compared with the total discounted costs; and if benefits 
are more than costs, investment can go ahead. The 
theoretical basis for the procedure is the fact that people 
are not willing to pay as much for something they are to 
receive at some future date than if they can have it 
immediately. Opposing this view are those who believe that 
present activity must take into consideration the needs of 
future generations. According to the theory, there exists 
a quantitative ratio between present and future gains to 
which a person is indifferent, and this ratio can be 
expressed by a rate of interest, or a compound interest 
equation (MacAllister 1980):
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Vt = Vo (1+r)t or Vo = Vt_
(l+r)t
Where Vt = Value at the end of year r 
Vo = Present value 
r = Rate of interest 
t = Time in years
In project analysis, the interest rate is called the 
discount rate, which is compound interest in reverse. Since 
benefits and costs occurring at different points in time are 
not equally valued, they are like oranges and apples, 
requiring some adjustment in their measurements, using a pre 
determined discount rate, as indicated above.
The adjusted values are then added to arrive at the total 
present value of the stream of future values. CBA 
evaluations seldom consider impacts beyond 25 years, because 
however large the impacts maybe, once they are discounted to 
present value using even a comparatively low discount rate, 
they do not amount to much. It is therefore common 
practice in CBA to use 25 years as a cut-off point, beyond 
which all impacts are ignored.
The difficulty arises over the choice of the correct 
discount rate. The type of discount rate to use is very 
important, and it has an effect on the type of projects 
selected. There is a great deal of disagreement 
theoretically and practically over the correct discount rate 
to be used in assessing public projects. Rates from 4 to 12 
percent are commonly encountered in the literature. A 
variation of only 2 or 3 percentage points can make the 
difference between accepting or rejecting many large scale 
public projects like irrigation schemes.
The arguments are directed principally on the implication of 
choosing higher or lower rates. The theoretical argument 
centres on the implication of any choice: The use of lower
rates will increase the number of long-term capital 
intensive public projects. Those in favour of this argue 
that the present generation should invest more of its 
resources for the benefit of the future generations and that
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present generation should devote more of its resources to 
long-term programmes and projects for conserving the natural 
environment. On the other hand, the use of a higher 
discount rate will reduce the number of long-term capital 
intensive public projects and make more money available for 
private business investments and for short-term public 
programmes. Higher rates would release funds needed to deal 
with more immediate social problems that are urgently in 
need of attention, and are far more important than making 
long-term investments for the benefit of future generations, 
(who, it is theoretically argued, will have much higher per 
capital incomes, and, therefore, will be quite able to take 
care of themselves without the present generation's help), 
and that higher rates would reduce the number of large scale 
public projects that destroy the natural environment 
hastening the depletion of non renewable resources, and 
foreclosing future options.
The implications to the present study of these arguments are 
obvious. Irrigation schemes and reservoir construction 
projects are by their nature, long-term capital intensive 
programmes. The streams of costs and benefits stretch far 
in the future, and these projects typically absorb vast 
amounts of scarce resources both in the short and long-term. 
The choice of a correct discount rate is therefore very 
paramount.
Step 5: The Decision Rule
Once the discounted costs and benefits have been 
established, it is necessary to apply some decision rule to 
test whether the project is economically viable. Three 
basic rules have theoretically been devised? the net present 
value, the cost benefit ratios, and the internal rate of 
return. These decision rules apply equally to economic and 
financial analysis.
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the discount rate at 
which the streams of cost and benefits are equal. The 
higher the IRR, the better the project, so irrigation 
projects, for example with a higher IRR are to be preferred
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to those with a lower IRR. The IRR method has the 
convenience that it enables a comparison to be made between 
the rate of return of projects and the minimum, or cut-off 
rate, that the government or financing agency may stipulate, 
and rates of return on other feasible investments. The IRR 
criterion enables decision makers to accept or reject 
projects that come out respectively above and below a 
reference predetermined rate? say the economic cost of 
capital, if all projects are funded from borrowed capital 
resources, as is the case with most dams and commercial 
irrigation schemes. All projects are ranked according to 
how high or low the value of their IRR is to the reference 
rate. The limitation of this ranking is that, like the cost 
benefit ratio, it does not single out the initial investment 
capital outlay as a crucial factor.
The IRR can be defined as that discount rate at which the 
Net Present Value (NPV) of a project is zero. The IRR and 
the NPV are thus linked by definition. The NPV is simply 
the difference between the discounted streams of benefits 
and costs. It is the value, discounted to the present, of 
doing the project, rather than not doing it. The NPV can 
only be worked out from a pre-determined discount rate. 
This needs to be the same for each project compared. One 
approach is to estimate what real rate of return is 
available on investments in the private sector, and to 
require that all public investments, like the irrigation 
schemes, achieve at least the same, or to accept the 
government's own estimate of the minimum acceptable rate of 
return on public investment, and use this as the discount 
rate. However, NPV is concerned only with the total net 
benefits and neglects the way such benefits are allocated 
between social groups. When equity is an objective, it may 
then be necessary to use some form of distributional weights 
before the 'accept' or 'reject' decision is made.
The NPV can be supplemented by the Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) . 
The BCR is the ratio between the discounted total benefits 
and costs. Thus, if the discounted total benefits of an 
irrigation scheme are 140 and discounted total costs 100, 
the benefits cost ratio is 1.4:1 (and the NPV is 40). This
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ratio enables the decision maker to distinguish projects 
whose NPV is high because it is large from projects that 
have a genuinely high rate of return (IRR). As such, both 
the BCR and the NPV should not be quoted without stating the 
discount rate that has been used.
In most cases the three decision rules will produce the same 
ranking of projects according to their attractiveness. 
There are however, cases where the use of the IRR on the one 
hand and the NPV and BCR on the other will produce different 
results. Generally, the three rules are affected by changes 
in crucial data, and are sensitive to variations of 
assumptions during the appraisal process.
Step 6; Dealing with risk and Uncertainty and the 
Use of Sensitivity Tests
Future benefits and costs cannot be predicte.eU with 
certainty, which always makes the results of CBA prone to 
error. The accuracy of prediction must recede the further 
the analysis is pushed into the future. With regards to 
agricultural projects which are at the mercy of erratic 
weather regimes, insect epidemics, droughts, and farmers' 
general ignorance, future predictions of a year or two from 
the present could be highly inaccurate. Uncertainty is 
therefore inherent in project analysis, especially when it 
is considered that estimate of costs of shadow prices and of 
consumer surplus and externalities are all approximates. 
Uncertainty increases when these estimates are projected 
into the future as required by the CBA analysis. CBA does 
not treat uncertainty, but deals with most elements of risk 
(McAllister 1980).
Since benefits associated with public investment can only be 
realized though a complex chain of 'risky' events, 
calculation of risk is essential. McAllister (1980) 
developed the following risk expectation equation:
E(x) = xip(xi)
Where E(x) = the expectation of x
xi = the outcome of event i (e.g. - drought or
locust epidemic) 
P(xi) = the probability that i (risk) will occur.
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When the probability of events affecting the magnitude of 
impacts cannot be ascertained, the expected loss cannot be 
calculated. In such situations the recommended method is to 
carry out a series of sensitivity tests.
Sensitivity analysis involves considering the effects of 
plausible variations in some of the assumptions made on the 
outcome of the results given the nature of the data. The 
objective of carrying out the sensitivity analysis is the 
belief that this would lead to:
a. Improvement in the understanding of the nature and 
workings of projects?
b. Increasing expected net-benefits by improving the design 
of the projects; and
c. Reducing risk by suggesting precautions to be taken.
Most irrigation projects are, in practice, sensitive to 
variations in the discount rate, because the discount 
process affects the costs and the benefits 
disproportionately. This is especially the case in projects 
for which benefits and cost coincide least in time. The 
most practical example is the construction of reservoirs, 
that will start to generate, in the distant future, a string 
of benefits over a long period.
Sensitivity analysis is therefore a check on the results of 
a project analysis if crucial variables were to differ from 
the estimated expected values used in the analysis. While 
it may enable the identification of areas needing further 
investigation, on its own sensitivity analysis does not 
remove the risk and uncertainties associated with all 
investments, but merely reveal to decision-makers the 
tenuousness of their choice.
Step 7: List All Intangibles
There are analytical problems arising from consideration of 
the intangible effects. Traditional CBA has ignored the
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question of externalities because they present problems of 
measurement, and the fact that some of them are considered 
to represent resource transfers and not appropriations. The 
practice has been to consider them theoretically as being 
minor or insignificant. Studies have consistently shown 
that, particularly in the case of agricultural projects, 
spill overs can affect the actual cost and benefit 
calculations. It is possible that externality price effects 
caused by the projects may lead to higher prices for the 
inputs that the project require and lower prices for the 
outputs they produce.
Since nearly all projects produce some externality effects 
it has become necessary that these be taken into 
consideration in any appraisal exercise. How this can be 
done remains still a major problem for both governments and 
analysts alike. The problem arises from the fact that most 
externality effects are unquantifiable and may have no 
market value. In the agriculture sector the externalities 
that present quantification problems for example, are those 
relating to pollution by fertilizers and insecticides, the 
increase in the incidence of bilharzia and malaria following 
the set-up of irrigation schemes, and disruption of social 
life resulting from large surface water impoundment. 
Attempts at surrogate pricing as a way of arriving at the 
value of such impacts have had little applicable relevance. 
In most cases it is sufficient to list these impacts and 
carry out a qualitative assessment of their influence on the 
cost outlays or streams of measurable costs and benefits of 
projects, as part of the main appraisal of projects. In 
this study externality effects are discussed in Chapter 7.
Criticisms of the CBA method
Notwithstanding all the systematic steps presented above, 
the CBA method has its own weakness and strengths that must 
be considered and appreciated before the use of the method. 
Clearly no methodology has been subjected to such bitter and 
extensive criticism throughout its development as the CBA 
method. It would be futile to try to capture all the 
criticisms that have been laid at the door step of the
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method. It is essential to restrict the analysis to those 
relating to the current study on Zimbabwe. This, in essence 
is a critique more of the Little and Mirrless Method and 
that of Squire and Van der Tak which are considered suitable 
in the assessment of this study.
Objections to the methodology already raised in the 
literature can be divided into two major areas; those 
concerned with the theoretical aspects of CBA, and those 
that look at its practical application in LDCs. 
Theoretically, critics have called into question the whole 
conceptual basis of the CBA method. Kornai (1976) rejects 
entirely the neo-classical framework on which it is based, 
and especially the whole premise behind shadow pricing. 
Some critics contend that CBA*s central notion of social 
welfare function is too simple. They contend that a social 
welfare function does not exist in any meaningful way 
because of the diversity of interests within the developing 
countries, because of the rapid change in the mix of 
official objectives, and because of the common propensity of 
governments to ignore declared objectives.
Then there are those critics who accept the theoretical 
framework of CBA, but who have very serious reservationsaWoufc 
particular aspects of it. Among these are people like 
Mishan (1972), Stewart (1971) and Streeten (1972) and lately 
Carruthers (1981) , Amin (1977) and Sadik as well as Colin 
Leys (1979). Weckstein (197fc) rejects all shadow pricing 
procedures as harmful, because of the belief that socially 
profitable projects, which are unprofitable at market prices 
will require a lot of subsidies, which in turn would demand 
more resources to assess their impact. Some economists now 
accept the need to take direct account of income 
distribution effects of any project both overtime and 
between individuals. However, they despair as Amin (1977) 
has shown, over the fact that it is deemed necessary to try 
to accommodate by reference to welfare economics, a theory 
which assumes (unrealistically) that compensation to losers 
by gainers can be effected, that interpersonal and 
intertemporary comparisons of utility are impossible, and 
that equity and growth are in direct conflict.
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Operational objections which are emerging following 
practical experience, are more serious. The mathematical 
sophistry of the method has come under attack. For example, 
most LDCs do not have sufficiently trained staff to appraise 
all projects according to the method of Little and Mirrless 
or Squire and Van der Tak. But unless all projects are so 
appraised, there arises the problem of unequal treatment of 
projects and consequent problems of interpretation and of 
establishing priorities. According to Carruthers (1981), 
the mathematical factor reduces the usefulness of CBA as 
practiced in LDCs today, and states correctly that "a 
practice has not much to recommend it if the workings of the 
method and the decision criteria are not evident to the 
decision-makers ....". Another problem is related to the 
derivation of a social welfare function through the use of 
weights. Who decides upon the weights? The politicians, 
the planners or the aid donors? Amin (1977) argues that 
the use of government weights represents no shift in the 
status quo and the use of those decided upon by the analyst, 
would amount to the usurpation of political power from 
democratically elected representatives.
Stewart (1971) argues convincingly, that social values must 
inevitably reflect the interests of the group making the 
value judgments. It has also been noted that the weighting 
of objectives as suggested by Squire and Van der Tak (1975) 
suffers from the political imprecision surrounding policy 
objectives, as well as price forecasting. Moreover, the 
laborious process of shadow pricing absorbs an undue amount 
of skilled effort, while expert evaluation reveals that in 
agriculture for example, the factors which determine project 
success or failure are not primarily related to these 
aspects of planning.
Another source of dissatisfaction with modern CBA is the 
age-old neglect of externalities. All mathematical logic 
and sophistication implied by shadow prices and weights, has 
been unable to take on board the issue of externalities. 
Studies that have attempted to quantify these costs using 
monetary values derived from complicated surrogate pricing 
calculations, have equally been attacked for producing
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"incredible" figures that have no basis in reality (Self 
1970). The principal lacuna in the analytical structure of 
the modern CBA, is the lack of precise statements about the 
assumptions that are being made about government policy. 
Government rationality is taken for granted.
The method also fails to deal with human, institutional and 
managerial constraints which unfortunately have contributed 
greatly to project failure more frequently than the mere 
lack of capital which is often replenished through 
borrowings. As Ruttan (1977) stated, the LDCS are still 
trying to cope with the debris of non-viable institutional 
innovations: with extension services with no capacity to 
extend knowledge or little to extend; cooperatives that 
serve to channel resources to village elites? price 
stabilization policies that have the effect of amplifying 
commodity price fluctuations? and rural development 
programmes that are incapable of expanding the resources 
available to rural people.
If the opportunity cost of using some of these methods was 
to be assessed, their usefulness in the LDCs could be found 
to be of doubtful significance compared with plain decision 
making based on limited computation backed by consensus 
value judgments. Rather cynically, CBA actually
incorporates an enormous amount of value judgement and 
intuition on the part of the evaluator? There is judgement 
as to the course of future prices, judgement as to whether 
the commodities are likely to be imported, exported or 
non-traded, judgement as to capacity utilization, 
externality etc. At the end of the day CBA evaluation is no 
better than the judgments of the evaluator. The aggregation 
of costs and benefits tends to lend scientific objectivity 
to this sum value of judgments of what would have happened 
in the absence of the projects. After all CBA appraisal is 
about forecasting, and in forecasting estimates are value 
tainted.
Implications for Irrigation Projects
Water development and irrigation stand for a multitude of
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technical measures designed to influence both the 
hydrological cycle and the agrarian systems for the purpose 
of creating benefits for the society as a whole. Attached 
to irrigation therefore, is this element of technological 
transfer, and any success of such transfer must rest upon 
the presence of financial resources, human and institutional 
factors, political will and the general stability of the 
economy. Any CBA method should attempt to answer as many 
questions as is possible, and at the same time remain 
flexible enough to allow the inclusion of those elements or 
variables that are unquantifiable.
Justification for Choosing CBA for the present study
Despite the foregoing criticisms of CBA method in project 
appraisal, it is argued here that the criticism should not 
serve as the basis for rejecting Cost-Benefit Analysis, but 
as a basis for highlighting shortcomings and point to 
possible future research areas, all aimed at improving the 
technique so that it can do the job society expects from it. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis is only a tool in the decision-making 
process, and not a substitute for decisions. Like any 
technical tool it has its weaknesses and its strengths. 
What is important from the planning point of view, is for 
the analyst to accept the limitations of the method and the 
assumptions, and to state them with the results of any 
appraisal so that the decision-maker knows when to take over 
beyond the limits of the technique. There should be no 
attempt at mystification of the technique's subjectivity or 
lack of objectivity beyond that of the society in which it 
is employed.
The above sentiments arise from the fact that CBA is the 
only technique that has been fully developed and is in 
practical use, despite its imperfections. It has been 
chosen as the framework for evaluation and assessment in 
this study for the following reasons:
a) CBA improves analytical consistency (as all variables 
will be assessed by one criterion), clarity and 
rationality, by evaluating systematically and then
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comparing costs and benefits, instead of relying on 
unresearched and unsubstantiated intuitive judgement 
which might prove to be random and inconsistent from 
case to case.
b) The method provides a way of incorporating government's
multiple objectives in a systematic way that forms the 
basis for replication from project to project.
c) As an investment assessment criterion, CBA and the
notion of economic efficiency is basic to neoclassical
economics and provides one of the key rationales for the 
free market system. For this reason it is chosen here 
to assess commercial irrigation agriculture which is 
dominated by corporate agribusiness.
Calculations in the Present Study
The study uses the CBA framework to assess, as far as data 
allows, all the costs incurred on behalf of commercial 
irrigation agriculture, in particular the cost of building 
the numerous dams. The water pricing system is analysed in 
relation to the capital cost outlays so as to determine both 
the level of state subsidies built into the pricing system 
and the capacity of commercial irrigation to service the 
foreign loans and local resources spent on dam construction, 
as well as its ability to self-sustain itself as an 
industry.
Clearly the study is attempting to assess the performance of 
irrigation schemes that started operations long ago, some as 
early as the 1930's and 1950's (see chapter 3). As such, 
this is an ex-post evaluation of an industry that has, like 
many others, not had a continuous data keeping system. This 
has made assessment of the impact of commercial irrigation 
on growth and equity difficult.
Small scale irrigation agriculture has been beset by 
problems of abandonment at some stage of their existence and 
the absence of data recording or keeping traditions as well 
as the numerous occupancy changes on the schemes. To this
51
we can add the 107 schemes that previously belonged to the 
commercial sector and have now been rehabilitated for
peasant ownership. Clearly, the apparent production 
discontinuity coupled with constant changes in ownership or 
occupancy does not augur very well for data and record 
keeping. The change in government in 1980 and the
subsequent exodus of most of the long-serving civil servants 
has resulted in the loss of records on subsidies and the 
destruction of government files, some of which were on 
irrigation agriculture.
Using the CBA framework, the streams of benefits from
irrigation are assessed. The role of the international
commodity market is analysed and its effect on foreign 
exchange earnings from the export of the irrigated cash 
crops evaluated. The extent to which commercial irrigation 
is able to meet other equally important societal objectives, 
other than the private profitability of the farmer are 
assessed. These include the ability of commercial 
irrigation to generate employment and to assure the nation 
that food security matters are being met.
Most important of all is the impact or linkage between 
commercial irrigation and the rest of the economy. In this 
study it has not been possible, nor indeed desirable to 
carry out a project-by-project CBA, in the absence of 
comprehensive data. Instead an industry-wide assessment 
using the CBA framework has been adopted, with the view to 
arriving at general conclusions for the whole sector.
Cost-Effective Analysis and the Subsistent Irrigation 
Sector
The subsistence irrigation sector comprises 76 communal 
areas schemes and the 107 resettlement irrigation schemes. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some of the communal peasant 
areas have had a long irrigation history dating back to the 
early 1930*s, peaking in the early 1960's and disappearing 
in the 1970's. For the period covered by this study 
starting in 1980, the present government has been busy 
rehabilitating some of the schemes that had fallen into
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disrepair following either voluntary abandonment by the 
peasants and/or damage during the 15 years of civil war. 
Apart from rehabilitation, new schemes have also been 
started. The resettlement irrigation schemes were started 
as part of the commercial sector irrigation programme and 
have become small-scale schemes following the purchase of 
these farms for the resettlement of some of the peasant 
farmers. Most of these are also being rehabilitated and 
redivided to meet the requirements of the new owners. As 
most of these resettlement schemes are just coming into 
production now, not much information is available about 
their operations.
The 1984 field survey occurred at the peak of a three year 
drought and a period of inactivity, and at a time when the 
process of land acquisition and redivision and relocation 
was at its inception in most cases. However, it is 
inconceivable that the operational mode and the resultant 
benefits would be far different from the existing communal 
schemes, given the similarity in approach. Within the broad 
policy focus on Growth with Equity, the subsistence 
irrigation sector projects are intended, by Government, to 
represent poverty-focused development programmes, which are 
aimed at providing opportunities for increased production 
and for permanent employment, as well as being capable of 
enhancing the lives of the rural poor. It follows therefore 
that most of the benefits relate to the satisfaction of 
consumption and the enhancement of the quality of life and 
the raising of the standard of living of the peasants on the 
schemes. Theoretically, there is a direct relationship 
between consumption patterns and the working capacity, which 
emerges starkly when people are suffering from famine and or 
malnutrition. Increasing the consumption of basic 
foodstuffs may therefore be a necessary, though not a 
sufficient condition for improving the productive capacity 
of the rural poor.
In direct contrast to the commercial irrigation sector, the 
subsistence irrigation sector projects are 'social projects' 
aimed at alleviating social problems. The belief is that 
what is being optimised through this form of investment, is
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the reduction of poverty and its attendant ills, to levels 
predetermined by the policy makers as acceptable. The 
benefits accruing to the cliental peasants are therefore 
exceedingly difficult to quantity and or express in monetary 
value terms. A lot of theoretical work has been done 
(McAllister 1980) in an attempt to place monetary value on 
these benefits through various forms of surrogate 
evaluations; for example the use of the cost of not 
investing in these projects being used as the value- 
equivalent of the benefits from the projects. No attempt is 
made here to go into all these calculations, as that will 
not shed any new insights to the present work, and 
especially in the absence of data.
Equity and the irrigation Sector
•Equity* has been defined, in the context of Zimbabwe's 
'Growth with Equity' policy, to imply the need to achieve an 
equitable distribution of income through investments 
directed to the poor section of society, the peasants. It 
is the contention of this study that subsistence irrigation 
schemes, practically or theoretically, cannot be the basis 
for the achievement of equity, for as long as small-scale 
irrigation implies subsistence. The policy of subsistence 
irrigation would appear to be a basic needs policy aimed at 
securing the provision of essentials of subsistence, namely, 
food, housing, health etc, with limited surplus sold in 
order to augment subsistence. Accordingly the irrigation 
schemes are set up in areas that are prone to drought and 
experience food shortages and where the irrigation potential 
does exist. The same level of investment is not accorded 
other poor peasants in regions where irrigation 
opportunities do not exist, even if the degree of the 
marginality and severity of climate is similar. Above all, 
because of its absolute physical spatial limitations 
irrigation can only cater for a few peasants, and because of 
its high requirement for capital resources, it is inevitable 
that the better off peasants often end up being the 
beneficiaries of all such schemes contrary to the expressed 
policy to help the poorest.
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Aims of the study for the subsistCrrce sector
The study seeks to identify and assess: the beneficiaries of 
the benefits from the irrigation projects? the cost to 
government of investing in these schemes? the subsidy burden 
on the treasury? the opportunity cost of the resources spent 
on this sector as compared to other sectors ? assess the 
extent to which the Government could continue to subsidize 
this sector, the changes in the standard of living of those 
on the schemes as compared to those in the rainfed sector or 
in alternative employment, etc. The impact of the schemes 
on land pressure release and food availability in the areas 
of location as well as on employment, t s . assessed.
Justification for Using CEA Framework
The choice in this study of using a CEA framework for the 
appraisal of the subsistent irrigation schemes arises from 
the following considerations:
a) Projects in this sector are not concerned with financial
or economic profitability, but with the provisions of
the basic necessities of social reproduction. The
concern here is therefore over the least-cost production 
method that will make it possible for these social
objectives to be realised. CEA is the most suitable 
analytical framework to assess whether these irrigation 
projects can meet these objectives in the most 
cost-effective way.
b) For the commercial irrigation sector, scarcity of
capital both at the initial investment stage and 
subsequently for operation and maintenance as well as 
for the purchase of inputs, plays a major role in the 
cost-benefit analysis. In the subsistent sector, the 
concern is more focused on the recurrent costs and the 
role of subsidies in the fulfillment of government
objectives.
c) The benefits produced by these projects are largely 
non-traded goods, and in some cases unquantifiable and
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destined for consumption.
d) Using CEA, it is possible to compare the dollar costs
with units of output, with the intention of assessing
the extent to which irrigation projects maximise output 
from a fixed budget, compared to rainfed agriculture for 
the same level of budget.
e) Because of its less rigid dependence on monetized inputs
and outputs CEA can be flexible enough to accept the 
evaluation of the fulfillment of project objectives, 
unlike CBA.
f) CEA allows for the opportunity to look at alternative
investment strategies outside irrigation which can
perform the same functions, i.e. alternative investments 
that would be able to satisfy the same objectives at 
lower costs than those for irrigation.
Steps Followed in this Study
In this study, CEA is not used as a criterion for the choice 
of the right project among alternative projects, because 
this decision has long been taken at the highest political 
level. CEA is used to find out if the government policy 
objective of increasing income redistribution is being 
fulfilled by the schemes so far chosen and at what cost, and 
whether there are alternative investment strategies that can 
do so at a much lower cost. Theoretically CEA like CBA is 
a product of welfare economics and suffers from largely 
similar limitations.
The following are some of the steps to be followed in the 
assessment of these schemes using the CEA framework.
Step 1:
As these projects have all been started, except for a few 
that have started recently after 1980, it is important first 
to list all the objectives the state would like these 
schemes to achieve. Most of the objectives may appear
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contradictory or too ambitious. It is at this stage that 
the correctness, consistency and compatibility of the 
numerous policy objectives discussed.
S te p  2 :
The next stage is to identify the type of peasants that have 
been selected to settle on each scheme. The identification 
of the beneficiaries must be followed by the analysis of the 
criteria used by the decision makers in selecting the 
farmers. Of equal importance is to find out the plot sizes 
allocated to each family as this may have a bearing on the 
realization of some of the policy objectives, such as the 
increase in food output, or land pressure release. The 
average size of each family on the scheme has also to be 
known for reasons of labour supply and/or for other reasons 
relating to the main objectives.
S te p  3 :
An assessment of the flow of public subsidies to the small 
scale schemes as the main public cost outlay has to be 
carried out as well as the contribution by farmers. This 
assessment will be compared with the results of an 
assessment of public subsidies to the rainfed agriculture.
S te p  4 :
The benefits from small scale irrigation schemes computed 
from the values of the crops grown, by quantity, are 
compared with the values of the crops from the rainfed farms 
for a comparable land size.
S te p  5
The net incomes will be calculated, i.e., for the irrigation 
sector, by first calculating the net income "with" public 
subsidies and "without", and twa. d with
similar calculation for the rainfed sector.
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Step 6:
Assess the results' sensitivity to higher water tariffs, (in 
the case of irrigation) designed to recover fully the 
operation and maintenance costs. The results should enable 
us to tell whether in theory as well as in practice, the 
schemes as they are designed, can be charged the economic 
rate of water that would allow for cost recovery. It should 
be possible at this point to arrive at the optimal mix of 
plot size and yields that would become economically viable 
enough to exist without subsidies for operation and 
maintenance.
Step 7;
Using assets acquired as indicators of a rise in the 
standard of living, is not a very sound method, as it 
suffers form the analysis-boundary problem as well as from 
the presence of inheritance or extra incomes acquired 
elsewhere including from the extended family system. 
Nevertheless, a glance at the levels of these assets between 
those peasants on the schemes and those practicing rainfed 
agriculture would throw some light on the properties each 
system can afford the beneficiary.
Step 8;
Lastly, a checklist method should be used so as to see if 
the small scale irrigation sector has fulfilled all the set 
objectives at the least cost possible, compared to say 
rainfed agriculture or any other alternative investment 
programme designed to achieve the same objectives. For 
example, a system of intra-regional food transfer, between 
the wetlands suitable for food crop production and the dry 
but suitable areas for ranching. The food transfers option 
is looked at as a serious alternative, despite the fact that 
little is known about it and is recommended as an area for 
future research.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
It is very necessary that the analysis of the implications 
of the private and public investment policy and practice in 
water and irrigation be understood within the context of 
Zimbabwe's physical and historical socio-economic circum­
stances. This is largely because a historical input in this 
type of study lays bare past policies and practices that 
have helped shape present day investment policies and the 
structure of the water and irrigation industries.
Of the three main factors indicated above, the physical 
environmental factor lays out the available natural resource 
potential upon which public and private investment has taken 
place. The physical environmental resource base can be 
divided into three sub-sections, the interaction between 
which is a central factor to the development of bulk water 
supplies and of irrigation agriculture. The three 
sub-sections identified are the following:
1. The suitability of the country's relief or topography 
for the development of all types of irrigation schemes: 
Normally, flat or undulating plains, allowing for flood 
drainage, are considered as potentially suitable?
2. The wide-spread presence of suitable irrigable soils on 
the right topography, and in areas served by a good 
network of rivers;
3. And the existence of a rainfall regime that has the 
potential of supplying all the water required for the 
development of all potentially irrigable soil resources.
However, an understanding of the physical potential on its 
own is not enough to explain the direction development has 
taken over the years: This understanding can only be
achieved by analysing the socio-economic and political 
factors that have acted as major forces in the exploitation
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of the physical potential for the benefit of society. In 
the process of assessment, issues such as economic 
efficiency, equitable distribution of income, employment 
generations and land allocation, are discussed.
The chapter concludes by assessing the performance of the 
economy in recent years. Clearly, this information forms 
part of the picture of the country's resource base, and is 
indicative of the country's capacity to raise the required 
resources for investment in water and irrigation.
The Physical Resource Potential
Many countries, Egypt and Sudan among them, have come to 
take it for granted that irrigation agriculture is essential 
and its expansion imperative. This is particularly so where 
the potential for unaided rainfed agriculture is limited. 
Under the circumstances, the pursuit of irrigation 
agriculture has taken the form of massive investments in 
large scale reservoir development and large scale control of 
water for the achievement of higher crop yields over limited 
land surfaces.
In Zimbabwe the historical development pattern can be 
explained both in politico-economic terms and in physical 
deterministic terms. The variability of these attributes 
both in quantity and quality across space, makes the 
physical factors an important constraint, especially when 
the low capital formation in agriculture is taken into 
account. Since this variability in resource endowment could 
have far reaching implications on the spatial allocation of 
investment resources, it is essential that a brief outline 
of these factors is given.
Perhaps the most dominant and decisive physical factor is 
the relief or topography of the country. It forms the 
fundamental base upon which all other variables operate, and 
most crucially, it shapes the dam sites and determines 
rainfall patterns and soil structures as well as, to some 
extent, human activity and settlement preferences.
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Altitudinally, Zimbabwe can be divided into three broad 
physiographic regions as shown on Fig 3.1 (Kay1 1979), 
comprising the Highveld, the Middleveld and the Lowveld, 
each with different implications for both water and 
irrigation development. The Highveld (4,000 ft above sea 
level and over) consists of a narrow central land belt 
plateau stretching from the south-west of Bulawayo eastwards 
to the Mozambique border mountains of Nyanga and the 
Chimanimani ranges. The dominant feature of the veld is its 
general flatness and the fact that it forms the main 
watershed for rivers draining into both the Zambezi Basin in 
the north and the Limpopo Basin to the south. From an 
irrigation point of view, the resultant density and network 
of rivers has a positive effect on the potential development 
of bulk water storage reservoirs. On the Highveld itself 
there are a number of potential dam sites and a number of 
large dams for the supply of water to the towns and cities, 
have been constructed. The prevalent, high rainfall makes 
the construction of dams for irrigation purposes less 
urgent.
Skirting the Highveld on either side is the Middleveld 
(3,000 ft to 4,000 ft above sea level), a rugged and heavily 
dissected terrain whose southern slope is much sharper and 
abrupt than the gentler northern slope which forms a broad 
belt stretching towards the Victoria Falls on the Zambezi 
Valley. The escarpment zone between the Highveld and the 
Middleveld is both geologically, and in slope configuration 
terms, the most suitable, particularly on the southern 
slope, for the construction of medium and large scale dams 
because of the numerous gorges? but does not provide the 
right topography for irrigation land development due to the 
steepness of the slopes. This is clearly an excellent 
example where the potential for large scale water storage 
does not coincide in location terms with the right 
topography for irrigation development. This has direct 
implications for investment, where kilometres of expensive 
canals and pipes are required to carry water across
1 For detailed description of the physical Geography of 
Zimbabwe reference is made to George Kay? "Rhodesia, a Human 
Geography, 1970".
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difficult terrain and mountain ranges to distant irrigable 
soils. In some cases this implies the installation of 
expensive pumping facilities. Examples of this situation 
already exist, whereby the Lake Kyle, the Bangala Dam and 
Lake McDougal are supplying water to the Triangle and Hippo 
Valley Irrigation schemes tens of kilometres away through a 
combination of the run-of- the-river and canals across the 
Lowveld.
The remainder of the country is the Lowveld (below 3,000 ft) 
which consists of two distinct segments as Fig 3.1 shows; a 
narrow belt of land running parallel to the Zambezi River in 
the north, and an extensive area of low lying undulating 
terrain in the south of the country. In purely relief 
terms, the Lowveld, because of its general flatness is the 
most suited area of the country for irrigation agriculture. 
The area is also served by a myriad of rivers that pass 
through this area from the Highveld on their way to the sea. 
However, not all parts of the Lowveld are well endowed 
either with rainfall or with fertile soils. Having the 
correct terrain suitable for irrigation is only part of the 
requirements for a successful venture in irrigation 
agriculture. The soils have to possess irrigable qualities.
Generally, Zimbabwe's soils can be divided into three main 
groups on the basis of their geological parent material, 
which naturally has implications^*- fertility. Firstly, the 
dominant sandy soils are derived from the wide spread 
omnipresent deposits of granite; these soils are acidic, and 
have a very low moisture retention capacity, are very 
infertile, and can only produce crops under heavy constant 
application of fertilizers, making crop production very 
expensive. They are therefore not suitable for irrigation. 
The sandy soils are, however, interspersed with small 
occurrences of the intrusive rock-derived loam and clay 
loamy soils, which like the sandy soils, are not strictly 
suitable for irrigation. This is largely because these 
soils have structural defects and occasional infertility 
depending on the topography and climate of the area. They 
are nevertheless much more suited than the sandy soils, for 
rainfed agriculture; but can be developed for irrigation at
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very high cost. The long-term effect of using these soils 
for irrigation are as yet not fully known, although salinity 
and sodicity are suspected to occur in the long run. Most 
suitable for irrigation agriculture are the heavier 
paragneis and basaltic clay soils, which are characterised 
by a high clay content, good drainage, high levels of 
fertility and high moisture content. As shown on Fig 3.22, 
these soils occur as pockets in very few areas, but large 
blocks of them are concentrated in the southern Lowveld, 
between Tuli on the southwestern border with Botswana and 
the Mozambique border on the south east. Other much smaller 
pockets occur on the banks of the Mfuli River, in Dande and 
the Musengezi Rivers in the north.
The fact that these irrigable soils are so scarce and are 
partially concentrated in only one area of the country has 
had far reaching economic and political consequences, both 
in terms of the realization of a regionally balanced and 
equitable allocation of investment resources for irrigation. 
The nature of the rainfall regime in the area where these 
soils are found is so unsatisfactory that it has hindered 
their full use. Traditional land use in this area, has been 
extensive ranching. Only under irrigation can the soils be 
exploited for crop production.
The occurrence of important climatic variables of 
temperature and rainfall do not necessarily complement the 
location of potentially suitable relief and irrigable soils. 
A mean annual temperature map (Fig 3.3) shows that modest 
temperatures (below 20 degrees Celsius) are associated with 
the Highveld, while the highest temperatures (20 degrees 
Celsius to 30 degrees Celsius) are associated with the land 
below 3,000 ft above sea level, and this is largely the 
Lowveld and parts of the Middleveld. Mean annual rainfall 
distribution (Fig 3.4) shows a direct association of highest 
rainfall occurring in conjunction with the highest relief; 
and the lowest, with the lowest altitude. This means that 
generally rainfall intensity decreases from the north to the
2 A detailed geophysical analysis of the soils of Zimbabwe 
is in Phillips, "The Development of the Economic Resources 
of Southern Rhodesia", 1962.
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south, with the least rainfall (below 41 cm) falling in the 
southern part of the country, the area of good irrigable 
soils.
Although over two thirds of the country receive less than 
76cm (30 inches) of rainfall as shown on Table 3.1 the 
coincidence of the highest temperatures and the lowest 
rainfall in the southern lowveld has far reaching 
implications for irrigation. Firstly, the low unreliable 
rainfall with a checkered occurrence record of one bad 
season for every three seasons, as compared to one bad in 
five good seasons, in the rest of the country, means that 
continuous rainfed crop production is nearly impossible. In 
most areas it can only be carried out under high risk 
conditions, or together with a greater reliance on livestock 
keeping. Secondly, the high temperatures are responsible 
for high evaporation and evapotranspiration rates, which 
further reduce both the surface waters and the water 
available for plant growth, hence the prevalence of 
drought-resistant vegetation in the area. This increases 
problems of keeping enough water for irrigation and of 
avoiding salinity.
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show that, for both Chisumbanje and 
Middle Sabi, irrigation schemes in the Lowveld, when monthly 
evaporation rates are compared with monthly rainfall 
variations there is a disturbing relationship which shows 
that peak evaporation rates coincide with the peak rainfall 
period, which is also the hottest time of the year. It is 
also evident that for nearly every month, potential 
evaporation exceeds rainfall. This means that the Lowveld 
is a rainfall deficit area. The development of the 
irrigable soils would therefore depend on the intensity of 
the October-December thunderstorm rains on the Highveld. 
Although thunderstorm rainfall does not soak the ground, it 
is nevertheless intense enough to generate enough run-off 
that is then carried southward to the lowveld by the Sabi 
and Lundi Rivers and their tributaries. Since the rainfall 
is highly seasonal, coupled by high evaporation rates, plus 
the fact that of all the rainfall per season, only 6 percent 
is available as run-off (Kay 1970), it is imperative that
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these large rivers are dammed, in order to conserve most of 
the water. Storage has got to be in such large capacities 
in order to offset water losses by evaporation. It is 
therefore clear that the available water resources are much 
more limited than the available irrigable soils, and the 
Government has taken the view that the only way this 
imbalance can be corrected is through large scale expansion 
of public investment in bulk water storage facilities.
TABLE 3.1
RAINFALL DISTRIBUTION IN ZIMBABWE
RAINFALL (CM) PERCENTAGE OF
ZIMBABWE
Over 91 5.1
81 - 91 12.5
71 - 81 19.8
61 - 71 31.6
51 - 61 17.6
41 - 51 8.3
Under- 41 5.1
Source: George Kay, Zimbabwe, a human Geography, 1970
TABLE 3.2
THE NATURAL REGIONS
NATURAL REGION CHARACTERISTICS
I Covers 1.6 percent of the country, has
effective rainfall, everywhere above 60 cm. 
The region is restricted to the Eastern 
Highlands and its agriculture affected by 
altitude, and limited land for cultivation. 
The region is therefore suitable for tea, 
coffee and deciduous fruits, vegetables and 
potatoes as well as plantations of wattle and 
soft wood trees.
/
II Covers 18.7 percent of the country and has
effective rainfall above 50 cm. Dry spells 
and midseason droughts are infrequent and 
rarely severe. The region is suitable for 
intensive crop farming with subsidiary 
livestock enterprise.
III Covers 17.4 percent of the country. Rainfall
is moderate and effective rainfall is between 
41 cm and 51 cm. Midseason dry spells and 
droughts are common and often severe. This 
region is marginal for crops such as tobacco
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and maize but suitable for drought resistant 
crops. It is therefore suitable for
semi-intensive farming based on mixed 
livestock and crops, where livestock is likely 
to be dominant.
IV Makes up 33.0 percent of the country, and is 
the largest single region. Rainfall is 
between 35 cm and 45 cm. Seasonal droughts 
are severe, and midseason dry spells during 
the rainy season are common. Crop production 
is limited to drought resistant plants. The 
region is suitable for semi-extensive farming 
based on livestock ranching.
V Covers 26.2 percent of the country. Rainfall 
is too low (effective rainfall everywhere is 
less than 41 cm (16") and too erratic for 
reliable production of even drought resistant 
crops. This region is naturally suitable for 
extensive livestock ranching only.
X The last region, and covers 3.1 percent of the
land and consists of excessively broken 
country, where steep slopes and skeletal soils 
preclude any form of farming (regardless of 
any climatic conditions). The areas included 
in this region are flood plains, swamps, 
mountainous areas etc, and areas of poor 
soils, which are physically unsuitable for 
farming.
Sources: Derived from both Kay (1970) and Phillips (1962).
The foregoing analysis has helped in the identification of 
the potential physical factors of production and their 
location in space. From the point of view of land use 
planning, it is necessary to combine these three physical 
factors in order to determine the country's agricultural 
potential. Phillips (1962) has developed a land use 
classification, dividing the country into six natural 
farming regions as shown on Fig 3.7 (a) and (b) . The
characteristics of these regions are detailed in Table 3.2. 
Region I, although very small, has the greatest natural 
agricultural potential. This area plus Region II and to a 
lesser extent Region III are suited to crop production? 
however, together they form only 38% of the country. By 
contrast 62% of the land area occurs in Regions IV and V (as 
well as a small percentage under Region X), which according 
to Phillips (1962) are only naturally suited to extensive 
livestock ranching.
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Fig.3.7 NATURAL REGIONS OF ZIMBABWE.
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This form of classification only considers natural 
conditions, and as such it excludes the potential which 
could be realized under land improvement like in the case of 
irrigation. If actual agricultural development (in the 
absence of any intervention) were to follow the pattern 
dictated by the physical potential, one would expect that 
the structure and scale of agriculture today would reflect 
the limiting effect of the physical factors. In efficient 
resource allocation terms , crop producers would tend to 
compete for limited land resources in Regions I, II and III 
while livestock farmers would be concentrating on regions IV 
and V. However the history of Zimbabwe's land development 
has been shaped by many other factor other than her physical 
attributes, such as the social, technological and political
to
factors. It is therefore essential briefly^assess the 
role played by these factors and to highlight their 
implications for present policies and practice.
The Socio-Political and Economic Context
The history of public investment in water and irrigation 
agriculture, is in essence a socio-economic history of how, 
using sophisticated technology, Zimbabwe has sought firstly 
to influence higher crop yields through deliberate 
intervention in the works of nature, and secondly to use 
irrigation in the allocation, over time, of scarce land and 
other resources among its citizens. The main aim is to 
achieve equitable distribution of resources, in a country 
where over 70 percent of the population has always depended 
directly on the land for their subsistence. Clearly, the 
history of land distribution and the shift of political 
power between the blacks and whites is central to the 
understanding of policies that are affecting the structure 
and pattern of irrigation land use today. Without going 
into the details of land use history3, the salient features 
must be recorded.
The occupation of what was to become Southern Rhodesia in
3Riddel (1978) , Palmer (1972) and other contemporary writers 
present a detailed history of the land question in the 
context of the analysis of the history of Zimbabwe.
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1890, was a result of the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) mining ventures backed by the Colonial Office in 
London. Therefore, Company interests and those of thousands 
of other prospectors were paramount? overriding issues of 
equity or agricultural development. After the failure by 
the Company and the prospectors to find a 'Second Gold Rand1 
in Mashonaland, the Company, without jurisdiction, started 
offering land of the size of 2420 hectares to every white 
person who would settle as a farmer.
In the absence of a perfectly competitive land market to 
regulate the allocation of land between races, the Company 
used uneconomic factors such as racial bias and military 
superiority as the criteria for land allocation. As a 
result the first civil war (1894 to 1897) over the question 
of land led to the expropriation by the whites of all of 
Matebeleland except for two Native Reserves of Gwaai and 
Shangaani, within the philosophy of 'winner takes all'. By 
1913, this form of land allocation had seen whites gaining 
12 million hectares which included all the land above 3,000 
ft above sea level and within 40 miles of the railway line. 
In natural regions terms, this is the area covered by 
Regions I, II and III as discussed above. With the passage 
of time, the replacement of the Company as sole 
administrator by the first all-white settler government in 
1923, heralded the start of institutionalized racial 
policies in the legislative process? operating without the 
constraining influence of the Colonial Office in London.
Greater control by the white settlers of the national 
judiciary and the legislature resulted in the creation of an 
institutional framework strongly biased in favour of the 
emergent white nationalist class. Through a series of 
parliamentary acts, such as the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, 
the 1941 revision of the 1930 Act, the 1951 Land Husbandry 
Act, the 1963 Tribal Trust Land Act, and the 1969 Land 
Tenure Act, the state continued the removal of blacks from 
those lands whose natural physical qualities were regarded 
as good for European occupation. The physical qualities of 
land, soil and climate have thus played a central role in 
the actual expropriation and allocation of land between 
races as shown on Table 3.3.
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TABLE 3.3
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY NATURAL REGIONS BY 1979
Natural % of European Ha. % of African Ha.
Region Area (Million) Area (Million)
I 3 1
II 27 8
III 22 17
IV 26 45
V 22 29
100 18.2 100 18.
When the population of whites (650.000) and blacks (6.5 
million) in 1979 is considered, it is evident that, on 
average every white person had access to one hundred times 
as much land as every black person. The inequalities were 
exacerbated by the unequal natural productivity potentials 
of the land allocated to each racial group, and by the 
racial biases in public investment for infrastructure 
development. The great concentration of blacks on marginal 
land, produced many cycles of poverty, especially during the 
drought years when the land was least capable of supporting 
high human and animal populations. Given the poor land 
husbandry methods of the peasantry sector,arising from 
inadequate extension support and lack of government support, 
the implications of bad continuous cultivation of poor land 
Were progressive soil erosion, and the progressive decline of 
land and labour productivity?leading to increased poverty.
Historically, this in-built trend of reduced labour 
productivity and worsening state of poverty and other 
factors ensured an expanding supply of cheap labour for the 
mining, the urban and the white agricultural areas. Thus, 
the racial land laws, coupled by such segregationist laws as 
the 1936 Native Registration Act, the Pass Laws, the 1931 
Maize Control Act, the 1936 Job Reservation Act and the 
infamous 1921 Master and Servant Act, outlawed 
constitutionally any form of economic competition both in 
the productive sectors and in resource allocation between 
races. It was to take a 15 year civil war b e ^ r e
- it was possible to repeal the racial constitution.
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This racially divided society provides the context within 
which the policies determining public investment in bulk 
water supply capacity and the subsequent development of 
irrigation agriculture emerged. The investment policies 
were also characterised by contradictions and inconsis­
tencies arising in part from the administration's avowed 
intentions to maintain separate development between the 
races, and in part, from the need to appear to be 
championing the economic advancement of the black people.
For example, the first ever recorded African irrigation 
scheme developed by the Africans in 1908 with the help of 
missionaries at Mtambara in Manicaland, received the support 
of the Department of Native Affairs in Salisbury. Within 
this climate of government support acreage under irrigation 
rose from 33 acres in 1912 to 200 acres producing 400 bags 
(each 200 pound weight) of wheat by 1922. However, even on 
these early schemes, the number of peasants on each scheme 
was too large in relation to the irrigation acreage? each 
family received only l/16th of an acre, which failed to meet 
the subsistence needs of most families.
The Department of Native Affairs was impressed by the high 
crop output achieved by the use of cheaply obtained inputs; 
water from the Sabi River was gravity-fed into the canals 
and no money was spent on storage capacity development. Of 
interest too to the government was the potential population 
carrying capacity of irrigation agriculture and the state 
saw in it, the ultimate answer to the poverty, overcrowding 
and landlessness, that resulted from the racial land 
allocation:
"It is considered that a very great increase in 
irrigation works intended for settlement by natives 
should be planned for. There is no other way of 
settling agricultural communities at sufficient density 
for a large population to be absorbed in a limited area"
Source: Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Director of
Irrigation, Salisbury, 1949.
In line with this policy, the rate of forcible removal of 
blacks from designated white land increased (Roder 1965) and
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so did the rate of the development of the irrigation schemes 
designed for the peasants. The settlement of Africans on 
the Maranke schemes, in the Sabi Valley, for example, was 
carried out with full state financial and administrative
support 11........  in order to enable natives at present on
private land and crown land farms in the Umtali District to 
be accommodated in Maranki Reserve” (Roder 1965). Six more 
schemes were developed for similar reasons in the Sabi 
Valley, and between 1936 and 1945 many were developed in 
other areas such as Tsholotsho and Beitbridge in 
Matebeleland. But the introduction in 1945 of a water 
charge of 10 shillings (fixed) per farmer per year, forced 
many peasants to shift from food crop production to cash 
crops.
In the early 1920's, the success of these schemes had 
depended not only on the continued flow of public subsidies 
to cover the construction costs of canals and land
levelling; but on producers having access to urban markets. 
This position was to change after the Maize Control Act of 
1931 which prevented producers from selling in urban 
markets. For the period up to and beyond 1945 the 
combination of such laws and water tariffs led to large 
scale abandonment of the schemes by many peasants.
White farmers' interest in irrigation agriculture emerged 
during the enactment of the Maize Control Act. The 1927 
Water Act, by linking water rights to land rights, 
effectively terminated the efforts to develop irrigation 
agriculture amongst black peasant farmers who, because of 
the communal ownership system, had no individual rights to 
the land. They therefore could not individually or 
collectively apply for any right to water. In relation to 
commercial irrigation, public investment in water as shown 
by Fig 3.8 increased after 1927, and more so after the
Second World War. Initially the abandonment of schemes by
peasants did not reverse the policy preconception that 
irrigation was the only mechanism which would allow large 
numbers of people to subsist on a small area of land. The
government remained undeterred, and from 1936 to 194 6 it 
spent huge sums in developing schemes and offering them free 
to irrigators.
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No economic criteria were used to assess the viability of 
these schemes either measured from the macro viewpoint of 
rates of return on capital or from the micro considerations 
of whether the schemes would yield higher levels of 
subsistence to the peasants. This situation did not last 
long.
After the Second World War, public policy was influenced 
more by the attractiveness of large scale commercial 
schemes. Investment policy shifted from subsidizing peasant 
schemes towards the production of large scale water storage 
facilities, for large scale irrigation schemes. The 
Sabi-Limpopo Authority (now the Regional Water Authority) 
was formed in 1965 specifically to fully develop all the 
blocks of irrigable soils in the Lowveld for private 
investors. The policy shift towards large schemes was based 
on a number of assumptions and circumstances. For a start, 
the high demand for food and raw materials in war-torn 
Europe offered chances of a potentially secure market for 
such products as sugar, coffee, cotton and tea. At home the 
formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(1953-1963) offered an extensive domestic market for the 
expected high yields. The Federation ' s economic boom 
associated with Zambian copper exports created the excess 
capital resources needed for investment? and (given the 
strength of the economy and the attractive investment 
environment) policy makers were confident that many foreign 
investors would be attracted to invest in irrigation
t©
agriculture, and fully utilize the developed waterA
resources.
In order to attract both domestic and foreign investment 
capital, the state embarked on a policy of forward or 
upfront investment in bulk supply capacity. The dam 
construction rate increased rapidly as shown on the 
cumulative graph on Fig 3.8, almost all development 
occurring on European land? where it was safe from the 
problems of siltation. The rate of construction of large 
dams accelerated further between 1965 and the mid 1970's, 
partly because of the self-sufficiency based import 
substitution policies adopted in the wake of the Unilateral
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Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, and the 
imposition of comprehensive economic and trade sanctions by 
the whole world on Rhodesia. It is important to note that 
the factors influencing public investment in irrigation 
agriculture during this period, had very little to do with 
economic efficiency, or the need to achieve the optimal 
allocation of resources, but more to do with the survival of 
the UDI government. The result was that too many dams were 
built in the absence of any demand forecasting, and as such 
the investment was not directly linked to real economic 
demand for water, or to the cost of producing water.
On the block of irrigation soils in the south eastern part 
of the Lowveld, only three multinational agribusinesses, the 
Anglo-American (Hippb Valley Estates), the Hullets Ltd 
(Triangle Sugar Estates) and a consortium of the above two 
companies (Mkwasine Estates) were attracted. These were, 
and still are the only recipients of all the water from 6 
large dams (the Lake Kyle, Lake McDougall, Bangala Dam, Siya 
Dam, Esquelingwe Weir and Mushandike Dam). On the banks of 
the Sabi River, a small number of domestic private farmers 
has been attracted to the Middle Sabi schemes and to the 
Chisumbanje Estates. Elsewhere in the country, especially 
on the Highveld, many private domestic farmers were 
attracted into supplementary irrigation, after the 
government subsidized the construction of numerous small to 
medium size dams using the first Farm Irrigation Fund 
established in 1967. Huge volumes of water capacity have in 
the end served very few farmers. In a bid to induce 
greater farmer participation in irrigation, and greater use 
of the water, the state was forced to sell the water at less 
than the cost of producing it.
In the meantime, the Federation broke up, and with it went 
the perceived captive domestic market that was one of the 
inspiring factors behind the irrigation drive. The European 
market became saturated with the supply of the same 
commodities produced in Zimbabwe from other suppliers, and 
the result of this competition was the dramatic decline of 
all commodity prices? and except for occasional price 
windfalls, this market was no longer lucrative. The 15
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years of sanctions sealed off any market that ever existed, 
except that of South Africa and those countries who 
conducted business in violation of the sanctions. Earlier 
enthusiasm that had given birth to commercial irrigation 
seemed temporarily stopped in its tracks.
However, the shift in government investment policy and 
practice towards the commercial sector had another perceived 
advantage in that the state no longer needed to support 
peasant schemes in order to solve problems of landlessness 
and unemployment. Rather, the large scale schemes were 
expected to offer employment opportunities that would absorb 
large numbers of the landless peasants. This was made more 
possible by the absence of any meaningful automation in the 
country's entire agriculture industry? making human labour 
resources the motive force of production. Therefore, future 
resource allocation to small scale schemes was to be 
justified on economic grounds, and in direct competition 
with all other sectors of the economy for scarce investment 
resources. Because of this shift towards efficiency in
resource allocation, by 1979 only a handful of the small
scale schemes were still operational.
Except for those small schemes drawing water form the
perennial Sabi River, using the run-off-the river method, 
most other projects had failed? their viability being 
curtailed by many factors among which was the frequency with 
which the small multi purpose dams, (the predominant source 
of water for all purposes in the communal areas) dried up 
every dry season. This situation underscores the 
observation that historically, the distribution of effective 
irrigation capacity was and still is highly unequal between 
the races. The state firmly established a system of
irrigation infrastructural provision which favoured the 
indigenous commercial and multi-national agribusiness 
interests, at the expense of the small scale peasantry 
irrigation sector. An institutional framework was put in 
place (Fig. 3.9) to buttress this racial divide.
Fig. 3.9
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An assessment of the institutions and organisations can be 
very confusing because of the frequent changes in names, as 
departments appear and disappear or are amalgamated into new 
organisations in response to changes in the political set up 
of the time.
Attempts are however made here and wherever possible to use 
current names, except where an old name serves the purpose 
of shedding light on the current policy or practice. In 
relative terms, it is clear that commercial irrigation was 
served by a disproportionate number of public officials and 
departments as compared to the peasantry sector. This had 
created problems of policy coordination between departments, 
with insular departmental interests taking priority over 
sectoral considerations, as each department attempted to get 
as many resources as possible from the Treasury. Petty 
competition between institutions for scarce capital 
resources precluded the use of sound economic evaluation 
techniques for the range of potential investment projects 
and the consideration of alternative options.
For example, after the UDI, the irrigation department of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, exploited to the benefit of 
commercial farmers the governments import substitution 
policies, especially with regard to wheat-production, by 
asking for permission to set up a Farm Irrigation Fund, that 
constituted a maximum of 92% public subsidy to those farmers 
who opted for wheat production. The Treasury initially set 
aside Z$1 million to subsidize the construction of private 
dams on the properties of the consenting farmers, mostly in 
Mashonaland. The farmers were asked to pay an interest rate 
on a sliding scale of 1% in the first year to 8% by the 
eighth year and beyond? and this was at a time when the 
commercial lending rate (an approximate of the opportunity 
cost of capital) in the economy was as high as 10.5%. These 
practices reflected the department's preoccupation with 
self-legitimation, rather than the rational concern over the 
efficient allocation of scarce capital resources in the 
overall development of the country's agriculture.
Lack of coordination of development efforts between
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departments and between those organisations serving native 
interests and those serving white commercial interests had 
meant that neither economic efficiency nor equity had been 
served by the investment decision process. As a result, in 
economic terms, the marginal cost of producing water could 
not be related to the resultant marginal benefits, as should 
have been the case. Capital investment decisions were often 
taken without assessing the level of economic demand for 
water by farmers, or the extent to which existing capacity 
was efficiently utilized. Verbal pronouncements by farmers 
at the annual congresses of the Rhodesian Farmers Union 
(RFU) supported by both their parliamentary representatives 
and letters from the department of irrigation, and not the 
rational and well researched cost-benefit assessment of all 
competing investments, were often enough justification for 
the construction of new dams. Often, there was no 
evaluation of the extent to which subsequent private 
investment in irrigation agriculture and in distribution 
systems and other irrigation infrastructure would occur. 
Clearly, such private investment was crucial before the bulk 
supply capacity could be used to serve irrigation needs. 
Any use of public resources without reference to the above 
minimum requirements, could only represent irreversible 
misuse of scarce resources.
Until 1965, most of these schemes were not required to prove 
that they were economically viable, or that they provided 
higher levels of subsistence. In the case of the 
departments responsible for native affairs, freed from the 
need for economy by the wide use of public subsidies, the 
expansion of investment could only be curbed by limited 
Treasury allocations and not by the departments' conscious 
effort to ensure that limited resources were effectively 
used to produce greater subsistence benefits in a cost 
effective manner.
A number of factors were responsible for the uneconomic 
practices of most departments:
1. The emergence after 1965 of an "all out" irrigation 
policy in response to the import-substitution drive
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post-UDI under which all potentially irrigable soils and 
dam sites were to be fully exploited, meant project 
development was no longer curtailed by the need to 
satisfy any choice criteria. In other words, the 
implicit assumption was made that the benefits from any, 
and all, irrigation projects inevitably exceeded the 
costs. Cost-benefit analysis(and any assessment method) 
was thus an irrelevance. This approach to development 
ignored the reality on the ground of real investment 
resource constraints, and the rising financial cost of 
constructing and maintaining the dams and irrigation 
networks. By 1980, nearly 90% of all the dams required 
major rehabilitation and/or maintenance work.
2. The investment policy did not consider the fact that 
irrigation projects do not only produce benefits, but 
also impose hidden costs. The implications of these 
were glossed over in the climate of over expansion and 
excess capacity development.
3. Engineers dominated all the policy making structures of 
the water industry. They sought solutions to complex 
crop production problems by resorting to the 
construction of water supply facilities as the only way 
to alleviate crop failure and to stop the occurrence of 
drought impacts. The engineers did not consider as part 
of their operational terms of reference the need to 
come up with alternative solutions outside the 
engineering mode. The engineers did not, for example, 
promote efficient water application technologies that 
could have had the effect of reducing water waste, and 
by implication, the need for new dams. The agronomists 
in the agriculture departments promoted low cost water 
delivery methods, such as the use of unlined in-field 
canals, and flood irrigation method, all of which had 
adverse water use implications.
4. The Ministry of Water had no economist posts, nor did it 
see the necessity of creating any. Where economists 
were employed, as in the Ministry of Agriculture, they 
were used to justify irrigation projects decided upon on
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other criteria. Their job was to support the irrigation 
advocacy stance taken by Senior Ministry Officials and 
the political objectives, all of which had nothing to do 
with irrigation economics, but more to do with lobbying 
for more public subsidies on behalf of probably 
inefficient farmers.
5. At the Cabinet level, most ministers and 
parliamentarians were farmers or represented farming 
constituencies. In 1970 for example, nearly 3/4 of the 
Rhodesian cabinet comprised farmers or people who had 
close links with the commercial farming community. The 
then Prime Minister (Mr Ian Smith) had an irrigation 
scheme at Hippo Valley Estates in the Lowveld. Thus, 
the Cabinet and Parliamentary irrigation committees were 
dominated by irrigation advocates, so paralleling the 
USA experience of the 1950s and 1960s as reported by 
Hirschleifer (1960), McKean (1958), and Haveman (1965), 
where political back scratching precluded the need to 
achieve economic efficiency in the allocation of
investment resources. Davidson*s (1969) work on 
Australia shows a similar trend. In Zimbabwe, 
officials were, as a result, unwilling to increase the 
price of water for irrigation despite the fact that 
irrigation claimed 2/3 of all the stored water, citing 
very generously the numerous benefits from irrigation as 
justification. The domestic water use and electricity 
Sectors were therefore burdened with the repayment of 
all costs arising from investments in water.
6. Public officials in most departments did not, for
reasons to do with the preservation of their jobs, 
question, the politically determined allocation of
resources, in terms of whether this was the most optimal 
in meeting the requirements of either allocative 
efficiency, or distributive equity.
The continued use of uneconomic investment policies were 
buttressed by the apparent success of irrigation in
increasing the production of some crops. For example the 
country was changed from a net sugar importer to a net sugar 
exporter as shown on Fig 3.10, within a few years.
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Fig. 3.10
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Similarly wheat output expanded significantly thus allowing 
for a dramatic reduction in imports such that by the early 
1970s the country achieved self-sufficiency for a number of 
years. However, these benefits were only realised under 
conditions of public subsidy. Lack of public awareness and 
knowledge about what was happening in the irrigation sector 
meant that the tax payer could not complain about the 
potential and real misallocation of resources. In addition, 
the public was only too well aware of the effects of 
droughts to argue against official practice even if they 
were to have all the information.
The State of the Economy
Perhaps one of the most important factors (apart from 
political intervention) that has enabled the continued use 
of uneconomic investment policies, was the economy's ability 
to finance the expansion of irrigation programmes. As shown 
on Fig 3.8, the expansion in public investment in bulk 
supply capacity from 1965 on, and the introduction of the 
subsidy-based Farm Irrigation Fund, coincided with the 
period of high economic growth in real terms (Fig 3.11). 
Between 1965 and 1974 economic growth was on average 7 
percent per year, far outstripping the 3.5 percent per year, 
population growth rate for the period (World Bank 1983). 
This meant that there was excess capital resources in the 
economy available for investment in the dams. The 
phenomenal growth was in fact due to the Government policies 
that stopped overseas remittance of dividend capital in 
favour of re-investment of shares and dividends locally, 
thus boosting economic development. In addition, per 
capita income at 1965 prices rose from Z$157.5 in 1965 to 
a peak of Z$ 223.3 in 1974, before dropping during the peak 
of the war, to Z $166.5 by 1979. The rise in incomes (be it 
for a smaller percentage of the population) meant that the 
state was able to raise more investment resources 
domestically, through taxation.
Public investment in water development declined 
progressively from 1970 to 1979, perhaps because of the 
intensity of the civil war. However economic factors also
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Fig. 3.11
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played a role through the combined effects of high oil 
prices and world economic recession, worsened by the 
operations of the sanctions. These forces set economic 
growth into decline. Public expenditure on water and 
irrigation projects thus, had to be curtailed.
An economic upturn, which occurred from 1979, produced a 
1981 record economic growth rate of twelve and a quarter 
percent in real terms (four times higher than the population 
growth rate), and allowed the renewed rise in per capita 
incomes. A new government came into power in 1980, this 
recreated a favourable environment for renewed public 
expenditure with little regard for economy. It was at this 
time, that within the political context of correcting past 
racial investment policies, this time in favour of the 
peasants, that public subsidy-based investment in 
economically inviable small scale schemes was re-introduced. 
This was despite the fact that available evidence had shown 
that these types of schemes had failed to be self-supporting 
in the past. The new government had two evils it wanted to 
resolve quickly: the growing land squatting problem by the 
landless peasants, who had supported the war on the belief 
that the new government would nationalize all private land 
and give it to them? and the large numbers of returning 
residents, mostly former refugees, who wanted both 
employment and land. Small scale irrigation seemed the most 
suitable approach to addressing all these problems short of 
nationalising all the land. The rate of public investment 
in bulk capacity also picked up, and so too did general 
public expenditure, using funds generated mostly from donors 
at the 1981 Zimbabwean Conference for Reconstructional and 
Development (ZIMCORD) * in Harare, set up for the specific 
purpose of mobilizing resources for economic rehabilitation.
The seeds were thus sown for the current account deficit to 
rise (see Fig 3.12) from Z $110 million in 1979 to Z $300 
million by 1980, and to escalate to Z$ 780 million by the 
end of 1985. This uncontrolled pattern of public 
expenditure was bound to lead to economic bankruptcy, and by 
1983, the country had to resort to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s standby facility, to support budget 
difficulties.
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Government officials had embarked on high public expenditure 
generally, and on the expansion of irrigation in particular 
in the 1980/81 financial year, on the basis, and indeed the 
enthusiastic belief that the economy was to continue to grow 
annually until, at least the end of 1985, at the planned 
rate of 8 percent in real terms. It was also officially 
assumed that at that rate of growth the economy was going 
to be able to shoulder the burden of planned public 
expenditure generally, and in particular, that relating to 
water and irrigation development.
However, unlike the 1965-1974 period when positive economic 
growth lasted for nine years, this time economic growth, by 
1982/83 had fallen to minus 2 percent, a fall of 14 percent 
from the 1980/81 peak level, and far below the planned 
target of 8 percent. The economic position remained poor in 
1983/84, when the growth improved slightly to minus 1.1 
percent, and overall sectoral performance deviated from the 
planned targets, by wide margins . As Table 3.4 shows, 
agriculture's target growth rate was 5 percent but the 
actual achievement was minus.9.8 percent, a deviation of 
14.8 percent. Clearly, agriculture performed worse than 
other sectors of the economy.
The three year drought was blamed, among other reasons, for 
agriculture's depressed position. Gross earnings from 
individual food crops fell dramatically compared to the 1981 
position. For example, maize earnings fell by 55.7 percent 
in just one year to reach only Z $74.8 million by 1982/83, 
wheat fell by 34.5 percent to Z $27 million, and groundnuts, 
soya beans and sorghum together fell by 47.9 percent to 
Z$12.3 million. These are mostly the food crops farmers 
grow on irrigation schemes as well as under rainfed 
conditions.
By contrast, the high value cash crops, most of them grown 
under irrigation, experienced positive growth in gross 
earnings. For example, tobacco's earnings rose by 18.6 
percent to Z $184 million, cotton by 7.9 percent to Z $83 
million and sugar by 8.1 percent to Z $81.8 million. But 
these positive growth rates for the export crops were not 
high enough to generate enough resources for the continued
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TABLE 3.4
SECTORAL PERFORMANCE. 1982/1983
Sector Planned Actual Deviations
Target % Performance % %
agriculture 5 -9.8 14.8
mining 0 -1.6 1.6
manufacturing 11 -1.5 12.5
transport 9 -1.2 10.2
Source: Derived from the National Development
(Transitional) 1981-1984 , The Government of Zimbabwe.
expansion of water and irrigation facilities. In part this 
was due to exogenous factors, particularly those of the 
depressed world market prices, but also of importance was 
the high national debt servicing ratio which took 36 percent 
of all foreign earnings annually, as well as the continued 
failure by the government to maintain a healthy balance 
between imports and exports as shown on Fig 3.13.
The generally negative performance of the economy meant that 
the state had to resort to raising revenue for investment 
through indirect taxation, because net real incomes had 
remained largely static at the 1981 level over the period 
1981 to 1984 (Fig 3.14). The implications for continued 
public investment in bulk water supply capacity development 
and for the implementation of all the planned small scale 
irrigation schemes, is that public expenditure could not be 
funded solely from taxation-based resources. Thus the 
government sought to finance these planned investments from 
both domestic and foreign borrowings. Fig 3.15 shows the 
steep rise in borrowings for overall investment. It has not 
been possible, in the absence of data, to separate the share 
of the debt that is due to water and irrigation development. 
The size of the domestic debt has worrying implication not 
only for balance of payments and budget deficit management, 
but also for the availability of resources for investment to 
the productive sectors of the economy, namely industry and 
mining. The bunching of short-term loans over a period of 
four years following the ZIMCORD donor conference, has also 
come to mean that the resultant high debt servicing ratio 
swallows all net foreign exchange earnings.
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Fig. 3.13
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Fig. 3.15
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By 1986/87 the situation in the economy had not improved 
significantly.
It is against the above physical and socio-economic 
historical background that present investment policies and 
practices are assessed. In other words, given the 
foregoing, does irrigation represent the best, among other 
alternative investment strategies that maximize both growth 
and the equitable distribution of resources? Before any 
attempts can be made to answer these salient questions, it 
is imperative that, on the basis of available data, an 
attempt is made to assess the cost of developing the 
country's irrigation system.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION COSTS 
INTRODUCTION
As indicated in the preceding Chapter, it is officially 
taken as axiomatic that irrigation, in Zimbabwe, is 
necessary to raise agricultural productivity, and that the 
physical irrigation potential of the country should be fully 
developed. Further, it has become an accepted part of 
policy that the public should provide the initial, upfront 
investment in bulk water supply capacity. The assumption is 
that the scale of investment required to utilize all 
potential reservoir sites or river off-take points to their 
full capacity would be beyond the financial capabilities of 
individual private farmers. Moreover, the public provision 
of bulk supplies is seen as a means of encouraging the 
private sector to invest in the distributional networks and 
field systems required to realise the irrigation potential 
of the country. The orthodox approach to the role water 
plays in the internal development of a country's agriculture 
suggests that investment in its exploitation can act to
spread growth and prosperity both across space and down to
the poorest groups in society. The fact that this assertion 
is not based on any empirical evidence and cannot be
substantiated by practice, has not deterred or taken
anything away from this belief that has assumed a life of 
its own.
Historically, no Government in Zimbabwe has been content to 
let private interests entirely determine the development of 
a sector considered to be so vital to the functioning of all 
other sectors of the economy.
All the assumptions now so deeply embedded in the irrigation 
policy are questionable. In particular, there are many 
issues which need appraisal. First, is it correct to assume 
that all land which could benefit from irrigation should be 
developed for irrigation whatever the cost? Is the mere 
presence of water and irrigable soil in any place, enough 
justification for the development of irrigation agriculture?
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A similar question applies to the attempt to develop all 
potentially suitable dam sites into water reservoirs. This 
basically raises the question of whether irrigation 
potential should actually be measured in purely physical or 
economic terms.
The economic approach has been to regard irrigation 
development primarily as an exercise in resource allocation 
(allocative efficiency criteria) the objective of which is 
to maximize the economic output from available resource 
inputs (Hirschleifer 1960). Decisions regarding the 
exploitation of the physical potential, at any time and 
point in space, should, thus, be made in the light of 
information on the economic, and social contributions of 
irrigation agriculture. Irrigation potential can therefore 
be measured in terms of the opportunity cost of the scarce 
investment resources and other factors of production.
A second, but clearly related issue is the question of 
whether irrigation agriculture is the most cost-effective 
method of raising agricultural productivity in the country. 
This issue clearly cannot be treated separately from two 
distributional questions? cost-effective for whom? 
(government, commercial farmers, peasants), and the question 
of who gains from any productivity increase? Such 
distributive questions were raised in early economic 
attempts to assess the viability of irrigation projects 
(McKean 1958 etc) and by more recent writers on LDC 
irrigation (Carruthers 1981, Clark 1970). But in the 
practice of irrigation, these policy issues have been 
neglected in most countries of the world, and Zimbabwe is 
no exception. In the Zimbabwean context, such current 
neglect maybe surprising given the political ideology and 
overt policy aims of the post 1980 government.
Third, the assumption that the public sector should provide 
the initial investment in bulk water capacity development 
and infrastructural support to the farmers, needs to be 
assessed and not simply taken for granted, especially in the 
light of costs involved. Particularly so, since a number of 
the largest schemes effectively are providing water for one
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or two multinational agribusinesses, whose international 
turnover from all concerns, arguably exceeds the entire GNP 
of Zimbabwe, and are therefore capable of meeting all the 
costs associated with irrigation unaided.
The need for the assessment becomes all the more urgent when 
it is considered that the greater part of government's 
additional financial outlay is in the form of subsidies to 
defray the effects of high input costs? producer price 
subsidies to motivate farmers to stay in irrigation and the 
free provision of supportive infrastructural facilities such 
as roads, railways and airports as well as an array of 
technical support services through effective field extension 
and the establishment and running of research stations, all 
at public cost. In addition the state has established a 
credit institution specifically for the farmers, the 
Agriculture Finance Corporation, and specifically for 
irrigation, a Farm Irrigation Fund which provides 
low-interest rate loans. The points at issue here are 
basically whether such producers would have provided their 
own supply of capital completely without state aid, or with 
only part of the costs covered by the state aid, and if not, 
whether the resultant losses in agricultural output would 
exceed the value of the saved capital resources.
Finally, two questions must be asked: first, whether the 
absence of water is the only constraining factor in 
irrigation agriculture, and whether its provision is the 
only essential prerequisite for irrigation. Second, the 
question must be addressed whether upfront water capacity 
development has encouraged (and has been the most efficient 
method of encouraging) the development of irrigation 
agriculture and the subsequent distribution of the benefits 
in the economy.
An economic assessment of the state's involvement in private 
commercial irrigation would require the evaluation of the 
stream of all costs including the subsidies incurred by the 
public sector, against the resultant benefit streams, with 
the benefits measured in terms of the public sector 
criteria. In the real world of poverty and
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under-development, especially in the LDCs, public sector 
criteria are characterised by the desire to achieve several, 
possibly incompatible objectives, at the same time. In
to
Zimbabwe it is common for the state simultaneouslyAwant 
private agricultural producers to operate in a manner 
consistent with efficiency, equity, etc plus a whole host of 
other economic and political objectives such as increasing 
national prestige, achieving regional and political 
stability and unity etc. The fact that some of these maybe 
recognized to conflict makes them no less desirable as 
objectives.
In fact a full analysis concerned with resource use 
optimization in the economy as a whole needs to consider the 
costs which must be incurred by both the public and private 
sectors, before the water has any effective use value. Such 
an evaluation is not an easy task, and is made more complex 
in Zimbabwe by the openness of the economy in trade terms. 
A considerable proportion of the industrial inputs are 
imported at very high foreign exchange cost, and in addition 
profits are remitted directly or transfer-priced to overseas 
shareholders and parent companies respectively. Because of 
the dominance of foreign agribusiness in the irrigation 
sector, the output from the sector yields benefits to 
overseas concerns. From the state*s point of view private 
sector costs are only relevant when measured in terms of 
opportunity costs to the economy, by which is meant, the 
foregone value of returns on investment in other (more) 
productive enterprises within the economy. This involves, 
at least in theory, the assumption that resources spent on 
irrigation could have been spent profitably somewhere else 
within the economy. While this assumption may be valid for 
the indigenous private companies and individual farmers, it 
cannot be valid for foreign multinational agribusiness. As 
the multinationals would not re-invest the saved costs or 
profits within the local economy, the analysis of the 
efficient allocation of investment funds between the state 
and the private sector becomes that much more difficult to 
ascertain.
The range of public cost outlays is not limited solely to
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storage capacity development, but tends to permeate the 
entire irrigation agriculture production process as earlier 
indicated. Outright subsidies mean that the irrigation 
sector is shielded from market realities. The fragmented 
manner in which the plethora of public support measures are 
implemented, through the numerous institutions serving 
irrigation agriculture, hinders full automatic grasp of the 
scale and magnitude of state expenditure on the sector. It 
is therefore important that an attempt is made to try to 
group all state costs before any discussion of the benefits 
from this cost outlay.
Public Cost Outlay
Public Sector Investment (PSI) in commercial irrigation 
agriculture can be expressed as a function of a number of 
cost outlays, as shown below:
PSI = f(CO + OMR + CSP + ICS + CSM + FC + ISS + Ir) tn
(I + r) tn
Where:
Co - represents the initial capital cost outlay required
for the construction of dams, canals, tunnels and 
a whole range of related fixed capital assess such 
as pumping stations and water gauging machinery, 
most of which have a substantial foreign exchange 
content.
OMR - represents all the annual operation and maintenance
and replacement costs of the dams and reticulation 
systems to the edge of the field, as well as cost 
over-heads, such as the cost of the numerous water 
bailiffs, and in addition, the upgrading, repair 
and rehabilitation costs.
CSP - Represents the Commodity Support Price subsidies
that the government pay as direct subsidy in order 
to influence the choice of crop and scale of 
output, annually. This cost outlay is associated 
with the crop pricing policies of the government,
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and manifests itself in the producer price, or the 
consumer price subsidy. CSP is associated with 
public policy objectives of either food 
self-sufficiency or reduction of food prices, on 
behalf of the poor section of society.
ICS - Represents the Input Cost Support measures aimed
at reducing the cost of production by lowering the 
costs of inputs required by farmers, as a way of 
keeping the prices of the final product low, and is 
also aimed at increasing the incomes that farmers 
realise. This form of subsidy is closely related 
to the CSP above. The major inputs are 
fertilizers, machinery and seeds.
CSM - Represents the Credit Support Measures that the
state sets up in order to make sure that farmers 
have access to cheap loans and other credit 
facilities. The Government's cost outlay here 
comprises the setting up of an exclusive farmers' 
credit institution such as the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation, and occasionally the writing off of 
the farmers' bad debts, as well as setting up of 
the Farm Irrigation Funds, as facilities for the 
expansion of irrigation at reduced cost to the 
farmers. These institutions can only operate under 
State guarantees against bankruptcy.
FC - Represents the feasibility study costs associated
with public investment in capacity extension. 
Because they represent a substantial cost outlay 
and are not recovered from the farmers, there is a 
need to assess them as a cost in their own right, 
given that they have a high opportunity cost 
element.
ISS - Represents the numerous cost outlays for the
Infrastructural Support Services that the state 
continues to finance in order to influence 
production systems, marketing, technology and the 
movement of goods and services. Among these
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services, Research, Extension and Transport have a 
great impact on irrigation agriculture.
IR - Represent the interest cost on all borrowings for
irrigation agriculture. As most of the cost 
outlays are met from borrowed funds, borrowed 
either on the domestic or the external money 
markets, most of these funds attract high interest 
rates with long repayment periods. The state pays 
the interests.
(1+r) - Represents the discount factor for the assessment
of the present values of the future cost outlays 
of the given costs streams.
tn - Refers to the time stream of each cost stream or
variable for the given number of years.
The Capital Cost Outlay
The Colonial Government of Rhodesia constructed nearly all 
the large scale dams for the benefits of the private 
commercial irrigation sector (Chapter 3) alone. 
Surprisingly, the new Government's investment outline in the 
nation's irrigation agriculture (Table 4.1) for the period 
1984/85 to 1986/87, shows that it too has accorded greater 
priority to the continued growth of the private domestic and 
foreign corporate agribusiness in the irrigation sector. 
While the Rhodesian Government could, on the basis of their 
policies, afford to channel a lot of resources towards 
commercial irrigation farmers, all of them white, the 
present Government, as per its pronounced policy of 'Growth 
with Equity' had to be seen to be aiding the peasantry 
sector. Certainly Table 4.1 does not show any departure 
with the past on the basis of the period covered by the 
figures.
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TABLE 4.1
PROPOSED MEAN PUBLIC CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
(1984/85 TO 1986/87)
$'000 %
Peasant Schemes 9,994 23
State Farm Schemes 803 2
Private Commercial 32,786 75
43,583 100
Source: derived from the World Bank working paper, 1984
The Colonial Government could also afford to construct many 
dams for the commercial irrigation farmers because the 
construction costs were low compared with the post 1980 
costs. According to the data and information collected from 
both public and private institutions involved in irrigation 
agriculture, the costs of dam construction and irrigation 
works have increased considerably during the last decade, 
more so since 1980, when price inflation for irrigation 
works reached 1.5% to 2% per month. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of the World Bank's 1983 study 
of the agriculture sector. Using the Mwenje Dam Raising 
project, as an example (Table 4.2) it has been possible to 
show this price evolution.
TABLE 4.2
THE COST OF RAISING MWENJE DAM
1970 1974 1980 1981
in $'000 (in money terms) 626 
Index: real 1970 = 626
1,050
794
3,310
1,155
5,000
1,425
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS' PRICE INCREASES
1970 1974 1980 1981
Index = 100 
Annual % increase
266
13
319
20
519
34
Source: Derived from the World Bank, Agriculture Study,
1983
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Clearly, the phenomenal increase of the cost of the 
construction materials at real 1970 prices, has largely 
been responsible for the cost escalation of nearly all 
recent dams. This implies that the unit cost of producing 
a cubic meter of water has risen considerably since 1980, 
compared to the 1960 and 1970s. This is more evident when 
the unit cost of producing water before 1980 is compared 
with that for the post 1980 period for dams of a similar 
capacity as Table 4.3 shows.
For example, the unit cost of producing a cubic meter of 
water at total capacity of Tende Dam ($0.01939) is over 29 
times higher, at 19761 prices than that at Lake Kyle 
($0.000660). Likewise, for smaller capacity dams of broadly 
similar total capacity, there is some evidence of higher 
unit cost at new dams than at old dams. For example, the 
unit cost of producing one cubic meter of water at Bindura 
Dam ($0.09237) is 30% higher than at Turgwe/Siya Dam 
($0.06404), at 1976 prices.
But the assessment of the unit cost of water using total dam 
capacity is always misleading, particularly so in drought 
prone Zimbabwe, without considering how much of the capacity 
is utilized at different times. Given the erratic nature of 
Zimbabwe's rainfall regime, all the huge dams like the Kyle, 
Tende, Mazwikadei, Bangala, Mukorsi, Manyuchi, to name a few 
(Table 4.3) will not fill up to capacity in less than five 
seasons.
If rainfall is consistently above average, these dams would 
fill to capacity in at least three seasons, and the smaller 
dams like Mwenje and Mkwasine, would require a full season 
and half to fill depending on the size of the catchment 
area. In addition, after every dry season or drought, the
1 The calculation of the 'real value' capital costs at 
1976 prices was based on inflation rates of 25% (1984), 18% 
(1983), 15% (1972), 12% (1981), 10% (1980), 9.5% (1979), 9%
(1972), 8.5% (1971), 6% (1970), 7% (1969), 7.5% (1968), 6%
(1967), 5% (1966), 8% (1965), 8% (1964), 7% (1963), 9%
(1962) , and 10% (1961) . 1976 is chosen here as the last year
for the construction of all old dams.
TABLE 4.3 THE UNIT OF PRODUCING WATER: A COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW PAHS
O L D  D A M S
COST/M3 COST/M3 COST/M3
YEAR DAM TOTAL CAPACITY YIELD CAPACITY TOTAL COST TOTAL COST TOTAL CAPACITY YIELD CAPACITY
m3m m3nr $ $ $/m3 $/m3
(At 1976 Prices) (At 1976 Prices) (At 1976 Prices)
1961 Kyle 1,378,100,000 247,000,000 2,950,180 9,089,946 0.000660 0.036802
1962 Bangala 126,600,000 100,000,000 4,641,594 14,301,441 0.112962 0.143010
1966 Manj irenj i 274,400,000 103,000,000 3,806,488 8,210,886 0.029924 0.079718
1976 Turgwe/Siya 105,400,000 55,000,000 6,750,000 6,750,000 0.06404 0.122727
TOTAL 1,884,500,000 505,000,000 18,148,262 38,352,273 0.0203512 0.0759445
N E W D A M S
COST/M3 COST/M3 COST/M3
YEAR DAM TOTAL CAPACITY YIELD CAPACITY TOTAL COST TOTAL COST TOTAL CAPACITY YIELD CAPACITY
m3 m3 $ $ $/m3 $/m3
(At 1976 Prices) (At 1976 Prices) (At 1976 Prices)
1984 Mazwikadei 360,000,000 100,000,000 44,720,000 13,875,620 0.0385433 0.1387562
Est. Bindura 87,000,000 50,000,000 25,900,000 8,036,194 0.09237 0.1607238
Tokwane 122,000,000 53,000,000 20,000,000 6,205,554 0.050865 0.117086
Tende 1,200,000,000 168,000,000 75,000,000 23,270,827 0.019392 0.135168
Mukorsi 1,727,000,000 348,000,000 75,000,000 23,270,827 0.013475 0.0668701
Manyuchi . 325,000,000 70,000,000 27,000,000 8,377,489 0.025777 0.1196785
Mkwasine 24,000,000 15,000,000 12,000,000 3,816,416 0.159017 0.254428
Mwenje 40,700,000 23,000,000 5,000,000 1,551,388 0.038118 0.674516
Silverstroom 17,500,000 10,000,000 6,400,000 1,985,777 0.113473 0.198577
TOTAL 3,903,200,000 837,000,000 291,020,000 90,390,101 0.023158 0.107993
Source:Derived from field data
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dams take longer to fill up. Every year, for example, by 
September, all the nation's dams are usually less than 3 0 
percent full, and lower in drought years.
Apart from the fact that dams rarely fill to full capacity 
in any one season, there is also the problem of high 
evaporation rates (Chapter 3) . A high percentage of the 
dams' capacity is lost through evaporation. This is more 
critical in the Middleveld and Lowveld where most of the 
large irrigation schemes and dams are situated. In some 
years losses of up to seven meters per dam are experienced.
In the absence of any measures to reduce water loss due to 
evaporation,the actual economic water stored behind any dam 
is far less than the full capacity figures suggest. The 
water loss situation is not helped by losses during 
reticulation arising from seepage losses, pilfering and from 
the water that forms pools half way between the dam wall and 
the down stream farmer.
The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and Development 
has also built into the dam capacity assessment, a certain 
percentage to cater for supply security risks. On the basis 
of the 'threat' to this supply security the Ministry, 
instituted water use management or outright water rationing 
measures in order to prolong the 'life' of the supply. All 
these measures and the factors discussed above have shown 
that there is need for caution in the assessment of the unit 
cost of producing water on the basis of full capacity
figures. The fact that the capacities of all these dams are
far larger than the real water stored in them, could be 
responsible for the evident high supply risk aversion of the 
Ministry responsible for water. Very often this is a
response to the overstated demand that the farmers exert on 
the water supply system.
Evidence has shown that nearly all farmers display the
propensity to overstate the quantities they require during 
their application for water rights. The difference between 
the water right quantities and what farmers actually use is 
substantial.
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Clearly, in the assessment of the unit cost of producing 
water, there is, therefore, a need to consider the real 
economically useful yield, as this is what is actually 
traded or sold to the farmers. In Zimbabwe, this capacity 
is referred to as yield capacity. On the basis of yield 
capacity it is clear that the amount of useful water 
available is far less than that shown on Table 4.3. Of the
1,884,500,000 cubic centimeters of water of total capacity 
produced by old Dams* only 505,000,000 cubic meters, or 27% 
is useful yield capacity, less than a third of the total 
capacity. The situation is even worse in the case of 'New 
Dams', where useful yield capacity is about 20% of total 
capacity. This of course implies that the Government has 
to attempt to recover all the capital costs and supply costs 
from only a relatively small volume of water; thus markedly 
increasing the real unit cost/price of water. In practice, 
it is unlikely that Government will be able to recover all 
costs fully. On the basis of yield capacity, the unit cost 
of water for Lake Kyle for example, is 56 times greater than 
the unit cost calculated from total capacity figures. For 
the more costly 'New Dams' the use of yield capacity raises 
the average unit cost from $0.023158 to $0.107993, a rise of 
79%, at 1976 prices.
A closer look at the individual dams will show that there 
are marked variations between dams. Clearly, all small dams 
(old and new) tend to show a sharp increase in the unit cost 
of water, when yield capacity is used. However, the small 
'New Dams' such as Mwenje, Mkwasine and Silverstroom, show 
substantially higher unit cost figures. The yield capacity 
is thus used throughout the study instead of total capacity, 
because it is the yield capacity that is traded, and forms 
the basis for the recovery of costs, and the basis for the 
tariffs charged.
The generally high cost of new dams at 1976 prices, tends 
to support the hypothesis that as most easy-to reach first 
choice sites have already been developed, the development 
of new, geologically less attractive sites will increase 
construction costs. But there are several other factors 
involved. First, the policy of using too many foreign firms
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instead of the domestic construction firms, has not lowered 
costs. It would normally have been cheaper to use domestic 
construction firms, except for a number of factors. 
Discussions with local and foreign contractors indicate that 
local firms are unable to compete against foreign firms for 
a number of reasons including the fact that earth moving 
equipment and general construction equipment owned by local 
private contractors are over 15 years old and totally 
depreciated and most have a $1.00 value on the books of 
accounts. Replacement costs are very high and spares are 
difficult to get because of the problems of foreign exchange 
shortages, and when they are available, the addition of the 
23% sales tax, makes the local retail price far too high. 
Against this background, the profit margins realised by the 
contractors are insignificant. It is only natural that 
local firms charge high costs. The combination of rising 
inflation, high customs duties (70% of purchase price) for 
all imported equipment and the deteriorating value of the 
Zimbabwean dollar against a basket of currencies of 
Zimbabwe's main foreign trading partners, has made it 
difficult for the contractors to recover all their costs 
from the contract fees.
The use of foreign contractors could have had the effect of 
reducing construction prices considerably if these were 
allowed to bring in their machinery, equipment and spares, 
without paying high customs duties. In the event that they 
are all required to pay duty, (for reasons of short-term 
revenue requirements), the contract price foreign 
contractors charge, therefore, differs from those charged by 
local contractors marginally. Clearly, if it were not for 
such considerations as the fact that donor funds are usually 
tied to the use of foreign contractors from the country 
giving the aid, it would not matter who does the dam 
construction work, on the basis of the cost.
Second, before independence, the Department of Water 
Resources and Development used to construct most dams 
in-house. In 1980, there was a massive exodus of almost all 
the highly skilled and experienced white engineers, most of 
whom emigrated to South Africa and other countries. Skilled
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construction manpower has been in short supply since. At 
present nearly 30% of the engineers in the Ministry are 
expatriates on short term contracts. At the end of 1985, of 
the Department's 70 established engineering posts only 40 
were filled, and this situation has prevailed as far back as 
1983. Given the low salary scales of Government, the 
Department is not only faced with the impossible task of 
attracting engineers to join it, but of preventing the few 
it has from leaving for the private sector where attractive 
employment conditions exist.
Third, the legislation, in 1980 of fixing the minimum wage 
level and the subsequent increases of this wage from $34 per 
month in 1980 to $158 per month by 1986 for all unskilled 
workers has affected badly many labour intensive industries. 
Most employers argue that since these minimum wages do not 
reflect the opportunity cost of labour, these wages 
represent an undue taxation of the employers. This has also 
been responsible for the increasing cost of constructing new 
dams. Given that the country is currently experiencing high 
unemployment rates, the high minimum wages has been blamed 
by many analysts for the low level of labour absorption in 
the economy.
While Table 4.3 shows very high construction costs for new 
dams both at 1984, and 1976 prices, these figures by no 
means tell the whole story, and they are only a fraction of 
Government's involvement in upfront water supply capacity 
provision on behalf of the private commercial irrigation 
farmers. For example, most of the dams will be connected 
by very long costly canals and reticulation systems, 
depending on location of the irrigable soils upstream, or 
downstream, away from the dam. For example, to the cost of 
Tokwane Dam of $20 million must be added $18 million for the 
50 kms of the Tokwe/Lundi canal linking the dam to the 
Triangle and Hippo Valley irrigation schemes. To the cost 
of Manyuchi Dam of $27 million (1984 prices) must be added 
$62 million for the 100 kilometers of the Rutenga canal. 
Many new dams will need to be connected to the end user 
right to the field edge, and in a number of cases the canals 
will require the installation of costly pumping stations to
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boost the flow of water over long distances. This is 
largely because the new dam sites are increasingly remote 
and difficult terrain from the block of irrigable soils.
While the unit cost of producing water for different sizes 
of dams shows that large dams are less expensive than small 
dams, the central issue is not the amount of money spent but 
whether these cost figures are what the nation would 
consider a reasonable price to pay for water required for 
irrigation. In a nation where the policy on water 
development is based on supply risk aversion, the least cost 
supply or cost minimization strategy has not even been 
considered as an option. Availability of money and not the 
cost, would seem to be the central constraint. Up to now no 
potential dam site has been rejected because of the high 
cost of construction.
The over-emphasis on supply issues has lead to the neglect, 
both at the policy and practice level, of water demand 
management. Water requirements for irrigation are never 
seen as being caused partly by the farmer's wasteful water 
use practices. Solutions have therefore never been sought 
through the institution of water management practices. This 
omission is amazing for a drought prone country. The 
farmers are not given the full indication of what it costs 
to satisfy the demands they put on the water supply system. 
In fact, the recent blanket or 1postage-stamp' price of $12 
per 1,000 cubic meters for all dams (new and old) in the 
country serves to give wrong signals to farmers, and may 
well promote demand for water, that will be difficult to 
satisfy without a significant effect on the economy.
A closer look at what the farmers themselves are prepared 
to pay for water is used here as a rough bench mark to show 
how many of the dams already built come close to the unit 
cost the farmers are willing to pay, if they are to remain 
profitable. The willingness-to-pay by farmers around the 
Mazwikadei Dam, as expressed in their letter to the Ministry 
for Agriculture, of $30 per 1,000 cubic meters is used in 
Table 4.4 as the reference price and a guide to what could 
have been charged. All the dams are therefore assumed to be
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supplying water to farmers whose willingness to pay is $3 0 
per thousand cubic meters. The farmers drawing water from 
these dams are assumed to be wheat farmers whose 
profitability would suffer if the price of water rises 
beyond $30.00 per thousand cubic meters. When yield 
capacity is used for both Tables 4.4 and 4.3 at 1976 and 
1984 prices respectively, it is clear that the government 
does not take into consideration the farmers' willingness 
to pay, when planning investments into water
TABLE 4.4
FARMERS' WILLINGNESS TO PAY COMPARED TO WATER PRODUCTION
COST
Dam Total
Capacity
m3106
Yield
Capacity
m3106
Total
Cost
m3106
Unit Cost 
Farmer's 
Preference 
m3106
Actual
Unit
Cost
m3106
Mazwikadei 360 100 44,7 0.03 0.4472
Bindura 87 50 25,9 0.03 0.5180
Tokwane 122 53 20 0.03 0.3774
Tende 1200 168 75 0.03 0.4464
Mukorsi 1727 348 75 0.03 0.2155
Manyuchi 325 70 27 0.03 0.3857
Mkwasine 24 15 12 0.03 0.8000
Mwenj e 40 23 50 0.03 0.2174
Silverstroom 17,5 10 6 0.03 0.6400
Total 837 291,02 0.03 0.3477
Source:Derived from field data
supply capacity extension. It is clear that none of the 
dams on Table 4.4 would gualify for consideration on that 
criterion. It follows therefore that since the government 
produces water at far higher cost than that the farmers are 
prepared to pay, the water produced must be sold below cost.
The scale of the loss arising from selling water below cost 
only becomes clear when the government's uniform water 
tariff of $12 per 1,000 cubic meters is compared with the 
unit cost of water on Table 4.4. Since the government's 
charge of $12 per 1,000 cubic meters is far lower than the 
farmers willingness to pay, the actual unit cost the
losses to the state are in two forms? namely a loss in 
relation to the sale of water from the dams (for example, in
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the case of the Mazwikadei Dam the loss is up to $435 per
1,000 cubic meters of yield capacity)? and since most dams 
are constructed using roughly 90% of loan money, the tariff 
set by government may well mean that for most dams the money 
spent on them will not be recovered in their life span 
through water sales. The state*s argument for setting a 
uniform charge of $12 per 1,000 cubic meters, is the belief 
that since the $12 is higher than the charge for all old 
dams, these dams would compensate for the losses from the 
low water price from all new dams. The subsidy built into 
the price also means that because the needs for future 
replacement and capacity extension are not built into the 
price, the state will have to continue to find more money 
for all future investments into dams, including increased 
borrowings from commercial sources.
Foreign loans contracted by the government (Table 4.5) for 
the purposes of building dams, is usually of two types:
TABLE 4.5
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LARGE SCALE DAMS
Foreign
Donor
Loans 
$ million 
at 1984 
prices
Interest 
Charges per 
Year 
%
Mazwikadei Italy 44,72 10.85
Bindura West Germany 25,9 9.00
Tokwane Italy 20,0 6.00
Mukorsi Yugoslavia 75,0 2.5
Mkwasine Saudi Arabia 12,0 5.0
Chisumbanje World Bank 10,4 9.5
Source: project Documents, 1984
The commercial loans, such as those from the World Bank, 
will always attract higher interest payments than those 
incurred through bilateral agreements, such as those from 
Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia. Most bilateral loans have a 
low interest charge because part of the loan is transformed 
into a commodity Import Programme (CIP), a method of making 
available to Zimbabwe foreign exchange for the importation 
of donor-identified and supplied capital goods. However,
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many of the advantages of the low interest charge are lost 
because of the very short loan-repayment period and the tied 
nature of the imports. Obviously the short repayment period 
does not allow sufficient time for the dams and the schemes 
to begin to produce economic benefits and to repay the 
loans.
The repayment of both commercial and bilateral loans imposes 
high opportunity costs on the economy. Firstly, repayment 
cash flows have to be generated by other sectors of the 
economy, since irrigation agriculture requires too long a 
lead time before it can realize its financial and economic 
potential; more over in most cases viability is never 
realized. Secondly, public supply of irrigation water to 
farmers does not necessary lead to the success of irrigation 
agriculture. The presence of water alone is not enough to 
assure profitability. Certainly, the farmers* ability to 
meet other equally important costs such as the cost of 
irrigation machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, infield 
reticulation canals, labour and transport costs, have a 
direct effect on profitability. Thirdly, in 1984, a paper 
from the Commercial Farmers Union on irrigation, concluded 
that for established farmers, the highest cost of providing 
water without becoming bankrupt, was $5,000 per hectare, and 
for those entering into irrigation for the first time, up to 
$3,800 per hectare, a view supported by World Bank surveys. 
But when the hectares to be irrigated by the dams on Table 
4.5 are added to the analysis, it is clear from Table 4.6 
that supplying water to each hectare costs not less than 
$10,000. It is therefore clear that substantial amounts of 
extra subsidies are needed by the farmers.
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TABLE 4.6
COST OF SUPPLYING WATER PER HECTARE
Dam Capital cost Hectares Cost/Hectare
$ Million Served $
Mazwikadei 44,7 3,000 14,906.67
Bindura 25,9 300 86,333.33
Tokwane 20, 1,575 12,698.41
Mukorsi 75,0 5,000 15,000.00
Mkwasine 12,0 700 17,142.86
Chisumbanje 10,4 400 26,000.00
Source: Project Documents 1984
The foregoing assessment has clearly shown that public cost 
outlays for the development of water represent, the 
p e v m c i n v - ;<atAcr>, of huge scarce financial 
resources into irrigation without a hope of ever recovering 
them fully, resources that have a very high opportunity cost 
as most of the money is borrowed at high interest rates. 
How far the government can pursue this line of investment 
into the future may well depend on the availability of 
viable alternative investment opportunities else-where in 
the economy.
The government's policy assumes that all private farmers and 
foreign agribusinesses involved in irrigation agriculture 
have neither the ability nor the capacity to shoulder alone 
all the costs associated with commercial irrigation. The 
flaw in this assumption is that while there maybe a number
fco
of individual farmers genuinely unable fullyA pay the 
cost of irrigation, as shown by the costs above, it ignores 
the fact that the agribusinesses involved have other 
extensive profitable business concerns within the country 
and elsewhere and therefore have the capacity to meet the 
cost of irrigation. For example, the Anglo-American 
Corporation, apart from being one of the big sugar producing 
companies in Zimbabwe, is also involved in forestry and gold 
mining concerns in nearly every country in Southern Africa 
including the profitable gold mines of South Africa. Such 
a company has in principle the capacity and the capability
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to cross-subsidize its failing concerns from those that are 
doing well. Experience and practice elsewhere however shows 
that companies like Anglo American are unlikely to do so.
Supply Capacity and the Pricing Policy
Empirical evidence has shown that in many countries of the 
World, the charges made for irrigation water are well below 
the costs of producing it (Carruthers, 1981 and Davidson 
1965). The experience of Zimbabwe is not different. The 
neo-classical argument is that if the price of water to the 
farmer exceeded the marginal cost of producing it, full 
economic utilization is likely to be prevented. Likewise, 
if the price charged was far less than the marginal cost of 
producing water, the misuse and misallocation of water would 
result as would a misallocation of resources in the economy 
as a whole.
It can be argued, at least in theory, that productive 
resources employed in producing new water supply capacity 
will be expended prematurely and non-optionally if supply 
extensions are provided when the costs involved exceed the 
value of the additional water to the farmers. By assuming 
that the price farmers are willing to pay for water is a 
true reflection of its value to them, premature investment 
can theoretically be avoided if water prices were based on 
the marginal supply costs.
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FIG. 1
THEORETICAL SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN MARGINAL PRICES
THEORETICAL SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN MARGINAL PRICES
P3
L.M.C.
Pz
S.M.C.
Pi
YXo
Existing capacity
Quantity of Water 
Source: Rees, 1978 (Unpublished PHD thesis)
Where:
DI,D2,D3 = Demand Curves for water at different periods 
of time, say DI = year 7, D2 = year 10 and D3
= year 15. This movement outward over time is
expected to be typical as farmers expand and 
become wealthier and are willing to take more 
water at all price levels.
S. M. C. = Short-run-marginal cost curve. This will be
low and will not increase until the limits of
Q.C*
existing capacity are approach^ when it will 
rise steeply becoming vertical at full 
capacity.
L. M. C. = Long-run-marginal cost curve, or the cost of
providing additional supply capacity.
With reference to Fig. 1 above, it is theoretically possible 
to set the unit prices of water below the long run supply
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cost while existing capacity is under utilized. It is also 
advocated that as full capacity (O-X) is approached the 
price of the last water units taken by each fanner should be 
increased to cover the full cost of the next extension to 
capacity. This means that the unit price of water should 
be set at the long-run-marginal supply cost (p2) and should 
increase over time to reflect changes in the cost of 
developing additional water facilities.
When, for example, (0-Y) supply capacity was required the 
water price would need to be (P3) to cover the costs 
involved. Only when it is ascertained, that the farmers are 
willing to pay these long-run supply costs is capacity 
extension economically justifiable. Until then, the price 
rises would theoretically at least, control demands within 
available supplies.
Although this study does not specifically assess the demand 
for water by individual farmers it is clear that if existing 
needs can be served adequately from developed capacity, 
there would be no need to use price to control usage, and 
the price of the water, could theoretically remain between 
PI and P2 for reasons of revenue generation. However when 
total demands are increasing over time, the continued use of 
short-run marginal cost prices would inflate the apparent 
need for investment in capacity. For example, given this 
price level farmers would demand 0-Y units of water by year 
15 (D3). This quantity can only be provided at a unit price 
P3, and if farmers had to pay this cost price, their demand 
and needs would in fact be met from existing capacity. In 
other words, it is possible by increasing prices to the 
level which reflects the costs of new capacity before 
investment actually takes place, to ensure that extra 
supplies are not provided prematurely, before farmers are 
prepared to pay the costs involved.
The savings that, at least in theory, could be generated by 
such judicious use of the price mechanism to postpone the 
need for additional investment could then be used in 
providing other goods more highly valued by the farmers, as 
well as by the economy as a whole. In Zimbabwe, prices of
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water have not been based on the above model, and have 
historically been very low in line with the need to recover 
low historical costs of capacity provision. No special 
reference is made to the obvious differences in costs 
between old and new dams, and the price would seem to be 
arbitrary. As already discussed above, while the price 
represents a reasonable rise in the price of water for old 
dams from an average price of $7.59 per 1,000 cubic meters 
to $12 per 1,000 cubic meters,it is however a gross under 
pricing of water from costly new schemes. For all new dams, 
the difference between the present official price of $12.00 
per 1,000 cubic meters and what should have been the 
economic cost of water (Tables 4.3 and 4.4) is the public 
price subsidy to farmers as shown on Tables 4.7.
It is also clear that the level of subsidy is very high per 
103m3. When the Department of Water Resources Development's 
own tariffs based on historical accounting2 are compared with 
the official price of $12 per 103 m3, with the exception of 
Mukorsi Dam, the level of subsidy is equally high, over 
three times the original rate even considering the lowest 
level.
The water pricing policy has ignored the need for the 
mobilization of surplus capital required to meet both the 
requirements of repaying the capital and raising revenue to 
meet replacement and capacity extension. What has, and 
still continues to be ignored, is the need to produce, 
through water sales, greater revenue necessary to contribute 
towards debt servicing. The low water price would seem to 
confirm the findings of Davidson (1965), in Australia, and 
Hirschleifer (1960) in the USA, where like in Zimbabwe, the 
Government has refused to treat irrigation water like a 
normal economic good despite the high costs involved.
2The formula used in the calculation of the historic 
cost tariffs is: Water tariff = annual repayment and
operation and maintenance costs for 20 years + half % 
contract cost + $300,000 divided by 10% risk factor (yield 
capacity).
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TABLE 4.7
PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY PRICE SUBSIDY TO FARMERS
Dam Total Cost 
$ Million
Yield Capacity 
103 m3
Original 
cost of Water 
$/103 m3
Mazwikadei 44.72 100 447.20
Bindura 25.9 50 518.00
Tokwane 20.0 53 377.40
Tende 75.0 168 446.40
Mukorsi 75.0 348 215.50
Manyuchi 27.0 70 385.70
Mkwasine 12.0 12 800.00
Mwenj e 5.0 23 217.40
Silverstroom 6.4 10 640.00
Dam Historic Cost 
Tariff
$/103 m3
Government 
Flat 
Rates 
$/103 m3
Public
Subsidy
$/103 m3
Mazwikadei 76.12 12.00 435.20
Bindura 81.11 12.00 506.00
Tokwane 49.06 12.00 365.40
Tende 37.50 12.00 434.40
Mukorsi 18.10 12.00 203.50
Manyuchi 44.79 12.00 373.70
Mkwasine 104.00 12.00 788.00
Mwenj e 46.74 12.00 205.40
Silverstroom 97.20 12.00 628.00
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
A precedent has long been set, buttressed against major 
changes by the restrictive rigid water righting system 
(Water Act, Chapter 41, 1976), which attached the right to 
water to property (land) in perpetuity. This has come to 
mean that there is no effective possibility of creating a 
water market, as the enshrined protective water rights have 
prevented the emergence of a price-led competitive water 
demand market. In fact, the system serves to prevent the 
entry into irrigation by new farmers.
However, in the real world optimizing water tariff in 
relation to cost of production is no guarantee that from 
an overall national view point marginal cost pricing is 
efficient. The prohibitive prices associated with the 
marginal cost pricing could, in effect, arrest development
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completely, as individuals are unable to raise the high 
initial capital.
Despite the distorting effects of subsidies, they are widely 
used in practice. While the Government of Zimbabwe has the 
legitimate right to use subsidies for specific policies, the 
seemingly indiscriminate wide-scale use throughout the cost 
structure is worrying. It is also questionable whether this 
practice necessarily achieves growth or equity.
The revenue-generation problem caused by the low price 
becomes all the more clear when problems of operation and 
maintenance are considered. As most of the dams discussed 
above are new, no real substantial operation and maintenance 
costs have been spent on them at this stage. The analysis 
is therefore on older systems like those under the Regional 
Water Authority.
Operation and Maintenance Cost Outlays
Recurrent operation and maintenance finance is the most 
scarce resource, and unlike investment capital, it cannot 
generally be obtained as aid or as cheap loans. Indeed, 
large capital projects can exacerbate the recurrent finance 
allocation problems in two ways: Because of limited
financial resources engineers have been unable in most 
cases, to construct expensive, but technically sound dams 
which would have the effect of reducing future operation and 
maintenance costs to a minimum? the other problem arises 
from the use of very expensive technology which is beyond 
in-house capacity when it comes to repair and maintenance. 
Moreover, empirical evidence (Carruthers 1981) shows that, 
operation and maintenance, once starved of funds and 
equipment, become a low prestige area which has difficulty 
in attracting resources and retaining high calibre staff.
In Zimbabwe, like in most poor countries, the desire has 
been to develop high capital cost gravity supply systems 
which have low recurrent costs. This reflects the awareness 
of the difficulties involved in obtaining aid for recurrent 
costs. This effort has been frustrated by the need to
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instal pumping engines that have very high recurrent 
resource requirements, at the head of these canals , because 
of the long distance covered by reticulation canals. 
Therefore, while operation and maintenance costs are usually 
of minor importance to water capacity projects in the 
developed countries, they assume a much more significant 
role in poor countries.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis has treated capital as the 
most scarce resource (Maas et al 1962, Major 1977 and Little 
and Mirrlees, 1974), and has assumed that operation and 
maintenance costs are minor items of expenditure. While it 
remains true that investment capital is still a very scarce 
and a crucial factor constraining Less Developed Countries' 
(LDCs) development programmes, empirical evidence (Blackie 
1984, Carruthers and Clark 1981) now shows that operation 
and maintenance costs are no longer insignificant items in 
the irrigation cost budget. In fact, the success and or 
failure of LDC irrigation programmes is clearly related to 
the availability of resources needed to operate and maintain 
schemes.
In Zimbabwe, the fact that in most cases operation and 
maintenance costs have not been fully met from the proceeds 
of water sales (because past water prices were far below 
even the recent flat rate of $12.00 per 1,000 cubic meters), 
has had far reaching implications. After subsidizing the 
capital cost the state has had to subsidize operation and 
maintenance costs, at very high cost.
Table 4.7 above, shows in column five the water tariff that 
would have been required by the Department of Water 
Resources Development, if cost recovered in historical 
accounting terms, was to be achieved, taking both capital 
costs and the operation and maintenance requirements into 
account. Clearly, diversion of scarce financial resources 
through payment of subsidies towards the operation and 
maintenance of dams and canals that otherwise would have met 
their own cost obligations, involves high opportunity 
costs. Although the government cannot normally borrow from 
abroad to offset the effects of operation and maintenance
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costs on the current account of the budget, its internal 
borrowings from domestic finance houses and banks for this 
purpose inevitably implies the withdrawal of much needed 
resources from other sectors of the economy.
During the 1960s and 1970s, it was rare for any analysis of 
capacity provision to include adequate depreciation 
allowances. Irrigation and water projects were costed in 
historic cost terms in order to meet short-term revenue 
requirements, and no surpluses were accumulated to replace 
capital facilities. Inevitably many of the early dams are 
now in need of costly overhaul, including dredging and 
measures designed to curb the increasing problem of 
siltation, replacement of pumps and canal relining. These 
unavoidable costs are increasing at a time when the 
1982-1984 drought has instigated a capacity extension panic 
among the policy makers that has resulted in the hurried 
construction of the costly dams discussed above.
Thus operation and maintenance costs have been rising 
rapidly over the years. For example, in 1981/2 alone, the 
Regional Water Authority3 spent over $3.6 million operating 
and maintaining its three river systems? the Mtilikwe, the 
Chiredzi and the Sabi. This amount represented 90 percent 
of the Authority's internally generated annual income of 
$4.8 million for 1981/82. In fact, in that year, the total 
revenue of $980,000 was collected from water sales in the 
Chiredzi system, but $1,494,000 was spent on operation and 
maintenance, so resulting in a deficit of $514,000. The 
Sabi River System realized an operating surplus of $476,000. 
The situation is unlikely to have improved significantly, 
even with the 1985 price increase to $12.00 per 1,000 cubic 
meters.
The level of deficits indicates that revenue generation 
through water sales is inadequate, and cannot even fully
3 The Regional Water Authority is the sole authority 
charged by Government to develop the South-Eastern part of 
the country for private commercial irrigation, and is 
responsible for operating the five huge dams supplying water 
to the area, through the three river systems of Mtilikwe, 
Chiredzi and Sabi.
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cover operation and maintenance costs, let alone allow some 
repayment of the initial capital investment. As a result
t o
the state has resorted penodicallyA boosting the
financial position of the Regional Water Authority by 
granting it low interest long-term loans. For example, in 
1981/82 the loan amounted to $20,712,672 (Table 4.8).
TABLE 4.8
REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY1S CAPITAL STOCK. 1981/82
Source of Revenue Amounts $ % of Total
Government long-term loan 20,712,672 72
Other loans 3,272,674 11
Authority's Revenue 4,775,914 17
TOTAL 28,716,260 100
Source: Regional Water Authority Project Documents, 1982
It is clear that the operations of the Authority are heavily 
subsidized by the state, as the Authority is most of the 
time operating a deficit account. As a parastatal, the 
Authority has to pay an interest rate of nine and half 
percent for loans from government, in line with other 
parastatals. This rate, though higher than the rate
government is charged for some of the foreign aid that flows 
into the country, is nevertheless lower than the domestic 
commercial lending rate of 13.9% which government has to pay 
when it raises loans internally. Thus, the government, when 
passing on such loans to the Regional Water Authority, is 
providing a subsidy. As such subsidies have become a 
permanent phenomenon their long-term implications both for 
the national budget and the clearing of the budget deficit 
are worrying.
Fig II, III and IV show cost trends in the three water 
systems over the last ten years for the major variable items 
of expenditures such as pumping costs, salaries, wages for 
unskilled and repair workers. The figures employ indices 
which take 1974/75 costs as 100. An exception to this is 
the Sabi System which only started operating in 1978/79. 
For all the three systems, the trend was one of rapidly
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increasing operation and maintenance costs, although 
individual systems show some variation in the way each cost 
item has behaved overtime. For the Mtilikwe and Chiredzi 
systems, the combination of pumping and gravity-fed water 
reticulation systems plus the several tens of kilometers of 
lined canals mean that manpower is used intensively, so 
ensuring that, wages and salaries are the major cost items. 
By contrast, the river-based Sabi System incurs greater 
expenditure on the repair of the pumping stations, the 
canals and the night storage dams.
As the pumping engines are imported, their repair depends 
on the importation of both spare parts and costly technical 
services. As a result the repair-costs represent, the 
highest cost variable. For all the Systems, figures for 
1983/84 and 184/85 were not available. It is likely that 
the missing figures would confirm the above trend.
Overall, the increase in the cost of labour, especially 
unskilled labour is directly related to the introduction, 
in 1980, of the statutory minimum wage, a wage widely 
believed to be far higher than the opportunity cost of that 
labour. In 1983, the opportunity cost of unskilled labour, 
based on seasonal peasantry production was estimated to lie 
between $120 and $200 per year compared to the minimum wage 
of $780 per year. Pumping costs were obviously affected by 
the rise in oil prices, and if the current real term decline 
in oil import prices is maintained,it is expected that 
pumping costs for the oil-based pumping stations will 
decline from 1985. However, unfortunately electricity 
charges have risen by over 70% since 1980 partly because of 
the rise in the importation of Zambian electricity, and 
partly to recover the $780 million invested on the recently
Fij
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Bl (RIVER-BASED) SYSTEM: OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS 
1978/1979= 100
Repairs
Pumping
Salary
Wages
•General cost100 116 131 197 271 oftrend
I I I T" “ 1
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83
:Derived from Assessment of field data
128
Fig. Ill
THE CHIREDZI (DAM AND GRAVITY-BASED) SYSTEM: 
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
900 -
800 -
700 -
600 -J
500 “
400 1
300 -
200 1
100 -
1974/75=100
Wages
Salary
Repairs
General cost 
424 479 of trend165 174 234 293106100 114
I I I I I I 
1974/ 1975/ 1976/ 1977/ 1978/ 1979/
75 76 77 78 79 80
1980/ 1981/ 1982/ 
81 82 83
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
129
Fig. IV
THE MTILIKWE (DAM & PUMPING-BASED) SYSTEM: 
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
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opened second coal-fired Power Station at Hwange. These 
costs will continue to be high for the electricity driven 
pumping stations.
In addition to the cost outlays so far discussed the state 
also incurs substantial expenses on behalf of the commercial 
farmers in the area of credit and other inputs as well as 
the price incentives built into the producer prices.
Public Investment in Infrastructural Support Services
The state is indirectly incurring extra costs on behalf of 
irrigation through research, extension services and credit 
support facilities, marketing and transport services. 
Irrigation agriculture stands for a host of costs over and 
above the capital costs, which, if they are not in place, 
would render all the capital assets obsolete. The level of 
provision of these supportive services as a back-up package 
determines, to a large extent, the level of success of 
irrigation agriculture.
Clearly private and public benefit streams could not be 
expected to flow solely from the provision of dams. To be 
effective irrigation agriculture requires a whole range of 
additional support services, which can only be provided at 
a cost. The state has, over the years gradually accepted 
the responsibility for a considerable proportion of such 
costs. Inevitably, these increase the effective level of 
public subsidy to private irrigation agriculture. The point 
at issue is that although these costs, like all other costs, 
have been rising, at least in financial terms, there has 
been no attempt to recover these, wholly or in part, from 
the farmers themselves.
The cost of research has been increasing over the years. 
For example, it rose from $1.2 million in 1979/80 to $1.8 
million by 1980/81 (World Bank 1983) , this represents a real 
term rise of $384,000 or 32 percent. This trend of cost 
increase in real terms is believed to have continued beyond 
1985, although there is no data at present at a sufficiently 
high level of disaggregation to support this contention.
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However, it is known that enthusiasm for commercial 
irrigation has been re-kindled in association with the 
establishment of the Farm Irrigation Fund (FIF) and 
research into ethanol, palm oil and rice cultivation trials. 
The research costs quoted above do not include the salaries 
of research staff, some of which are expensive expatriate 
staff. If the salary cost variable were to be included, 
public cost outlay for research would increase 
substantially.
Part of the reason for the increasing cost of research has 
to do with the great number of research stations that have 
been set up, and the degree of specialization which each has 
sought to attain. As a result, separate research stations 
have been established for each of the major crops? examples 
of these include the Tobacco Research Board, the Cotton 
Research Institute, the Seed Maize Research Association and 
the Zimbabwe Sugar Association. Moreover, a number of 
stations have been developed which are specific to 
individual irrigation schemes; such as the Chiredzi Research 
Station, the Middle Sabi Station and one at Chisumbanje. 
Since government resources are scarce and are not 
specifically set aside for irrigation, their use to support 
research has to be measured against the opportunity cost of 
the resources in their alternative uses.
When it comes to extension services, there has been a marked 
demand for such services. This is largely because all 
commercial irrigators, commercial rainfed cultivators and 
the peasant farmers, require this service. Therefore, more 
resources are needed to train and equip extension services 
staff. As irrigation greatly increases land use intensity 
in addition to the high degree of crop specialization, more 
extension staff are required, than under rainfed 
agriculture, to serve the same acreage of land. For 
example, one extension officer is required for every five 
farmers using irrigation, as compared to one extension 
officer for 60 commercial rainfed area farmers, or one 
extension officer for 10,000 peasant farmers under dry land 
cultivation. The expenditure involved in service provision 
also includes transport costs, spare parts, staff housing,
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training and equipment.
The state is also involved in the provision of foreign 
exchange for the importation of crucial inputs such as 
fertilizers, tractors and other forms of machinery for which 
irrigation is a major user. These are then provided at a 
much lower price than the farmers would have to pay if they 
faced the open market individually. The state implements 
these price reduction measures by either exempting imported 
farm inputs from paying customs duties, or by instituting 
price control measures requiring that the prices of selected 
inputs would not rise above set price mark-ups. Although 
these supportive measures affect all farmers including the 
rainfed based farmers, irrigation benefits more than other 
crop producing sub-sectors of agriculture because of the 
much higher level of use or application of these inputs. 
Although no data is available for the determination of 
public capital outlay for this item of expenditure, it is 
however considered to be high.
In the area of credit facilities, apart from the 
irrigation-specific Farm Irrigation Fund, discussed below, 
the government has established the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) specifically to lend money to farmers at 
reduced interest rates (8.7% per year, payable over 50
poLtcw)
years, since 1981). ThisArelieves farmers of the necessity 
to approach commercial banks for all their loan 
requirements, which would attract an interest rate of 13.9% 
per year. The AFC has often, on the advice of the 
government, written off the bad debts of many farmers, or 
allowed debt rescheduling for farmers who failed to meet 
their debt obligations following say a drought year, or when 
international prices are particularly low and are adversely 
affecting profitability.
Public subsidy expenditure also occurs in the form of the 
provision of transport facilities. Zimbabwe's agriculture 
generally suffers from transportation bottle necks, 
especially in the movement of large volumes of crops to both 
the domestic and foreign markets, and the movement of inputs 
(fertilizers, insecticides and machinery) to the farmers.
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The problem is obviously accentuated by the fact that the 
country, being a land locked state, is connected to the 
ports by lengthy rail and road networks that pass through 
hostile territories, and thus are open to sabotage, as well 
as delivery delays of 6 months to a year. Within the 
country, of all the groups of farmers the private commercial 
irrigation farmers would seem to be by far the most 
favoured. For example, the Triangle-Hippo Valley irrigation 
complex is linked by rail to all major cities and has access 
to the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo, and to all 
South African ports either by rail or by all weather roads. 
Moreover, between Triangle and Chiredzi there is the Buffalo 
Range Airport, the third largest airport in the country, 
which was specifically developed to serve the irrigation 
area. In the same way, the Middle Sabi and Chisumbanje 
areas have reasonable accessibility, being linked both to 
Mutare and Harare as well as to Triangle by all weather 
roads, and with the recent expansion of the Chisumbanje 
irrigations schemes, the railway line is to be extended from 
Chiredzi to Chisumbanje.
Because the provision of these transport services was 
originally specific to irrigation agriculture, it is 
important that these public costs are included in the 
assessment of the overall public outlay for the commercial 
irrigation schemes.
The Farm Irrigation Fund
The costs to the government of providing water and other 
services to the private commercial farmers are compounded 
by the state's provision of low interest loans to these 
farmers, aimed at reducing their costs. For this purpose, 
the state has set up, under the Audit and Exchange Act, 
Section 30 of the Agricultural Finance Corporation Act, the 
Farm Irrigation Fund (FIF) (Chapter 168 of 1984). In pure 
cost-benefit terms, the provision of these cheap resources 
arising from the low interest charges on loans, is normally 
ignored in the assessment. The practice is to regard these 
cheap resources as mere transfers of income or purchasing 
power within the economy, and not a direct resource cost,
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ignoring the high opportunity cost of the resources in the 
economy.
However, in Zimbabwe, the above theoretical position does 
not apply with regards to irrigation. The use of the Fund 
involves real economic costs. As already mentioned above, 
most inputs into irrigation (tractors, combines, fertilizers 
and insecticides) are imported, and the payment for these 
inputs either by the government on behalf of the farmers, or 
directly by the farmers borrowing from FIF, in foreign 
currency, represents an economic cost in opportunity cost 
terms. Since the Fund is built up from both domestic and 
foreign borrowings, the repayment of these borrowings 
constitutes a real resource cost to the nation. At the 
national level, the cheap loans associated with FIF have a 
powerful impact on the distribution of wealth and income. 
As such, they have to be assessed, so that their impact to 
both the losers and beneficiaries is measured. More 
critical is the fact that they introduce inefficiency in the 
investment of scarce resources, distorting product prices 
and the farmers' demand for inputs, so resulting in a 
general misallocation of national resources.
The Farm Irrigation Fund was set up with the specific 
purpose of promoting commercial wheat production, although 
other crops produced in rotation with it also benefit. The 
problem besetting wheat production, arises from wheat output 
failing to keep pace with domestic demand. This has been 
viewed by Government as a physical issue created by the 
inadequacy of inputs and by the limited acreage under the 
crop. It was never regarded as a problem probably caused 
by the artificial rise in consumer demand stimulated by 
subsidized consumer prices, nor was it ever seen as a 
product of the employment of inferior production technology 
or the generally low per hectare-yields (4.5 tons/hectare) 
compared with yields in other countries like Britain 
(approximately 7 tons/hectares). Solutions were not 
therefore sought in these areas, but in the expansion of the 
acreage under cultivation, using the same old production 
approaches, resulting in the upsurge in the demand for water 
supply capacity needed to service these new areas.
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The commercial Grain Growers Association, in a paper to the 
then Ministry of Agriculture, argued in defence of the need 
for the state to set up an interest rate subsidy, on the 
grounds that high interest rates of 13.9 percent were one of 
the main factors inhibiting private investment in irrigation 
agriculture, and in wheat production in particular. In 
response to this the Farm Irrigation Fund set up. a 30% 
interest subsidy for the first ten years, with farmers being 
charged 9.75 percent per year only, and then reverting to 
the market rate of 13.97 percent thereafter. The aim to 
make the FIF into a revolving fund has so far not been 
successful. The expected inflow of foreign grants and 
softer loans have fallen short of expectations, and of the 
initially assessed strength of $96 million (1984 project 
documents), only $32 million (33%) was raised by the end of 
1986, most of it from overseas loans with a short term 
repayment period or as suppliers credits. Already, some 
farmers have defaulted in their debt obligations following 
the poor rains and low yields of the 1985-1987 harvest, 
further depleting the resources of the Fund.
The value of the Fund has also depreciated considerably in 
line with the continued decline of the dollar against the 
international basket of currencies. For example, the value 
of the Zimbabwean dollar fell against the United States 
dollar and the British pound from US$0.91 and sterling 0.62 
respectively in December 1983 to a low of US$0.58 and 
sterling 0.36 by January 1987, a fall of 36% and 42% 
respectively. The main contributory factor was the 
International Monetary Fund*s request at the end of 1983 for 
a 40 percent devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, which was 
followed a year later by a further 40 percent devaluation 
associated with the 1985 Export Revolving Fund. During the 
same period domestic inflation increased in response to 
increased wage demands and price increases that followed the 
devaluations. The Fund's purchasing capacity in the 
domestic market has therefore deteriorated markedly within 
two years, and requires a lot more injection of resources to 
build it to its planned 1984 strength, and then to maintain 
the 1984 purchasing power. If extra resources are not 
found, it is possible that the 1984 planned 10,000 extra
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hectares or 50,000 tons of wheat per year required to meet 
self-sufficiency, would not be realized.
The Farm Irrigation Fund Subsidy and Wheat Self-Sufficiency
Three investment scenarios are developed below, using cost 
figures got from the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands (1984 
prices) to illustrate the different choices open to a farmer 
borrowing from the Fund, and the implications of that 
choice, 'for the governments objective of wheat 
self-sufficiency in the next ten years. Table 4.9 figures 
are based on the assumption that 125 farmers will borrow 
from the Fund annually, that each farmer will develop 80 
hectares.
TABLE 4.9
THE COST STRUCTURE OF THREE TYPES OF SCHEMES BORROWING FROM
THE FUND
Variables Total Low Average High
Hectares Cost Cost Cost
Scheme $ Scheme $ Scheme $
Cost of Dam 80 80,000 150,000 220,000
Equipment 96,000 136,000 184,000
Engineering Fees 11,200 177,250 22,900
Electricity 3,100 5,600 8, 000
Total 190,300 308,850 435,900
Cost per hectare: $/Ha 2,379 3,861 5,436
Source:Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, 1984
On the basis of the figures on Table 4.9, if a farmer chose
the scheme with the least cost per hectare, that choice
would represent a preference for a low capitalized
production process, that is, too small a dam, which is
unlikely to last any dry season let alone a drought. This
would mean that half the time the scheme would have to lie
idle, and this would raise the costs to the farmer for the 
time he is out of production. This would be an 
uncompetitive choice, and if producer prices are not raised 
high enough, the farmer taking this choice would be unable 
to pay his debts, especially if there was a drought, 
assuming of course that the scheme is his only source of
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livelihood. For the government, if all the farmers were to 
go for this choice, the 10,000 hectares per year target 
would be more difficult to realize both in the short and 
long term, and the self-sufficiency objective would continue 
to recede.
However, while the choice of the average and high cost 
schemes would allow such an objective to be met, at the cost 
of $3,861 and $5,436 per hectare respectively production is 
likely to be unprofitable and therefore such schemes are 
unlikely to be undertaken even with the loan subsidies, and 
this outcome becomes all the more plausible when all other 
costs are added to the fixed costs on Table 4.9. Only a
handful of farmers would be attracted, far less than the 125
expected by the government, and clearly the target hectarage 
per year could recede further. Thus, a catch 22 situation 
has arisen which strongly suggests that both the policy 
objective and the chosen means of achieving it need 
reappraisal.
An assessment of the likely profit margins that a farmer 
could expect from the three scenarios (Table 4.10), for the 
first ten years when he is receiving the loan subsidy,
suggests that if he chose a low cost small scale option he 
would be very highly profitable at 30% interest rate
subsidy. Returns on investment at 30% interest subsidy for 
a farmer who goes for a large scale high cost option are the 
lowest ($516) and it is likely that after tax deductions 
this farmer would be in debt? while the farmer who chose the 
average cost scheme option would realise returns that are 
half of those realised at the low cost option at the same 
level of subsidy.
A farmer who chooses the medium scale average cost scheme 
option would require the Fund to provide a 60 percent 
interest rate subsidy (below 5.65%) before he can become as 
profitable as he would be if he chose the low cost scheme 
option at no interest rate subsidy (13.9%). This outcome 
concurs with the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands1 
arguments for further interest rate reductions of over 50 
to 60 percent if the Fund is to attract more investors.
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TABLE 4.10
Interest Low Cost Average High Cost Percent Interest
Rates % Scheme $ Scheme $ Scheme $ Subsidy
13.9 27.382 7.583 -13.610 0
12.51 29.470 11.025 - 8.776 10
11.12 31.507 14.365 - 4.063 20
9.73 33.488 17.607 516 30
8.34 35.409 20.751 4.959 40
6.97 37.265 23.787 9.243 50
5.65 39.052 26.706 13.362 60
jSource:Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, 1984
Only the farmers who already have the irrigation machinery 
and other inputs can be attracted to borrow money from the 
Fund to invest in average cost schemes while new entrants 
to irrigation agriculture facing higher initial capital 
costs would most probably go for low cost schemes? the 
option that is unlikely to fulfil the government's objective 
target of 50,000 tons of wheat per year.
According to the World Bank (1983) and the Ministry of
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement, private investment 
in irrigation is only worth while if the annual percentage 
net returns are above 9%. If the three scenarios or options 
are measured against this standard, only farmers borrowing 
from the Fund to invest in low cost schemes would be 
realising worthwhile returns (17.6 percent) at the set
subsidy while those choosing average cost schemes would fall 
short of this expectation, and those choosing the high cost 
schemes would show very poor returns for all levels of 
interest rate subsidies shown on Table 4.11.
The foregoing cost analysis has shown that while low cost 
and small scale schemes majjnot be able to achieve the target 
10,000 hectares within a reasonable time scale, they would 
however be financially profitable at all interest rates 
including at the rate which approximates the real 
opportunity cost of capital in the economy, namely 13.9
percent. Clearly, it can be argued that some of these
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TABLE 4.11
PERCENTAGE NET RETURN PER YEAR TO IRRIGATION
Interest Low Cost average High Cost Percent Interest
Rates % Scheme % Scheme $ Scheme Subsidy %
13.9 14.4 2.4 -3.1 0
12.51 15.5 3.6 -2.0 10
11.12 16.6 4.7 -0.9 20
9.73 17.6 6.7 -0.1 30
8.34 18.6 6.7 1.1 40
6.97 19.6 7.7 2.1 50
5.65 20.5 8.6 3.1 60
Source: Derived from the Ministry of Land, Agriculture and
Rural Settlement's projects documents, 1984.
schemes could be developed profitably without the subsidies, 
the farmers could borrow from commercial banks without the 
need for the Fund. In this respect, it would appear that 
the need for the Fund is highly questionable. However, the 
profitability of the low cost schemes is predicated on 
attractive producer prices and public support in the 
development of attendant services.
Other factors will merit consideration in conjunction with 
the low cost small scale option. First the question of 
wheat self sufficiency has to be related to the excess 
demand for wheat products resulting from the existing 
consumer price subsidy. Second, the nation will have to 
face the fact that wheat self-sufficiency is becoming an 
increasingly expensive option. Since wheat, and wheat 
products do not represent the basic staple diet for the 
majority of the population, it may be necessary to consider 
access to wheat in terms of "ability-to-pay" than on 
"equity". There is a clear need to consider meeting part of 
the demand from imports as a policy option. The argument 
that home production saves valuable foreign exchange is of 
dubious relevance, since the funds to provide the inputs 
needed for irrigation production, are also imported. The 
net import savings are thus likely to be at best minimal and 
may well be negative. And third, it is perhaps more 
important now than ever, that the present wheat production
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system under existing technology be closely examined with 
the view to improving output before any new investment in 
expansion of hectarage or water supply facilities is 
allowed.
Because the state has continued to use subsidies to 
influence public demand for the crops produced as well as 
to influence levels of production, state capital outlays 
have continued to increase. The producer price subsidies, 
though equally applicable to rainfed agriculture, assume a 
much greater significance under irrigation.
Agricultural Producer Price Subsidies
Government intervention in agricultural pricing and 
marketing system in Zimbabwe has a long history, and has 
overtime steadily increased. At the beginning of 1980, the 
commitment to an open-ended subsidy policy for the 
agricultural sector, was partly justified by the argument 
for self-sufficiency, and by the need to earn more foreign 
currency from the export of large volumes of surplus 
products. It follows therefore that the producer prices set 
by government had to be high enough to provide an adequate 
incentive or return to producers so that self-sufficiency 
and export earnings are maintained. The fact that the case 
for higher producer prices often triggers higher selling 
prices for the crops produced is almost lost to the policy 
makers until they are required to pay more subsidies to 
cushion the consumers from the effects of these prices. In 
this section, attention is paid only to those crops produced 
under irrigation, and not the whole agricultural sector.
Irrigation agriculture involves the production, except for 
wheat and to a less extent maize, of low volume, high value 
cash crops such as cotton, coffee, tea and sugar-cane. 
Except for wheat and sugar-cane which are 100% irrigated 
crops, the rest have the greater part of their production 
under rainfed conditions? and the irrigated output is thus 
marginal to the total production. Generally, most crops 
produced in the country are sold through various publicly 
controlled and administered marketing boards, all of which
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come under the umbrella organisation of the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (AMA).
Of the crops grown under irrigation, maize, wheat, soya 
beans, and coffee are sold through the Grain Marketing 
Board. Tea, tobacco and sugar-cane are not controlled crops 
and are therefore not subjected to state determined producer 
prices. The final products processed from these crops and 
sold in the domestic market are, however, affected by 
government price intervention in the retail sector. Bulk 
marketing of the uncontrolled crops is directly linked to 
the international commodity prices and is affected by their 
fluctuations. For the controlled crops, the producer price 
represents the minimum price the government can guarantee to 
pay to producers, and its announcement ahead of the planting 
season, is designed to reduce the price uncertainty faced by 
farmers, so enabling them to arrange their production in 
order to meet government output objectives. The producer 
prices that are finally announced are the result of 
bargaining between the producers and the government, taking 
into account the cost of production, forecast of internal 
demand and potential export earnings.
The central thesis is that whatever benefits may have 
accrued from commercial irrigation crop production, they 
have only been achieved at considerable costs to the state. 
This thesis is reinforced when the producer price system is 
analysed. For example, the bumper maize crop of 1980/81 was 
achieved only because of a 40 percent increase in the 
producer price over the 1979/80 level, (1979/80 price was 
$60.50 per ton, and 1980/81 price was $85.00 a ton), with a 
further 40 percent increase being allowed the following year 
to reach a price of $120.00 per ton by 1981/82. By the 
beginning of 1986 the producer price had risen to $180 per 
ton a rise of 200 percent on the 1979/80 price. In the case 
of wheat the producer price rose from a price of $115 per 
ton in 1979/80 to $300 per ton by 1986/87, an increase of 
160 percent, or 27 percent per year. That of cotton rose a 
100 percent in six years from 37.50 cents per kg in 1980 to 
75 cents per kilogram by 1986/87. Clearly these prices were 
not a result of the market forces of supply and demand
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mechanism. The prices carry a large element of subsidy. 
This becomes clear when the retail selling prices for the 
crops are also assessed.
Whatever advantages the state had hoped for from the use of 
the subsidy, were lost, because of the existence of a food 
policy that places greater emphasis on maintaining low food 
prices mostly for the urban consumers. The result has been 
a sharp increase in required budgetary subsidy as shown on 
Table 4.12. The non-payment of subsidies in 1982/83 for 
maize meal and wheat flour indicate the effect of the 
drought, when domestic production was almost nil, and heavy 
imports of grain had to be resorted to. The little that was 
produced locally was kept in stock as a buffer. The rising
-to
wage rates, helped artificially increase the food demand 
levels.
TABLE 4.12
BUDGETARY SUBSIDIES FOR VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ($000)
Maize Wheat
Meal Soya
Year Maize Flour Wheat Flour Beans Total
1970/80 4270 1400 925 3300 1379 11274
1980/81 9662 14430 N/D 6304 1919 32324
1981/82 6275 64800 N/D 8500 1001 80576
1982/83 14774 Nil 6224 Nil 1478 22476
1983/84 17864 400 8745 60 1563 28632
Source:Ministry of Finance,Economic Planning and Development, i°« 8 4 - 
In the case of maize for example, while the producer price 
and the price for the millers have increased as Table 4.13 
shows, the retail price has not. Thus the bulk of the 
subsidy required was directed to the millers. As a result 
of the high price incentive, the government has incurred a 
huge fiscal burden. Not only are losses sustained on 
domestic sales but, as maize output was higher than that 
required to meet domestic requirements, the government had 
to subsidize exports in competition with cheap US surplus 
maize, in order to get rid of the surplus produced. All 
these costs do not include the high storage cost of over $70 
per ton. Storage costs of the surplus is running at $60 
million per year? while transport costs have quadrupled
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since 1980 to $16 a ton (Africa Economic Development? July 
1987) .
TABLE 4.13
MAIZE: PRODUCTION. PRODUCER PRICE AND LOCAL SELLING PRICELi__•*-
Yield Producer Local Retail Price
' 0 0 0 Selling
Price
(General
Public)
Year Ton Price (Millers)
$ per ton $ per ton $ per ton
1979/80 1000 60.50 63.00 51
1980/81 1900 85.00 89.00 51
1981/82 1282 120.00 137.00 51
1982/83 576 140.00 150.00 70
1983/84 666 160.00 165.00 90
1984/85 500 180.00 200.00 100
Source:Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, 1984
In the case of wheat, in addition to the interest rate 
subsidy of the 1985 FIF, further support has been given 
through the producer price fixing policy, which has been 
dominated by the need to achieve self-sufficiency. While 
it is true that these public expenditures have in the past 
achieved self sufficiency, (Table 4.14), the subsidy costs 
of doing so now and in the future are increasing alarmingly. 
This is largely because of the rapid increase in the bread 
consuming urban population and because of the entry, in 
1980, of a large number of these people into higher minimum 
wage income bracket? factors which serve to increase the 
demand of wheat and wheat products and thus make it harder 
to achieve self-sufficiency.
Volume of output has been affected more by the availability 
of water and changes in weather, (as in 1983/84 and 1984/85 
drought years), than by the increase in producer prices or 
increases in the retail and selling prices. However, the 
high producer price has had some effect on volume of output, 
especially since the wet season of 1985/86, when the heavy 
rains provided the much needed water for irrigation
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TABLE 4.14
WHEAT PRODUCER PRICES AND THE QUEST FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Marketing
Year
Volume
(tons)
Producer
Prices
$/ton
Local
Selling
Price
$/ton
Self-Sufficiency
Level
%
1975/76 121,083 110.00 ND 88.2
1976/77 141,433 121.00 ND 123.4
1977/78 164,540 123.00 ND 137.1
1978/79 207,999 110.00 ND 147.8
1979/80 158,940 115.00 134 93.8
1980/81 163,042 135.00 134 79.5
1981/82 200,912 165.00 157 89.3
1982/83 212,944 190.00 169 91.1
1983/84 124,250 220.00 239 54.6
1984/85 98,505 250.00 285 44.8
1985/86 205,484 285.00 323 83.0
1986/87 225,00 300.00 358 89.0
Note: ND = No data available
Source: Agriculture Marketing Authority 1987
purposes. Self-sufficiency has remained elusive despite 
increases in output, and in the producer price and the 
removal of some consumer subsidies on bread as from 
September 1984. The state has had to supplement local 
production through imports. In 1984/85 alone the state 
imported 104,184 tons of wheat, most of which was landed at 
an average cost of $296.93/ton compared with the cost of 
$285/ton local selling price to millers, and retail price of 
$200.00 per ton. Thus the differential between cost of 
imported wheat and the local wheat selling price to millers 
and the general retail price accounted for the deficit of 
$4.4 million suffered by the Grain Marketing Board.
Clearly, the fixing of high producer price and the removal 
of some consumer price subsidy has not saved the government 
from incurring high wheat import costs. In 1982 alone, 
millers received a subsidy of up to $6 million. Current 
trends in the wheat production sector tend to suggest that 
demand will continue to outstrip supply for sometime, and 
that self-sufficiency may be unattainable, until either the 
high level of demand caused mostly by the urban people, is
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curtailed by a steep increase in the local retail price, or 
until capacity extensions and or changes in production 
technology are introduced. It may well mean that all these 
measures would be unable to produce wheat self-sufficiency. 
The mix of domestic production and importation could be a 
permanent feature. The economics of such a mix will need to 
be examined by future research so as to determine the levels 
of the mix that are economically acceptable.
Soya beans and cotton have not been subsidized by the state 
to the same degree as maize and wheat. In the case of 
cotton and coffee the international market prices have 
largely dictated the prices paid to the farmers by the 
domestic marketing boards. For the uncontrolled crops such 
as sugar cane, tea and tobacco, the producer prices are the 
international commodity price; and the fortunes of the 
farmers involved in the production of these crops rise and 
fall in direct response to price fluctuations on the world 
market. Only coffee, of the crops under examination, 
realised trading surpluses (Table 4.15) for every year since 
1979/80.
The total subsidy paid by government to cover the losses of 
the Agricultural Marketing Authority (A.M.A) have increased 
from year to year. For example, while the accumulated total 
subsidy paid to A.M.A. in 1979/80 was a mere $1,919,175, by 
the end of 1983/84, this figure had risen to $38,519,500, an 
increase of $36,600,325, a rise of 95% in five years or 19% 
per year. Most of A.M.A.'s losses are due to the 
differences between the high price the Authority pays to 
farmers for the crops delivered, and the low price it sells 
the crops to millers and retail outlets in addition to 
losses from exports and the high storage and handling costs. 
At the beginning of 1985, A.M.A.'s trading loss for 
commodities including irrigated crops, stood at $400 
million, a fifth of which ($80 million) was estimated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture as due to losses associated with 
controlled irrigation crops, especially the huge importation 
of wheat following the 1981/82-1983/84 drought when the 
local wheat production was at its lowest, and other 
crops were experiencing depressed world market prices.
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TABLE 4.15
SUBSIDIES PAID BY GOVERNMENT TO THE AGRICULTURE MARKETING
AUTHORITY (AMA) ($)
Year Wheat Soya Bean Coffee Total
AMA
to
a) 925,381 1,397,304 _ 2,322 ,685
1979/80 b) - - -
C) ( +636,593) 1,919,175 (+1,690,194) 1,919 ,175
a) 1,919,175 — 1,919 ,175
1980/81 b) 153,658 1,069,257 2,227,926 3,450 ,841
C ) ( +361,105) 1,069,257 ( +130,402) 1,069 ,257
a) 1,069,257 — 1,069 ,257
1981/82 b) 9,333,762 2,053,007 (+2,042,924) 11,386 ,769
C) 8,932,972 2,121,872 (+2,188,027) 11,054 ,844
a) 6,223,778 1,478,434 — 7,702 ,212
1982/83 b)12,143,468 5,687,283 (+4,327,354) 17,830 ,751
c)15,549,961 6,496,347 (+4,444,368) 22,046 ,308
a) 16,741 6,994 — 23 ,735
1983/84 b)10,184,978 3,640,521 (+4,633,588) 13,825 ,499
c)27,602,410 10,917,090 (+4,810,995) 38,519 ,500
Note: a) = subsidy paid for deficits on previous trading
year
b) = Annual Trading Loss (or Surplus)
c) = Accumulated sum paid by government after
trading year
Source: Agriculture Marketing Authority, 1984
It was in 1985 that the price of sugar hit the bottom for a 
long time, selling in London at US$0.2 cents a pound, and 
recovery has been painfully slow, especially with the recent 
deterioration of both the US$ and the Z$, and Zimbabwe's 
loss of the USA sugar quota market. The implications of all 
these issues on the realisation of net benefits from all 
these cost outlays is the subject of the next chapter.
Public Cost Outlay to Irrigation and Rainfed Agriculture: 
A Comparison
The basis for comparing public cost outlay to irrigation and 
rainfed commercial agriculture, is limited to a few areas 
which include research and extension, the producer prices 
and loans. Because of this, it is felt that this analysis
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should not be buried in the main text of the Chapter, but 
treated separately, so that the unique nature of the 
different levels of public support to the two sectors is 
outlined clearly. The essence of the comparison is to 
attempt to show that a large part of the agriculture sector 
is receiving the least public sector assistance by way of 
subsidies, compared to the very small irrigation sector, on 
a per hectare basis. The picture that emerges is perhaps 
not entirely helpful in the absence of data on the level of 
benefits each section produces for the economy. This is 
done in the next Chapter.
Figures on Table 4.16 are based on 1984 prices. For the 
irrigation sector, most figures are derived from the 
foregoing text, while those for the commercial rainfed are 
based on a study of the Agriculture Sector Study by the 
World Bank. The assumptions behind the figures are 
explained in the notes under the table.
The State spends 20 times more money on commercial 
irrigation than on commercial rainfed crop agriculture. 
Expenditure on the rainfed sector is only 5 percent of the 
expenditure on irrigation. Where comparative costs are 
possible, like in the field of research, because of the high 
saturation of extension workers in the irrigation sector it 
has come to mean that the state spent twice on irrigation 
than on the rainfed sector; and 16 times in support of loans 
going to the water and irrigation sector than those going to 
the rainfed sector. Although the figures are only 
estimates, the obvious conclusions that can be drawn from 
them are that practically every cost item of the irrigation 
sector's cost configuration is supported by the government, 
and that, irrigation agriculture is not possible without 
massive state help. This clearly raises the question as to 
whether irrigation agriculture can produce enough benefits 
to justify the appropriation of so much scarce resources.
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TABLE 4.16 
COST COMPARISON
IRRIGATION RAINFED
MAZWIKADEI DAM WATER LOMAGUNDI (HIGH RAINFALL)
Public Costs ($/hectare) Public Costs ($/hectare)
Crop: Wheat TOTAL Crop: Maize TOTAL
1. Capital costa) 8,944 N/A N/A
2. Operation and 
Maintenance 100 N/A N/A
3. Feasibility Studiesi 80 N/A N/A
4. Service 
Provision10 833
Research,
Extension,
Experiment 480
5. Farm Irrigation 
Fund subsidy0 1,158 N/A N/B
6. Producer Price 
Subsidy0 248
Maize Producer 
Subsidy 270
7. Water Price 
Subsidy0 4,350
N/A N/A
8. Interest on 
Foreign loans 1,617
Loans connected 
with supply credits 
and imports of 
inputs 100
Total 17,330 850
1 Source:Derived from field
1
Notes:
data
a) Capital cost calculations based on 60% of the $14, 906.67
per hectare of the 3,000 ha to be irrigated by water 
from Mazwikadei Dam (Table 4.6)
b) Service costs based on the annual $5 million spent 
overall and on the ratio of extension workers to 
farmers. The figures are rough estimates.
c) Farm Irrigation Fund figure is based on 30% of the
$3861, the cost of the average cost scheme approved by
the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement.
d) The per ha wheat producer price subsidy is based on $55
per ton multiplied by 4.5 tons per ha, while those of
maize are based on $45 per ton multiplied by 6 tons per 
ha.
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e) The water price subsidy is based on the assumption that
wheat will require 10,000 cubic meters of water per
year, using figures on Table 4.7.
f) Interest on loans, is based on the 10.85% interest rate
for the Italian loan used in building the Mazwikadei Dam 
divided by the 3,000 hectares to be irrigated.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE BENEFITS FROM COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE 
INTRODUCTION
If the assessment of investment costs has been difficult, 
the assessment of the stream of benefits from irrigation is 
even more difficult. It is generally true that benefit 
estimation is subject to great uncertainty, not the least is 
determining the degree to which these benefits can directly 
be attributed to public investments in bulk water capacity 
development alone. Certainly, in a Zimbabwean context there 
are particular analytical problems. The analysis of 
benefits has to be undertaken from two distinct 
perspectives? the state and the private irrigator.
Clearly, if only the firm's own investment is considered, 
the cumulative private benefits accruing to the private 
investors may not necessarily fulfil the benefits expected 
by the state. This way the expected outcomes of public 
investment could well become an act of faith. The faith 
being that in the pursuit of profit maximization, the 
private investor would incidentally generate those public 
benefits. It would therefore be true to say that when 
public planners list the numerous benefits to be derived 
from bulk water supply developments, they neglect the fact 
that public influence over the outcomes is marginal and 
indirect. They have few mechanisms for controlling the pace 
and direction of private investment decisions, and have thus 
increasingly relied on expensive state subsidies, to cajole 
private investors to attempt to fulfil public objectives as 
well.
However, the pursuit of private benefits need not be 
antithetical to the creation of public benefits. And the 
relationship between the state and the private investors 
need not necessarily be confrontational, but complementary 
as the success of one side depends on the investment 
activities of the other side.
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Fig. 5.1 represents the ideal or the expected benefits from 
commercial irrigation as perceived by the state planners. 
It is the possibility of achieving all these that lies 
behind the public policy preoccupation with investment in 
large water storages for irrigation purposes. As indicated 
on the diagram, an ideal irrigation situation has even the 
capacity to repay all the loans incurred in building the 
dams from the foreign exchange earned, with enough surplus 
resources for capacity expansion. The investors, in this 
ideal case, receive high prices for their crops and are able 
to save enough money not only to meet their recurrent cost 
obligations free of state subsidies, but are able to 
reinvest most of the profit as well as being able to 
increase the wages of the workers. The crop yields are 
expected to increase under irrigation, making it possible, 
to achieve food supply self-sufficiency as in the case of 
wheat and sugar. For the other crops, higher yields would 
mean a lot of raw materials for the agro-processing industry 
and other sectors of the economy in addition to exporting 
them.
Employment would be generated by the farms growing all these 
crops under irrigation. Some employment opportunities would 
be created by the processing industries. Workers would be 
expected to receive higher incomes. This would enable the 
workers to increase their demand for goods and services in 
the economy, and this in turn would give the necessary
growth impetus to other sectors of the economy. The 
workers' standard of living would also improve.
This ideal situation is based on a number of assumptions, 
about a whole variety of socio-economic conditions, the 
majority of which are outside the control of both the
government and the private investors. For example, in order 
to realise high inflows of foreign exchange, the 
international commodity market must buy all crops exported 
at very attractive prices? the prices of imported farm 
machinery, fertilizers and insecticides must be low so that 
the farmers can realise higher net returns? and the interest 
on foreign loans must be set at levels that will not allow
huge outflows of the foreign earnings.
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Fig. 5.1
BENEFITS DERIVED FROM COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE-THE IDEAL CASE
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The situation also presupposes high producer prices for 
these crops in the domestic market, and low price mark-ups 
for those inputs originating from within the domestic 
economy as well as low wages for the workers.
In the real world, where Zimbabwe is but a minor crop 
producer and a price taker on the world market, none of the 
assumptions can be fully satisfied.
Although the cumulative effect, under the ideal situation 
will lead to economic growth and the realisation of income 
equity, the real world situation is unlikely to produce the 
same result, as the discussion below shows.
The disbenefits are included in the diagram for
completeness. They serve to indicate that even under
theoretically optimal conditions, irrigation agriculture
«
will produce benefits as well as disbenefits. However, 
these disbenefits are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, of 
this study.
The Streams Of Benefits
Zimbabwe's commercial irrigation agriculture is wholly based 
on cash crops for the export market, except for wheat and to 
a lesser extent sugar cane. But most of the high value 
export crops, namely cotton, coffee tea and tobacco are not 
only grown under irrigation conditions, but also under 
rainfed conditions, at varying degrees of crop intensity. 
For these crops it is therefore possible to carry out a 
rough comparison of yields under rainfed and those under 
irrigation conditions.
The yields of these crops under irrigation has got to be 
substantially higher than under rainfed conditions, for the 
high cost of growing them under irrigation to be 
economically justified. In the absence of data on what the 
farmer incurs in producing these crops, the comparisons can 
at best only be based on estimates. The per hectare cost 
figures of producing under irrigation and under rainfed 
conditions are derived from Table 4.16, where wheat costs
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represents the irrigated crop case, and maize the rainfed 
case. In this case a hectare of irrigated land would cost 
$17,330 to develop, while that under rainfed would cost $850 
only. To these figures we can add the variable production 
costs borne by the farmers where they exist.
The High Yields
A comparison of yields between the rainfed and the irrigated 
components of such crops as tobacco, coffee, cotton, soya 
bean and maize, clearly shows that the irrigated component 
of the crop realises substantially higher returns than the 
rainfed one per hectare, for all the four years. For 
example Table 5.1 shows that increases due to irrigation 
returns for tobacco, rose from 303 kg per ha in 1981 to 575 
kg by 1983. In each year the incremental yield due to 
irrigation was 17% above that from rainfed production, in 
1981, 21% in 1982, 29% in 1983, and 16% in 1984. For
coffee, the average increment was 26% for the three years 
assessed, and 67% for cotton over 4 years, 42% for soya bean 
and 47% for maize. These average percentage increases over 
the rainfed yields indicate that irrigation has been very 
beneficial, and indeed a superior system of producing the 
same crop. If the 'higher yields' objective was the only 
criterion to be considered, then irrigation would be fully 
justified.
Clearly, other questions, like the cost that had to be 
incurred to produce the extra yield, are very important. 
As Table 5.2 indicates, on the basis of the cost to the 
state of developing one hectare of irrigated and rainfed 
land, (Table 4.16), the incremental yield due to irrigation, 
is certainly achieved at substantially higher costs than 
under rainfed production conditions. For example producing 
the extra yield of tobacco under irrigation cost the state 
$45.00 per kg annually, resulting in a cost increase of $43 
over rainfed agriculture for every kg produced. In the case 
of coffee the average cost of each extra kg produced under 
irrigation is even higher at $80, compared to $4, if that 
extra yield was produced under rainfed conditions.
TABLE 5.1
A COMPARISON OF YIELDS. RAINFED AND IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE. THE INCREMENTAL VALUE DUE TO IRRIGATION
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9  8 4 Z of crop 
under
CROP UNIT RAIN­
FED
IRRI­
GATED
INCREASE 
DUE TO 
IRRIGATION
RAIN­
FED
IRRI­
GATED
INCREASE 
DUE TO 
IRRIGATION
RAIN­
FED
IRRI­
GATED
INCREASE 
DUE TO 
IRRIGATION
RAIN­
FED
IRRI­
GATED
INCREASE 
DUE TO 
IRRIGATION
RAIN
FED
- IRRI­
GATED
TOBACCO 
Yield per ha kg 1738 2041 303 1905 2313 408 1964 2539 575 2298 2657 359 90 10
COFFEE 
Yield per ha kg 1202 1183 (-19) 1101 1242 141 904 1313 409 1210 1437 227 30 70
COTTON 
Yield per ha kg 1777 2503 726 1671 2629 958 1478 2676 1198 1577 2967 1390 55 45
SOYA BEAN 
Yield per ha kg 2075 2375 300 1630 2368 738 1225 1984 759 1491 2186 695 70 30
WHEAT 
Yield per ha kg - 5012 - - 5140 - ND 5140 - - 4962 - - 100
MAIZE 
Yield per ha kg 5873 6949 1076 4098 6033 1935 2442 4343 1901 3326 4867 1541 92 8
SUGAR CANE 
Yield per ha kg - 103.9 - - 113.7 - 104.1 - - 104.7 - - 100
SOURCE: Yield data from CSO, Crop Production on Large Scale Commercial Farms, 1984.
TABLE 5.2
THE COST OF THE EXTRA YIELD PER KG DUE TO IRRIGATION (USING FIGURES FROM TABLE 4.15) PER HECTARE ($)
1 9 8 1 1 9  8 2 1 9  8 3 1 9  8 4 AVERAGE
EXTRA1
YIELD
COST PER KG $ COST PER KG $ COST PER KG $ COST PER KG $
CROP UNIT IRRI-* 
GATION
RAIN”’3
FED
EXTRA
YIELD
IRRI­
GATION
RAIN­
FED
EXTRA
YIELD
IRRI­
GATION
RAIN­
FED
EXTRA
YIELD
IRRI­
GATION
RAIN­
FED
IRRI­
GATION
RAIN­
FED
Tobacco kg 303 57.00 3.00 408 43.00 2.00 575 30.00 2.00 359 48.00 2.00 45.0 2.0
Coffee kg 19 - - 141 123.00 6.00 409 42.00 2.06 227 76.00 4.00 80.0 4.0
Cotton kg 726 24.00 1.00 958 18.00 0.89 1198 15.00 0.70 1390 13.00 0.60 18.0 0.80
Soya Bean kg 300 58.00 3.00 738 24.00 1.00 759 23.00 1.00 695 25.00 1.00 33.0 1.5
Maize kg 1076 16.00 0.79 1935 9.00 0.44 1901 9.00 2.00 1541 11.00 0.55 11.0 0.95
NOTES
1 The Extra Yield is the incremental yield per ha due to the application of irrigation, from Table 5.1
2 Cost per kg irrigation, refers to the cost to the state of each extra kg of yield, given that it cost the state $17,330
to develop one irrigated hectare.
3 Cost per kg rainfed, refers to the cost to the state of each extra kg of yield, if that incremental yield was produced
under rainfed conditions, given that state help to rainfed agriculture per hectare is $850.00.
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At these costs, the benefits derived from higher yields 
under irrigation, diminish into insignificance. Continued 
production of these crops under irrigation would only be 
justified if the returns on the crops were substantially 
high enough to cover the production costs and give the 
producer some profit. For controlled crops and those sold 
through the national marketing boards, the producer prices 
paid for crops would need to be much higher than those 
discussed in Chapter Four, to make production under 
irrigation worthwhile.
The question must be asked, as to how farmers have managed 
to cope with such steep unit costs of production under 
irrigation. Clearly, no farmer would be producing these 
crops under irrigation if he was required to meet these 
costs from his pocket without state support. This means 
that, although these figures are real economic costs that 
ought to be computed into the cost of producing each crop; 
from the farmer*s point of view these costs are external and 
do not directly affect the profitability of his operations. 
The farmer is more worried by the financial costs of 
producing the crop. On the basis of this partial allocation 
of costs, it has been possible for farmers to continue to 
produce under costly irrigation conditions. Ironically, the 
policy makers have also tended to promote this partial view 
of the relationship between the (extra yields) incremental 
yields under irrigation and the cost of achieving them.
Considerations of the economic costs of realising these 
extra yields would tend to nullify any benefit that could 
have been realized. If anything, producing these crops 
under irrigation, increases the costs to be incurred by the 
state in net terms. From the figures above, one is tempted 
to argue that more economic benefits would be realized if 
rainfed land area were expanded in order to produce that 
extra yield now realized under irrigation.
Food supply self sufficiency
Nearly the entire commercial irrigation sector of Zimbabwe 
is based on the growing of low volume high value export
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crops. The exceptions are the growth of wheat as an import 
substitution crop for the domestic market, and fifty percent 
of the sugar cane output which is destined for the local 
market. Tea, coffee and cotton play a minor role in the 
domestic food supply equation, except as beverages, 
especially in the case of tea and coffee for the urban 
population mostly. Cotton*s contribution to the national 
food supply situation is through cattle feed and cooking 
oil? and that has been inadequate for over 6 years.
The focus on food supply self-sufficiency has, for years 
been directed at wheat production. Zimbabwe's wheat is 
totally produced in winter under irrigation. Thus yields 
are predicated directly on the availability of water, the 
decline in the number of farms producing wheat, and from 
high cost of farm inputs, as well as from dramatic declines 
in hectarage, due to farmers shifting to other crops in 
response to variations in producer prices. Table 5.3 shows 
that since 1982 there has been a sharp decline in the farms 
producing wheat, and on the hectarage put to wheat 
production. Although the yield per hectare has remained 
high at above 5 tons? the decline in hectarage under wheat 
seems to have been one of the main causes behind the drop 
in the total crop harvested from the peak of 191,857 tons 
in 1982, down to a mere 83,807 tons by 1984, a drop of over 
56%.
Interviews with farmers seem to suggest that, although lack 
of water for irrigation during the three years of drought 
may have started, for many farmers in the High Veld, as the 
main reason for the decline on the hectarage under wheat, 
the high producer price of the easy-to-grow, maize may have 
been responsible for later losses of the hectarage. These 
farmers noted that, although the producer price of wheat was 
higher than that of maize, the higher input costs for wheat 
made it less profitable.
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TABLE 5.3
WHEAT PRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF REDUCED HECTARAGE ON YIELD
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Number of farms 
Area planted (ha) 
Crop harvested(ton) 
Yield (ton/ha)
424
36,556
154,593
4,74
504
36,590
183,380
5,01
485
37,329
191,857
5,14
304
21,504
110,988
5,16
271
16,891
83,807
5,00
jSource:Grain Marketing Board, Crop Estimates,1985.
While yields have continued to decline, demand for wheat 
products has continued to grow. Since 1980, wheat intake 
by the Grain Marketing Board (excluding stocks held back by 
farmers) has fallen short of domestic demand as Table 5.4 
shows.
TABLE 5.4
WHEAT SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION (tons)
Marketing Year 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
Grain Marketing
Board
INTAKE
IMPORTS
LOCAL DEMAND
DEFICIT(surplus)
163.000 
3,000
205.000 
39,000
201,000
17,000
223,000
5,000
213.000 
31,000
234.000 
(10,000)
124.000
55.000
227.000
48.000
98.000
104.000
220.000
18.000
ISource:Grain Marketing Board, Crop Estimates,1985.
The government has come to rely heavily on imports to 
assuage the shortages. In fact, reliance on imports has 
tended to grow with the decline in yield from 1980/81 to the 
1984/85 marketing year, when imports were more than the 
grain supplied to the GMB by the farmers. Of the 104,000 
tons imported that year 23,704 tons came in as grant aid, 
from Australia, Canada, the EEC, West Germany and 
Yugoslavia, and 30,603 tons as in-house barter with maize 
from Christian Care, Lutheran World Federation, World Food 
Programme and the Netherlands Government.
Attempts to achieve wheat supply-self sufficiency have been 
difficult according to Table 5.5.
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TABLE 5.5
WHEAT SELF 
YEAR
SUFFICIENCY
DOMESTIC
DEMAND
G.M.B.
INTAKE
LEVEL OF SELF 
SUFFICIENCY
(Ton) (Ton) %
1980/81 205,000 163,000 79
1981/82 223,000 201,000 90
1982/83 234,000 213,000 91
1983/84 227,000 124,000 55
1984/85 220,000 98,000 45
Source:Grain Marketing Board, Crop Estimates,1985.
The level of self-sufficiency may have risen from 1985 to 
1986 as indicated in Table 4.14 above (Chapter 4). What is 
perhaps important to underline is the fact that this level 
of self-sufficiency is not a true assessment of the wheat 
supply situation in the country, since wheat is sold on 
allocation basis to millers. Without the strict allocation 
system local consumption (demand) would probably be higher 
than current levels, thereby decreasing the level of 
self-sufficiency considerably. So the demand figures on 
Table 5.5 reflect levels of allocation and not of demand.
Clearly the achievement of full national wheat supply 
sufficiency in the country will prove to be very expensive 
either in terms of costly extension of land under wheat as 
exemplified by the Mazwikadei Dam project (Chapter 4) or in 
terms of state subsidy outlays designed to cushion the urban 
consumers from the true economic cost of wheat products. 
Doubts must be cast on the rationality of pursuing a total 
supply self-sufficiency policy, especially when it is 
considered that the consumer price subsidy (which is
unlikely to be removed) has allowed for the growth of 
uncurtailed demand for wheat products. Urban dietary habits 
have shifted away from the more traditional maize porridge 
for breakfast and 'sadza* (thick maize porridge) for lunch, 
in favour of bread and sandwiches respectively. The pursuit 
of a policy of domestic supply self-sufficiency must at the 
end of the day be subjected to the economic sensibility of 
doing so in relation to the changes in the price of wheat on 
the world market. The price for pursuing a domestic
self-sufficiency policy must be carefully assessed (an area 
of future study) and justified rationally.
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In the case of sugar, domestic supply self-sufficiency 
levels were achieved in the mid 1960s, and since then, the 
production of the crop has been directed more towards 
foreign exchange earnings objectives through the exports of 
large quantities of the output. Table 5.6 s'hows the share 
of the total output that have been destined for the domestic 
and for the export markets.
Domestic demand for sugar has been increasing since 1979/80, 
reducing the share destined for export, so that by 1984/85, 
the domestic share of output is nearly the same as that for 
export. The rapid increase in the domestic demand coincides 
with the increase in earnings following the introduction of 
the Statutory Minimum Wage in 1980. As a result, 1984/85 
domestic demand is 77% that of 1979/80 output and 180% of 
1979/80 demand figures. Certainly sugar production has 
kept ahead of demand in the domestic market.
TABLE 5.6
SUGAR PRODUCTION AND DISPOSAL (TONS)
YEAR DISPOSAL (tons)
PRO­ % OF PRO­ % OF PRO­
DUCTION DOMESTIC DUCTION EXPORTS DUCTION
(tons) market
1979/80 272,50 116,000 43 156,200 57
1980/81 339,200 151,200 45 187,900 55
1981/82 369,900 171,400 46 198,500 54
1982/83 397,100 183,200 46 213,900 54
1983/84 410,700 206,500 50 203,000 50
1984/85 438,500 209,200 48 228,800 52
Source: Derived from Sugar Sales (Pvt) Ltd, London, UK.
Note: 1. Domestic market figures exclude the quantity of 
sugar used for ethanol production.
Unlike sugar and wheat, coffee sales in the domestic market 
have continued to decline since 1980/81 as Table 5.7 shows. 
It can be argued that the departure of large numbers of 
whites who constituted an effective domestic market for 
coffee between 1980 and 1982 is responsible for the drop in
162
local sales by as much as 50 percent. While wheat relies 
100 percent for its support from domestic sales, and for 
sugar 50 percent, coffee must rely on the world market price 
for 95% of its sales.
TABLE 5.7
DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR COFFEE
YEAR
LOCAL
SALES (Tons)
AS PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL SALES
1980/81 530 10.8
1981/82 601 10.4
1982/83 341 5.4
1983/84 472 5.8
1984/85
J---
487 5.1
ISource:Grain Marketing Board, Crop Estimates,1985.
Given the vagaries of the world prices, the crop's total 
reliance on this market places it in a precarious position. 
Besides, while wheat and sugar have some nutritional value 
as foods, hence their production can be justified from the 
food supply self-sufficiency objective, coffee cannot be 
justified on this basis.
Tea's fortunes on the domestic market have followed those of
coffee although volumes of sales have been much larger than
those for coffee. Again, tea does not fit into the food
supply self-sufficiency equation. It is so far very clear
that the irrigated crops' contribution to the requirements
for domestic foodstocks has been disappointingly marginal,
and only for a small urban population. Perhaps through the
offer of employment opportunities, . . commercial irrigation
hasagricultureAcontributed to the realisation of high incomes 
by the workers^ the majority of whom are from the poor 
peasantry sector.
Employment Generation
The generation of employment opportunities has for a very 
long time been identified by successive governments of 
Zimbabwe as bl major benefit to be derived from commercial 
irrigation. Such notions are particularly supported today
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in the climate of high unemployment and under employment of 
labour. Any analysis of the employment benefits of 
commercial irrigation has to identify the difference between 
employment benefits in terms of the absolute physical 
numbers of people that can be employed at the schemes, and 
the income distribution dimension of that employment. This 
separation in analysis, is made more necessary by the fact 
that policy makers and planners often focus undue attention 
on the physical aspects of employment at the expense of the 
earnings of labour. Labour, as an input to the crop 
production process, has an opportunity cost, so it is 
essential to establish whether its use in irrigation 
agriculture, is the efficient alternative form of 
employment, from the point of view of the whole economy. It 
is also important to assess the cost implications this has 
on the cost of irrigation. The Zimbabwean context also 
requires that any labour analysis should look at the role of 
permanent labour, covered by legal and statutory instruments 
of government, vis a vis the army of temporary labour whose 
constituent body remains undefined.
In pure physical numbers of workers employed in the 
commercial irrigation agriculture, the number of permanent 
workers is estimated at less than 50,000 of which nearly
17,000 are employed on the largest single continuous block 
of irrigated land of the Triangle-Hippo Valley-Mkwasine 
Schemes, constituting some 41,000 hectares of irrigated 
sugarcane. Tea alone employs some 10,000 workers, coffee, 
some 5,000 workers and cotton, nearly 10,000 and the 
remainder are employed on wheat farms and irrigated tobacco. 
The sugarcane schemes constituted the single largest 
employer of labour in Masvingo Province, and between 1981 
and 1983, the schemes were providing one job opportunity for 
every 34 hectares developed.
When it is considered that all these workers are employed 
on only 136,000 hectares of land (2.7 workers per ha 
developed), as compared to only 10,000 workers over the same 
area of rainfed land, it is clear that, commercial 
irrigation has been able to employ far more people per unit 
area, than any other form of agricultural practice in the
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country because of low mechanisation and high dependence on 
human labour for all activities. However, statistical 
figures show that since 1980, the hectarage under irrigation 
has been declining, and with it, the decline in employment 
trends or opportunities.
While the employment growth in the whole economy has 
stagnated at 1% and -1% (Socio-economic Review 1980-1985), 
that in the commercial irrigation sector has remained static 
at zero growth rate over the period under review. From the 
agriculture sector as a whole*s point of view, the physical 
permanent employment offered by irrigation is minor, at 18% 
of the total labour force employed in agriculture (an 
average of 270,000 workers nationwide).
Evidence clearly shows that employment impact of commercial 
irrigation is most felt in the neighbourhood of each scheme. 
The fact that the effect is location-specific implies that 
regions that lie far away from the schemes, or which have no 
resource base for the development of irrigation cannot 
benefit. Findings of a study done by Roder (1965) on the 
origin of workers on the schemes in Manicaland, concurs with 
this observation in the present study. The employment 
benefits are therefore not widespread, but are concentrated 
in Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces.
Nearly 90 percent of the total labour force at each scheme 
is unskilled, and can therefore easily be recruited from 
within the neighbourhood of the schemes. This is made 
possible by the fact that most of these schemes are labour 
intensive and require very little input of scarce skilled 
labour, which would be imported from regions further away 
from the schemes. The reason: for this high dependence on
unskilled labour is to do with the nature of the crops being 
produced.
Crops such as tobacco, cotton and tea,owe their competitive 
advantage on the international markets to the high quality 
products associated with hand picking during harvesting. 
While large numbers of people are required during the 
planting of these crops, these numbers swell much more
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during harvest periods when large numbers of seasonal 
temporary labour are recruited to help in the hand
harvesting of the crops. Normally irrigated tobacco would
employ one worker to half a hectare compared to one for 2
hectare under rainfed cropping or one to five hectares for 
rainfed maize, but at the peak of harvesting time the number 
of workers per hectare can increase to as much as 5 per 
hectare on irrigation farms, depending on how profitable 
this would be. Cotton and tea employ even higher numbers of 
temporary (seasonal) labour as they are especially 
vulnerable to improper handling and require that both the 
fibre quality of cotton, or the leaf-quality of tea be of 
paramount consideration. In the case of tea, the 
mountainous topography precludes the use of machinery, and 
makes human labour the first and only harvesting method of 
choice. Seasonal labour is not costly, and depending on the 
scale of famine, drought, unemployment, etc, in the 
neighbourhood, most workers are prepared to take 
substantially lower wages than permanent workers. In 
addition seasonal labour is not protected by the legal
statutes of the Statutory Minimum Wage, so making it easier 
for the employers and workers alike to come to some 
reasonable wage agreement, far lower than the government's 
stipulated level.
Although sugarcane does not depend for its quality on hand 
harvesting, most operations are labour intensive. This is 
largely because it is still considered economic to use human 
labour than costly machinery, even at the current level of 
wages. Only wheat has introduced, on a large scale, combine 
harvesters and tractors. The mechanisation option for all 
crops grown under irrigation, and indeed for the whole 
agricultural industry has become less and less attractive 
because of the shortage of foreign currency needed to import 
all the machinery, particularly during the period under 
review. As indicated earlier, it has also been difficult to 
import spare parts for the maintenance of the current stock 
of aging machinery.
The increase in the cost of tractors for example from 
$30,000 in 1984 to $60,000 by 1987 has made it uneconomic
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to place too high a reliance on machinery. The foreign 
exchange allocation system, with typically a one year delay 
in the assessment of applications and approval of 
allocation, be it for new machinery or spares, has affected 
planning at the farm level. This situation has all the hall 
marks of being permanent for the foreseeable future. It is 
clear that 2»»vktsaW«je iv\ cvCiwxitedl
mechanisation progrGi^wx -e alone  ^ a full blown
mechanisation of the whole production process. The domestic 
bottlenecks have got to be seen against a background of poor 
world commodity prices which have been on a downward trend 
since 1982/83; and the high levels of unemployment in the 
economy, especially of the unskilled labour.
Although human labour seems the only means of production of 
choice for irrigation, it is important to assess the 
economic cost of this choice. The cost of creating one job 
under irrigation 1981/82 was estimated at $4,000 as compared 
to $200 under rainfed conditions. By 1984, this rose to 
over $6,000 per job under irrigation compared to less than 
$400 per job in the rainfed sector. Available information 
suggests that at this cost, job creation cost was only 
second to industry and mining. It is therefore possible 
that the ceiling for the expansion of employment benefits in 
irrigation may have long been reached. It is true that new 
schemes are experiencing these high costs much more than the 
older schemes constructed when costs were very low.
Economic analysis would require that any incremental job 
opportunity to be created be justified on the marginal 
incremental benefits it would bring to the investor. Given 
that the crops grown are export reliant and are in turn 
affected by poor world commodity prices, the prospect of any 
extra labour bringing more benefits to the investor are 
slim.
However, the social benefits of irrigation, in project 
appraisal, are not often discussed in macro terms as above.
A micro-analysis of the real wage earned by the worker, on 
which he makes a living, is usually the basis for the 
calculation of the aggregate benefits to workers from the
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employment. The wage earned by the worker can be taken to 
represent the workersfs value for working under irrigation. 
However, this is not always true, especially in an economy 
where wage levels are fixed by an Act of Parliament. In an 
ideal competitive economy, the wage labour earns should 
approximate the opportunity cost of that labour. However 
this requirement would mean that the wage earned by 
irrigation workers, in a situation of high unemployment and 
underemployment of labour, would be close to zero, the 
opportunity cost of that labour. On this basis, irrigation 
workers' standard of living would be the same as those under 
subsistence rainfed agriculture, and that is less than $400 
per year.
In 1980, the enactment of the Statutory Minimum Wage 
(Statutory Minimum Wage Act 1st July 1980), saw the rise of 
wages for farm workers from $20 in 1980 to $75 per month by 
1985, a rise of 275% over 5 years, or an annual increase of 
55%. These have been huge real increases in income even 
taking inflation into account, compared to the $30 per month 
realised by the subsistent farmer (CSO, 1985). Assessed on 
their own, these wages do not reveal the disparity between 
farm workers' wages and those received by other workers in 
other sectors. As Table 5.8 shows, the agricultural 
worker's wage is at the bottom of the income table, for the 
less skilled grades.
Even if it is assumed that the $75 is added to the average 
$30 per month produced by the rest of the family under 
subsistence rainfed agriculture, the total income realised 
is not substantial.
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TABLE 5.8
MINIMUM WAGE - LOW INCOME GRADES - A COMPARISON
Sector
Monthly
Wage
($)
Musicians (urban)
Musicians (rural)
Commercial Fish Worker 
Town Council General Worker 
District Council Hand 
Skilled District Council Hand 
Miner
Unskilled Welfare Worker 
Agricultural Industrial Workers 
Domestic Worker 
House Keeper 
Baby Minder
Agricultural Farm Worker
166.75
143.75 
147.20
143.75
78.00
143.75
143.75
85.00
143.75
75.00
77.00
79.00
75.00
Source: Zimbabwe, The Herald, July 1st, 1985, page 3.
But the size of the wage does not carry the actual real 
value which the receiver enjoys from it. There is therefore 
the need to break down the wage received into what it can
purchase. This way it will be possible to compare what the
wage can purchase and the Poverty Datum Line (PDL), a level 
of income above or below which a given size of family can be 
said to be adequately subsisting . The PDL is a realistic 
measure of the quality of a wage because it is based on real 
costs incurred in the pursuit of subsistence, and therefore 
changes from year to year in line with changes in prices of 
goods and services in the economy. It is therefore a 
reflection of the wage that is required, or to be paid to 
the workers if they are to realize the minimum requirements 
of subsistence regardless of that labour's opportunity cost, 
in line with the objectives of equity.
On the basis of a PDL of $128 per month calculated by the
Riddell Commission on Incomes in 1980, the minimum wage of 
irrigation workers remains in the bracket of 'poverty' 
incomes; for it does not accord the worker, the minimum 
requirements for subsistence. Apparently this situation 
affects over 6 categories of workers and is not specific to 
irrigation agriculture. The key question therefore is not
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how far above or below the PDL the wage is, but whether it 
is better than nothing. Clearly, the wage, though low, 
represents nearly three times what the workers would 
realise if they did not join irrigation agriculture 
employment.
However, public wage fixing reduces excessive income 
differentials in society and can form the basis in future 
for addressing the equity problem. The policy dilemma is 
that, while the wage level is clearly very low from the 
worker*s view point, pushing the wage further up, under 
present conditions of high unemployment would fuel the rate 
of unemployment. Public wage fixing denies the worker the 
right to price himself/herself into a job at his/her own 
perceived opportunity cost. On the other hand a wage policy 
whose horizon is the realisation of a subsistent income 
would encourage private investors to go into irrigation on 
the false assumption that wages would remain for ever 
subsistent. This would cause adjustment problems should 
wages increase drastically in future. The policy solution 
has been to grant workers wage increases in small doses, so 
as to ameliorate the effects of the sharp wage rise on the 
export crop and on profitability. As this has often led to 
price increases of goods and services within the retail 
sectors, wage increases have had no beneficial real effect 
on the workers* purchasing power.
It is equally very important to assess the benefits that
accrue to the individual investors, as far as data will
allow.
The Profitability of Commercial Irrigation
The motive force behind the development and indeed expansion 
of commercial irrigation is the private investor. To 
attract the private investor, irrigation agriculture has to 
be seen to be profitable.
It is however clear that despite the state's provision of
considerable public aid, the private irrigator still has to 
bear significant development costs, which clearly affect the
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private profitability of irrigation ventures. These costs 
comprise, depending on the type of crop grown, labour, 
tractor operating costs, fertilizer and lime, seeds, 
herbicides, insecticides aerial spraying costs, irrigation 
costs, combine hire, transport, bags, packaging, storage, 
insurance, levy costs and other sundry costs such as income 
tax payment, interest payment on loans and building costs.
The cash requirements to meet all these costs can exert a 
lot of pressure on the resources of the investor. Most 
investors therefore rely heavily on borrowing from banks and 
the Farm Irrigation Fund in order to be able to carry out 
any investment. Clearly, their ability to repay the loans 
and be able to continue in irrigation agriculture ultimately 
depends on the crop prices that are in operation.
Table 5.9 shows for a selected number of crops, that the 
size of the profit margin realised by the private investor 
depends on the size of the gross income realised in relation 
to the total variable costs incurred. For the venture to be 
profitable, the gross income must be higher than the total 
variable costs. In the examples given, it is clear that the 
gross profit for each crop has been fluctuating over the 9 
years reviewed. Wheat, cotton and soya beans realised peak 
profit margins around 1983, 1984 and 1985, while maize*s
peak profitability period was 1980/81 when it realised 
$330.45 per hectare. A comparison of all the four crops' 
profitability on a per hectare basis, suggests that wheat 
cultivation has been the most profitable venture realising 
the highest gross margin of $475.85 per hectare in the 
1984/85 seasons.
In order to assess the real returns to the investor it is 
necessary to assess the returns for every dollar invested. 
On the basis of this criterion, only maize has realised the 
returns per invested dollar of up to $2.01. All other crops 
have experienced more or less uniform returns fluctuating 
between $1 and $1.6 for every dollar invested. For all 
crops, the margin of profitability declines towards 1987.
TABLE 5.9 RETURNS TO PRIVATE INVESTORS
CROP Y E A R S
WHEAT 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total Variable Cost 438.64 507.83 591.81 696.17 785.79 94 7.01 1159.74 1223.25
Gross Income 663.55 811.00 934 .10 1081.30 1246.75 1422.86 1497.75 1497.75
Gross Margin 224.91 308.17 342.29 385.13 460.96 475.85 338.01 274.50
Returns/$ T V C 1.51 1.60 1.58 • 1.55 1.59 1.50 1.20 •1.22
T V C + 1/2 + 10Z of G I 724.32 842.03 901.13 1152.39 1303.37 1562.81 1889.39 1984.65
Index of Return/$ T V C 100.00 105.96 104.64 102.65 105.30 99.34 85.43 80.79
SOYA BEANS 1979/80 1980/81 1901/82 1982/03 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Total Variable Cost (T V C) 277.52 315.13 361.62 401.4 7 457.59 539.60 653.55 716.64
Gross Income (G I) 368.00 391.00 460.00 598.00 660.10 736.00 782.00 782.00
Gross Margin (G M) 90.48 75.87 98. 38 196.43 202.51 196.40 128.45 65.36
Returns/$ T V C 1.33 1.24 1.27 1.49 1.44 1.36 1.20 1.09
T V C + 1/2 + 10Z of G I 453.08 511.80 588.43 662.16 752.40 883.00 1058.53 1153.16
Index of Return/$ T V C 100.00 93 .23 95.49 112.03 108.27 102.26 90.23 81.95
COTTON
*
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Total Variable Cost 396.83 440.05 519.48 569.35 675.37 820.72 996.92 1138.21
Gross Income 590.04 621.23 822.69 813.78 907.34 1062.61 1191.55 1191.55
Gross Margin 192.21 181.18 303.21 244 .43 231.97 241.89 194.63 1.05
Return/$ T V C 1.49 1.41 1.58 1.43 1.34 1.29 1.20 1.05
T V C i 1/2 + 10Z of G I 654.25 722.20 861.49 935.42 1103.79 1337.34 1614.54 1826.47
Index of Return/$ T V C 100.001 94 .63 106.04 95.97 89.93 86.58 80.54 70.47
MAIZE 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Total Variable Cost 267 .58 328.71 416.50 470.30 521.99 651.03 799.91 882.74
Gross Income 466.93 659.16 659.16 659.16 781.41 1002.15 999.88 999.88
Gross Margin 199.35 330.45 242.66 188.86 259.42 351.12 199.97 117.14
Return/$ T V C 1. 75 2.01 1.58 1.40 1.50 1.54 1.25 1.13
T V C + 1/2 + 10Z of G I 488.06 558.99 690.67 711.37 861.13 1076.77 1299.85 1424.10
Index of Return/$ T V C 100.00 1114 .86 90.29 80.00 85.71 88.00 71.43 64.57
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
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Clearly, the total variable costs and the gross income or 
the gross margin aggregate figures are all affected by many 
other negative factors in the economy such as inflation. 
It has therefore been necessary to index all the figures on 
returns per dollar using 1979/80 as the base year. Using 
real term figures, it is clear that irrigated commercial 
maize has not been profitable since 1981, and the profit 
margin has declined by as much as 40% of 1979/80 figures.
Cotton has experienced similar declines in profit margins, 
with the lowest level in the 1986/87 season when profit 
margins were 30% below the 1979/80 levels. On the contrary, 
wheat has been very profitable since 1979/80, and 
experienced minor declines of less than 20% from 1985. In 
the absence of figures on other cash crops such as tea, 
coffee and sugar, it is clear that wheat has been a more 
profitable crop than the other crops.
What is perhaps of great concern to the cashflow position 
of the investors is that they are required to meet a much 
higher cost outlay per hectare, in financial terms, in 1987 
than was the case in 1979/80.
In the case of irrigated maize for example where the outlay 
was, in 1979/80, at $267.58 per hectare, in 1986/87, it was 
$882.74, an increase of 230% against a fall in profit of 35% 
for the same period while the cost outlay for wheat rose by 
179% over the same period. This implies that it is much 
more costly financially to engage in irrigation in 1987 than 
it was in 1979/80. This conclusion has very serious 
implications for the expansion of commercial irrigation in 
Zimbabwe. Clearly, while profit margins have actually 
fallen in real terms, investors are having to put more
financial resources into irrigation. This has a tendency of 
barring the entrance of new farmers into commercial
irrigation.
Discussions with investors have revealed that all is not
well in the irrigation sector. Farmers have blamed low
profit margins on a host of factors ranging from the input 
price escalation to the low international commodity prices.
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In addition to these, is the ever present problem of the 
delivery of necessary inputs such as farm machinery, 
fertilizers, insecticides and fuel, not arriving at the farm 
in quantities and at the times that are opportune from the 
farmers' point of view. The fact that the availability of 
these essential inputs cannot be guaranteed has affected 
optimal planning at the farm level resulting in a lot of 
hesitation on the part of the farmers to exploit to the 
fullest, the crop production opportunities in order to 
realise much higher profit margins.
The recurrence of droughts and the resultant water shortages 
have also eaten into the profitability of irrigation. The 
peak of any drought has often ushered in temporary water use 
control measures, that in farming terms, have come to mean 
the curtailment or the 'shrinkage' of the hectarage under 
irrigation, and by implication, causing a drop in output and 
profitability.
Since the irrigation sector is cash crop and export 
dependent, crops such as cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea and 
sugar are going to continue to rely for their profitability 
on the vagaries of the international commodity prices. 
Since the 1982/83 price peak, the world agricultural 
commodity prices have experienced sharp declines, resulting 
in the erosion of profits and the viability of most of the 
irrigation plantations in Zimbabwe. The position of 
irrigation farmers is made worse by the fact that, because 
of the fixed physical structures of irrigation, and the 
plantation nature of the production system, the farmers are 
not able to shift from these crops to other crops easily, or 
without incurring huge financial losses. The improvement, 
since mid 1986 of commodity prices on the world market and 
the rise in demand, has been a source of encouragement. It 
is, however often difficult to tell whether the upturn in 
prices reflects a long or a short term trend.
One indicator of the low profitability of irrigation 
agriculture is perhaps the high level of indebtedness and 
in some cases, outright insolvency, among the farmers. 
Although up-to-date statistical figures are not available,
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the Chavunduka Commission (1982) indicated that by 1982, 
many commercial farmers (irrigation and rainfed) were unable 
to repay the loans borrowed from the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC), let alone service the interests. The 
occasional 'writing-off* of farmers' bad debts by government 
has enabled most farmers to remain on the land.
The same Commission showed that in 1982, only 1,547 farmers 
were able to pay tax out of 4,975 commercial farmers, 
despite the existence of a very generous tax regime for the 
farmers. Although 'payment of tax' as a measure of 
profitability is rendered weak by the high degree of tax 
avoidance and evasion the fact is not lost that nearly two 
thirds of the country's commercial farmers experienced 
'serious' financial problems.
Foreign Exchange Earnings
Perhaps the most important benefit that can be realised from 
cash crop irrigated agriculture is the level of foreign 
exchange the sale of crops overseas can bring. It follows 
therefore that the higher the level of foreign exchange 
resources realised by the irrigation sector the greater the 
chances that the sector would be able to get most of the 
essential inputs, as well as service or repay all the loans 
borrowed for dam construction.
From a national point of view, the generation of foreign 
exchange by irrigation agriculture is important in terms of 
meeting nationwide obligations that need foreign exchange. 
The Zimbabwean economy has been experiencing serious foreign 
exchange constraints, which have resulted in the curtailment 
of the imports of intermediate goods and essential raw 
materials and services, needed by the whole economy but more 
so by the industrial sector. The state has tended therefore 
to support any investment that has the potential to generate 
foreign exchange? and commercial irrigation is one such 
investment.
For example, tobacco, cotton, sugar, maize, coffee and tea 
earned the country $222 million in 1979 and $257 million in
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1980. However, real gains can only be evaluated in 'net' 
foreign exchange terms. The size of the 'net' for Zimbabwe 
is affected by a number of factors. In production terms 
Zimbabwe is a small producer of all the export crops and as 
such has limited influence on the prevailing international 
commodity prices. As a 1price taker1 as opposed to a price 
determinor, Zimbabwe's gross earnings are entirely at the 
mercy of the big producer countries and the stock holding 
policies of the buying countries. Zimbabwe has a very high 
foreign debt servicing ratio of 36 percent per year (as of 
1986) which tends to take a very large share of the gross 
foreign exchange earned.
Although there are no figures, it is believed that the 
transportation of these export crops takes a sizeable share 
of the gross earnings.
In order to assess the gross foreign exchange earned by 
irrigation, the gross volume of export for all crops 
(including the rainfed component) has been assumed to 
contain all the output from irrigation. The percentage 
volume due to irrigation has been calculated using the 
representative portion of output that is due to irrigation. 
The gross value earned has then been divided by the gross 
volume and the result multiplied by the volume due to 
irrigation. The error in the calculation is negligible. 
The end product of this calculation is Table 5.10. The 
figures produced are only valid insofar as the basic 
assumption, that all produce from irrigation is included in 
the volume exported, can be accepted. This is considered 
a fair assumption, given that sales in the domestic market 
of the produce (except for maize and sugar) is relatively 
insignificant. In the absence of data on foreign exchange 
earned specifically by the irrigation sector, this is the 
only possible approach to approximate foreign exchange 
earnings by irrigation.
According to Table 5.10, it is clear that gross foreign 
exchange earned was largely from tobacco, cotton and coffee 
by volume and value of export. Maize, a low value, high 
bulk commodity has consistently yielded poor foreign
TABLE 5.10
GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FROM IRRIGATION CROP EXPORTS ONLY (1979 - 1983)
CROP 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 PRINCIPAL 
DESTINATIONS 
OF EXPORTSMASS
*000t
VALUE
$M
MASS
’000t
VALUE
$M
MASS
’000t
VALUE
$M
MASS
’000t
VALUE
$M
MASS
’000t
VALUE
$M
Tobacco 6 8 9 12 13 22 9 19 9 23 Holland China W.Germany
Cotton Lint 22.05 21 24 26 24 27 21 23 22 33 Italy W.Germany Japan SA
Sugar (Raw and Refined) 245 21 166 47 172 55 220 52 202 52 USA EEC Botswana
Maize 17.52 1.4 5 1 19 3 28 3.2 40 3.3 Zaire Zambia SA Ethiopia
Coffee 2.8 7.7 2.1 5 4 7 5 11 5 13 SA Switzerland W.Germany
Tea 4.4 4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 4 3 4.4 6 UK South Africa Eire EEC
TOTAL 297.77 63.1 209.4 94.3 235.3 117.3 287' 111.2 282.4 130.3
2 Share due to Irrigation 352 392 312 312 312
Source: Figures on this Table have been derived from figures in the Monthly Supplement to the Digest of Statistics,
January 1985
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exchange returns, and so has sugar. A comparison with other 
crops would show that one train load of cotton can earn as 
much foreign exchange as eight train loads of maize, and one 
train load of tobacco can earn the same as about 15 train 
loads of maize.
Although earnings by tobacco are clearly substantial per 
volume of sales, tobacco prices on the international market, 
have remained volatile. This has had the consequence of 
affecting the stability of the tobacco industry, as a whole 
and indirectly of the economy that is heavily dependent on 
it. World market cotton prices have also been depressed for 
some years, but the high quality of the Zimbabwean fibre has 
always attracted premium prices. Coffee prices have been 
boosted by the country's joining of the International Coffee 
Agreement, which has given Zimbabwe an assured fixed quota 
market annually of 65,000 bags (60kg size). The world 
coffee prices also received a boost due to the short-to- 
medium term effects of the Brazilian drought, which has 
created a higher demand for coffee, allowing small producers 
to benefit as from 1984. In addition, Zimbabwe's quota is 
set to increase by 10% annually until it reaches 400,000 
bags. Without this quota, the country would find it almost 
impossible to export its coffee competitively; even on the 
spot market.
Sugar, the main irrigation export crop, has suffered 
exceptionally wide price fluctuations on the world market. 
This has mostly been due to the unfair competition from the 
subsidized beet sugar within the EEC countries, and the 
production of the corn-based sugar in the USA market.
The London Daily nominal prices, as shown on Table 5.11 show 
that there has been a steady decline in the price of sugar 
since 1980. The price fell from Sterling Pounds 291.52 per 
ton in 1980 to Sterling Pounds 70.00 per ton by July 1985; 
a fall of 76% of the 1980 price. Demand for sugar in the 
OECD countries and in the USA also suffered from the 
health-awareness campaigns and from competition with the 
industries producing sugar-free artificial sweeteners.
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TABLE 5.11
LONDON DAILY PRICE OF SUGAR. 1980-1985
(ANNUAL AVERAGE PER TON)
YEAR
PRICE
(STERLING)
(LONDON)
DOMESTIC PRICES 
(STERLING EQUIVALENT) 
(ZIMBABWE)
1980 291.52 191
1981 202.21 182
1982 118.92 112
1983 140.04 145
1984 103.56 93
1985 July 70.00 45
Source: C. Czarnikow Ltd (1985) Personal Communications
1 Domestic Prices' are calculated from field data.
The Zimbabwean Sugar Industry owed its survival to the sugar 
quota market, especially between 1982 and 1985. Joining the 
International Sugar Agreement has enabled the country to 
sell 260,000 tons? approximately the total current annual 
export. In addition to this quota, the Lome Convention 
allows Zimbabwe to sell 25,000 tons of cane sugar annually 
into the UK market. The quota market affords the country 
much higher prices than the prices realised on the world 
market or the spot market.
Within the southern African regional market, while exports 
to South Africa are affected by political considerations, 
Botswana buys 30,000 tons under contract, and in recent 
years barter trade with Mozambique has allowed Zimbabwe to 
export sugar in exchange for fish and cashewnuts.
The fortunes for the tea industry have equally been 
depressed. The high domestic production costs have eaten 
into the industry's productivity, at a time when domestic 
consumption was falling, and the government refusing to 
support the industry. On the world market, the carry-over 
stock of 55,300 tons in 1983 ensured that the price of tea 
was kept low. The situation improved slightly in the 
1984/85 period when India, a major tea producer reduced its 
exports in order to satisfy the domestic market.
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The poor world market prices for the crops discussed above, 
have partly been responsible for the country's acute foreign 
exchange shortage.
Net Foreign Exchange Earned
The net or surplus foreign exchange earned by irrigation, 
after subtracting all foreign exchange used for the 
importation of irrigation inputs, represents the true 
benefit of irrigation agriculture to the whole economy. The 
following formula has been employed in calculating the 'net1 
foreign exchange earned:
Nf = Fg - (^- (^-lrc + If + lm + lo)) * <1+r) 
where
Nf = Net Foreign Exchange Earned
^  Fg = Gross Foreign Exchange Earned
lrc = Imported capital and interest charges on the
capital
If = The cost of Imported Fertilizers
lm = The cost of imported machinery
lo = The cost covering all other inputs e.g. spare
parts, fuel, insecticides and expertise 
1+r = The discount factor over time
Figures on Table 5.12 are used in the calculation of 'net' 
figures. The tabulated figures are all estimates arrived 
at very roughly, first, by calculating the percentage of the 
general gross import bill, that is due to irrigation. After 
estimating the dollar equivalent of irrigation's share, due 
consideration is taken of the fact that commercial 
irrigation sector is double cropping and therefore uses 
twice as many inputs as any other cropping system in the 
country. In the case of imported capital, the estimation 
takes into account the fact that, on current evidence, most 
dams constructed, have been constructed using 4/5 foreign 
capital and 1/5 government resources.
TABLE 5.12
USE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES BY THE COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION SECTOR (1978 / 1983) ($*000)
IMPORTED IMPORTED INSECTICIDE INSECTICIDE FERTILIZER FERTILIZER FUEL FUEL FOREIGN
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPORTS IMPORTS IMPORTS IMPORTS IMPORTS IMPORTS CAPITAL
MACHINERY IRRIGATION IRRIGATION IRRIGATION IN THE 
ECONOMY
FOR
IRRIGATION
SECTOR
AND
INTEREST
CHARGES
TOTAL
YEAR FOR DAM 
CONSTRUC­
(GENERAL) (40ZSHARE) (GENERAL) (50ZSHARE) (GENERAL) (45ZSHARE) (GENERAL) (30ZSHARE) TION
1978 5 859 2 344 12 045 6 023 14 747 6 636 5 827 1 748 28 667 45 418
1979 8 818 3 272 13 158 6 579 23 939 10 773 8 441 2 532 29 000 52 156
1980 17 355 6 942 15 894 7 947 29 578 13 310 9 435 2 831 58 600 89 630
1981 18 685 7 474 18 486 9 243 45 000 20 250 15 916 4 774 68 000 109 742
1982 18 108 7 243 18 064 9 032 48 000 21 600 12 025 3 608 62 000 103 474
1983 28 036 11 214 12 391 6 196 19 374 8 880 11 109 3 333 74 100 103 723
NOTES
1 All figures for irrigation above are based on rough estimates of the share of use of foreign exchange by irrigation
2 The higher figures for the capital cost borrowed for dams reflects the rise in interest charges, and the progressively 
worsening position of the Zimbabwean Dollar against major currencies.
3. The foreign exchange expenditure items, are the major ones, and do not include many minor ones such as the cost of wheat 
inputs, imports of bags, electricity, expatriate labour etc. Foreign remittances of profit is one major item of foreign 
currency expenditure that is not included above because of lack of data.
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
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Using the equation Nf = ^Fg - (lrc + If + lm + lo)t(1+r> the 
calculation of Nf, can be arrived at for all the years 
involved by first calculating the ^ Fg side of the equation 
using information on Table 5.10. Data for the right side of 
the equation, (the summation of what is in brackets) is 
derived from Table 5.12, which are then subtracted for all 
the years from Fg. The result of this calculation is 
Table 5.13. The lo element of the streams of ‘other 
imports' has not been calculated because of the absence of 
basic data that would have made estimation possible.
On the basis of the above calculations it would appear that 
commercial irrigation is a net foreign exchange earner. 
Clearly, this conclusion has been reached at using very 
crude statistical figures and the omission of very important 
items of imports that use a lot of foreign currency. It can 
be argued therefore that the inclusion of these could have 
the effect of reducing significantly the margin of net 
foreign exchange returns, and in some cases it would be 
possible to record negative returns. If the 'net' returns 
on Table 5.13 were calculated in real 1979 prices, the net 
returns over the five years would be much less. Although 
this is not done here, the reason why that outcome is 
possible is mostly to do with the fall of the value of the 
Zimbabwean dollar by almost 80% of the 1980 value, the 
increase in the rate of inflation and the presence of other 
uneconomic factors in the economy, that have the effect of 
affecting the relative values of commodities.
TABLE 5.13
NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING -
COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION rS'OOO*
GROSS FOREIGN TOTAL USE OF NET FOREX
YEAR EXCHANGE EARNED FOREIGN EXCHANGE SURPLUS/
DEFICIT(-)
1979 63,100 52,156 10,944
1980 94,300 89,630 4, 670
1981 117,300 109,742 7 558
1982 111,200 103,474 7,726
1983 130,300 103,723 26,577
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
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Internal Linkages with the Domestic Economy and the 
Fostering of rural Development
In cost benefit analysis terms, and with reference to Fig. 
5.1, the linkage effects of public and private investment in 
commercial irrigation represent the projects* impact beyond 
those immediate to the schemes. An analysis of the linkage 
effects inevitably introduces a high degree of subjectivity 
in the analysis, because of the nature of the streams of 
benefits that result. As it is often impracticable to 
quantify these effects, the adoption of a descriptive 
analysis in this study is considered sufficient.
Since sugar cane, tea, coffee, cotton and tobacco are 
largely exported in raw form, the country therefore not only 
loses the value added due to processing but also the 
opportunity of setting up agro-based industries and the jobs 
that could result from some form of beneficiation. These 
benefits are realized * off-shore' in the importing 
countries. Also lost are the benefits associated with 
product diversification, as well as the preclusion of the 
emergence of a crop processing technology in the long term.
Although this study has not analysed this problem fully, 
preliminary investigations have shown that it is possible
that commercial irrigation has exacerbated poverty and
s
income differential by attracting able-bodied men to work on 
the schemes. This has led to the reduction in domestic food 
production among the peasants concerned, which cannot 
adequately be compensated by the low minimum wages. Since 
the workers and their families cannot rely totally on the 
wage paid, the decline in food production has resulted in 
widespread poverty among the workers, and malnutrition among 
their children. Certainly further research work is called 
for, to verify these assertions.
At the farm level, the creation of surplus savings for 
re-investment has clearly been made more difficult by the 
low rates of individual profitability and the high rates of 
indebtedness among the farmers. Expansion of the sector, 
clearly has to continue to rely heavily on the continued
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flow of state subsidies, as has been the case so far. The 
relatively reasonable profit margins realised by the few 
large agribusinesses such as the Anglo American are eaten 
into by the need to remit some of the profit in the form of 
dividends to external shareholders as a matter of corporate 
obligation. This clearly means that the reinvestment 
capacity of irrigation must remain highly proscribed. The 
dependence by the sector as a whole, on costly imported 
inputs, has not been helpful.
Only to a limited extent has irrigation encouraged the 
emergence of manufacturing industries producing sprinkler 
equipment, small tools, pipes and ploughs. While this is 
certainly a positive development, the benefit from it is 
reduced by the fact that the inputs produced have a very 
high import content. Besides, considerations of economies 
of scale in terms of marketing, and with respect to capital 
and available skills, would require the growth of the sector 
to more than double its present size, before an economic 
manufacturing base can be developed to service it.
The realization of regional benefits arising from the 
location of most of these schemes in the dry and remote 
parts of the south-eastern Lowveld, has been precluded by 
the fact that these schemes have largely remained isolated 
"islands" of growth in vast areas of relative backwardness. 
From a regional economic development planning point of view, 
the "enclave development" nature of the schemes, means that 
they form neither a part of the overall regional development 
strategy nor do they exhibit any sensitivity to 
neighbourhood problems. For example, while the peasantry 
sector surrounding the Triangle and Hippo Valley schemes was 
seriously hit by the 1982-1984 droughts and famine, the two 
schemes continued to produce cash crops, and no attempt was 
made to put a few hectares of irrigated land aside for food 
production.
From the degree of intensity of use of both capital and 
technology, the schemes have clearly had little or no direct 
link with the activities of the neighbourhood environment. 
The resulting absence of technology transfer to the communal
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areas means that future expansion of private irrigation 
along current lines will clearly continue to reproduce these 
negative relations. In the absence of a coherent and 
conscious effort by both the government and the private 
investor, to change the current status, there is no basis 
for optimism that irrigation agriculture could produce 
1 trickle-down1 effects into the whole economy other than 
those discussed above.
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CHAPTER 6
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN SMALL SCALE IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE 
INTRODUCTION
In the previous Chapter, an attempt has been made to assess 
the extent to which both public and private sector 
investment in bulk water supply capacity and commercial 
irrigation agriculture have iu&ol the policy
objective of output maximization or economic growth. In the 
peasant sector, however, the Government's objectives are 
different, namely to influence the distribution of income, 
to reduce regional growth disparities, and generally to 
raise the standard of living of the peasants. The aim is to 
achieve these objectives through massive investments in 
small scale irrigation agriculture.
An attempt is made in this Chapter to demonstrate that small 
scale irrigation agriculture has failed to act as an 
appropriate vehicle for achieving the desired benefits 
associated with the Government's equity objectives. It is 
further argued that where public sector investment in small 
scale irrigation schemes has achieved some of the set 
objectives, this has only been done at very high cost 
involving massive subsidies, and at the expense of other 
potentially more rewarding investments elsewhere in the 
economy. The extent to which the full exploitation of the 
present dryland agriculture can be seen as a viable 
alternative to irrigation agriculture is then examined and 
further study work recommended.
In Zimbabwe, particularly since 1980, the justification for 
all forms of public intervention in the peasantry sector has 
been based on the political requirement to redress those 
developmental imbalances associated with the racial policies 
of past regimes (Chapter 3). Of crucial importance, public 
intervention has had to address the relationship between 
limited land resources and rapid population growth. The 
need to intervene, on behalf of the peasants has got to be 
seen in the context of the relative lack of industrial 
growth, and the absence of alternative employment
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opportunities in the economy, and the inevitable pressure on 
the rural resource base. A pressure no doubt, greatly 
exacerbated by the past racialist land policies and the 
inability of the present government to undo them. Above 
all, this intervention has been seen as a practical attempt 
by the government to solve problems of hunger, poverty and 
deprivation, in the communal areas.
Being seen to be addressing the issue of distributive equity 
became the key preoccupation of politicians. The aim was to 
ensure that the benefits from growth were equitably 
distributed in such a way that the pace of growth would not 
be stifled. In reality, this has meant that the modern 
agricultural sector has remained largely untouched and the 
equity considerations have been confined to the policies 
developed for the peasant sector. In the long term, the aim 
is to upgrade rural peasantry incomes and to reduce income 
disparities between that sector and the modern sector of the 
economy. There was thus little attempt to redistribute 
incomes directly? the assumption was made that policy 
initiatives could promote faster rates of real income growth 
in the peasant sector. Thus in time it was hoped that 
differential growth rates would achieve the redistributive 
objectives of the government. The small scale irrigation 
strategy was conceived within this view.
The seeds of failure were inherent within this approach to 
reducing income disparities. As a strategy, it could only 
achieve the equity objectives over a considerable period of 
time. Moreover, the perceived need to maintain growth in 
the 'market1 economy meant that in reality a high proportion 
of available investment resources had to be allocated to the 
market sector. Perhaps the most damning aspect of this 
strategy was the fact that it did not question nor did it 
seek to change the historically established patterns of 
wealth. If anything, by seeking to redress inequalities 
solely through intervention in the peasant sector, the 
strategy fossilized the inequalities that existed prior to 
1980.
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On a wider contextual level, the Government of Zimbabwe's 
direct intervention in small scale irrigation schemes can be 
seen as a reaction to the observed deficiencies of the 
economic growth efficiency model. It has largely come to be 
realised in development economics literature that neither 
the equity with which benefits from production in the modern 
economy are allocated between people over space and time, 
nor the spatial allocation of any associated growth and 
associated developments are matters of concern in the 
efficiency model. But these closely related tissues are 
rarely matters of indifference to the 'socialist' 
government, which is concerned both with the proportion of 
income, employment and the general rise in the standard of 
living accruing to the peasantry sector and other low paid 
groups.
Theoretically, any discussion of distributive equity is 
plagued by the very different definitions which have been 
employed within the development economics literature (Rees 
1985). Some analysts would argue that equity means equality 
with equal shares for all, while to others it means 
allocating shares according to need. Further, there are 
those who regard it as equitable to give the greatest share 
to those who have made the greatest contribution, giving 
more rewards to the industrious, those willing to take risks 
and those with greater skills or knowledge. A further group 
of 'market' oriented economists argues that it is equitable 
to allocate shares according to people's willingness to pay 
for them; that is, following Young (1980) 'to each according 
to the contribution of resources in his possession'. This 
put simply means that those possessing large initial 
resource endowments will receive proportionately large 
shares of the productive system's output. In the developing 
countries, very few people would openly argue that a system 
was equitable if it served to make the rich still richer, 
especially when it is considered that in most cases resource 
endowments for the rich few, are a result of historic 
legacy.
In Zimbabwe and in most Third World countries, the variant 
of equity that is dominant, at least at the policy
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formulation level, is that which seeks to give rewards "to 
each according to need". There is also the problem of 
balancing "growth" versus "consumption" objectives, lack of 
investment versus the high propensity to consume of poor 
groups. This notion of rewarding members of the society on 
the basis of some set standard of what constitutes 'need' 
has been buttressed by the proliferation of the ‘Basic 
Needs' literature in current development discussions. The 
synopsis of the argument behind this notion of equity, is 
that society must, as a matter of right, make sure that 
everyone of its members has received the three 'basics', 
namely: adequate shelter, food and adequate access to health 
and education facilities before any development can be said 
to have taken place. In fact some have gone as far as 
recognizing the fulfillment of this notion of equity as the 
prerequisite requirement for any 'just' society. It follows 
therefore that greater expenditure on health and education 
is often seen as fulfilling this notion of equity. It is, 
however, clear that the proponents of this form of equity 
have not been able to come up with any low cost mechanisms 
for its achievement. Existing mechanisms such as the social 
security systems set up in some developed countries, would 
impose a tremendous burden on the LDCs' economies. Indeed 
it would be impossible to operate in poor countries where, 
those in "need" are in the majority (above 70% of the 
population)? where the revenue generation base is small and 
overtaxed, and where overall development is heavily 
dependent on foreign aid.
All the above equity concepts are concerned with outcomes; 
with who gets what from a productive system. However, over 
the past couple of years, the thinking in Zimbabwe has 
shifted in favour of an alternative notion which stresses 
the process involved rather than the end-results. The idea 
being emphasized is that there should be equality of 
opportunity or equality of access to opportunities and of 
participation in the development process. The notion
clearly does not address the question of prior availability 
of 'opportunities', especially when it is recognized that 
in most Third World countries, 'opportunities' in whatever 
form are non existent and cannot be taken as given.
189
Notwithstanding this fact, it is true in many respects that 
the growth with equity policy is regarded by the Government 
of Zimbabwe as one which achieves equity by allowing, for 
example, the peasants to participate in income generating 
projects like the small scale irrigation schemes. What the 
policy makers often forget in the pursuit of this form of 
equity is that the 'peasants* are not necessarily a 
homogenous class of people with 'equalized' material base 
and needs.
Ideally the projects in which peasants participate should 
be so viable that the beneficiary peasants do not require 
further government handouts or subsidies. In the same vein, 
it is theoretically supportable for the government to incur 
the 'one-off' expenditure essential for the creation of 
economic 'take-off' conditions. The fact that actual 
experience has failed to live up to the desired outcomes, as 
enunciated in the 'Growth with Equity' policy strategy, is 
the subject of discussion in this chapter. It must be 
pointed out that the process of experimenting with this 
notion of equity is not a costless exercise.
The use of such vastly different equity concepts in part 
reflects genuine ideological differences between analysts 
and helps to explain the highly polarized debate over what 
should constitute the most equitable social system. The 
arguments over equity are further complicated by the fact 
that it is by no means unusual for the governments and 
individual citizens to appeal simultaneously to quite 
different notions of equity when it is in their interest to 
do so (Rees 1985). While the Government of Zimbabwe accepts 
the notion of equity based on the active participation of 
the peasants in the process of their development, the 
peasants frequently view this notion as highly inequitable 
since the process of their development does not in anyway 
challenge the historical basis of the existing inequality, 
nor does the government have any plans, or tangible 
programmes for rectifying the unequal distribution of the 
resource base itself. The failure of many equity-oriented 
and public supported schemes can be traced to this issue of 
unequal resource base which makes public subsidies almost
inevitable.
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Following Rees (1985) it is highly possible that equity 
considerations can be used as a means of legitimizing 
decisions made on quite different grounds, or to justify 
demands and actions that are in reality motivated by self 
interest or political considerations that have nothing to 
do with equity. If there is so much disagreement as to what 
constitutes 'equity* at the theoretical level, the attempt 
to move beyond the rhetoric, and try to implement the 
various notions of equity has been bedeviled by numerous 
problems, some of them, arising from the definition 
problems.
Ecruitv and Public Investment in Small Scale Irrigation 
Agriculture
There is a lot of validity in the allegation that public 
sector investment in small scale irrigation agriculture, 
mostly through the use of subsidies, is a form of a 'bribe' 
designed to persuade the landless peasants and those living 
on the overcrowded communal lands to desist from agitating 
for an 'equitable' redistribution of land.
The civil war that culminated with political independence 
in 1980 was fought under the banner of 'more land for the 
peasants'? and the socialist principles and policies of the 
ruling party made that outcome all the more plausible. 
Restoration of 'stolen lands' to their 'rightful' owners was 
then regarded as the highest form of 'equity'. It was only 
natural therefore that most peasants expected and believed 
that they were to repossess all the land that was under 
private commercial agriculture.
This did not happen. Instead, the pragmatic policies of the 
'new' government shifted away from the original plan of 
massive land handouts, to a more controlled and limited land 
resettlement programme. Under this programme, returning 
refugees from neighbouring states were given first 
resettlement preference, and then peasants from a few highly 
overcrowded communal areas. The 1979 Lancaster House
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Accords and the resultant Independence Constitution, had 
made the acquisition of land by the Government both very 
expensive and restricted. Naturally, only a small number of 
peasants could be resettled. Even the planned resettlement 
figure for 1983 was only 20,723 families out of a government 
target of 162,000 families (The Three Year Transitional 
Development Plan, 1981) ? that is only 8 percent of the 
planned three year target as Table 6.1 shows. However a 
World Bank review at the end of 1983 indicated that even
TABLE 6.1
EQUITY THROUGH LAND REDISTRIBUTION NUMBER OF FAMILIES 
SETTLED
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3
THREE YEAR TARGET ACTUAL ACTUAL (ESTIMATE)
1980/81 - 1982/83 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83
162,000 480 7,497 20,723
Source: Derived from the 'World Bank, Agricultural Sector
Study, 1983'.
this low figure was not achieved and only 18,000 families 
had actually been settled. If availability of land proved 
difficult, the cost of resettlement was excessive. For 
example $60 million of British aid was spent in resettling 
only 18,000 refugee families ($3,400 per family, 1982 
prices). An estimation by the World Bank in 1983, showed 
that to settle a further 144,000 families, a total of $640 
million was required. It became clear that the economy 
could not finance such a program:
"........  funding only the set up costs of a program
of this scale entirely from domestic resources would 
consume funds equivalent to more than 70% of total
government revenue over the years.......  and would
require resources amounting to eight and half times
total government development expenditure........  and
these figures make no allowance for added recurrent 
costs".
(The World Bank, Agriculture Sector Study 1983).
A further factor that contributed to the abandonment of land 
redistribution as a strategy for achieving equity, was the
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belief among politicians that large scale land 
redistribution could threaten the country*s agricultural 
viability, and in turn the economy. This was an open 
acknowledgement that the commercial agricultural * sub-sector 
was the backbone of this agriculturally based economy.
Thus the post-independence surge of illegal squatting on 
commercial lands, resulted in the arrest of the squatters. 
But, politically this reaction could only be a temporary 
measure; it was vital that alternative strategies were 
worked out. Small scale irrigation schemes seemed to offer 
such a solution. In other words, what could not be solved
by the extensive redistribution of land, was to be solved
by the intensive settlement of peasants on small irrigated
plots scattered throughout the communal areas, on small
pockets of irrigable soils. However the key question that 
has not been answered is whether irrigation is the correct 
or appropriate vehicle for delivering distributive equity.
Whv Irrigation?
The question that has to be asked is why the government 
decided to rely on investments in irrigation agriculture as 
the vehicle for the achievement of equity. Irrigation
agriculture, as a system of crop production, at least in its 
ideal form, possesses many attractive qualities compared to 
any other form of cropping system:
1. It allows for very high yields to be obtained from a 
small piece of land?
2. Land use is intensive and agriculture can be carried out 
throughout the year?
3. Crop diversification is made more possible in areas 
where one crop per growing season is the norm?
4. It has a very high potential population carrying 
capacity?
5. The incomes of participating farmers are potentially
high?
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6. Because of the year round cultivation possibilities, 
full time and seasonal employment opportunities are 
expected to be good?
7. Irrigation allows climatically marginal areas with good 
soils to be brought under cultivation and crop 
production.
However, this attractiveness of irrigation agriculture 
belies many practical problems which makes it less suitable 
as an appropriate mechanism for the achievement of equity, 
as this Chapter seeks to demonstrate.
For the Zimbabwean Government, it is irrigation agriculture 
in its 1 ideal' rather than actual form that seems to have 
had the greatest influence on the policy process. Despite 
glaring evidence of the failure of the irrigation-based 
Green Revolution (Amin 1979) to afford 'equity' there has 
been no dampening of the government's enthusiasm for 
irrigation. To the politicians, irrigation seems to offer 
answers to two policy problems at once. That is, it 
addresses problems of income redistribution through 
development? and it seems to offer solutions, albeit in the 
short term, to the explosive problem of landlessness without 
the need to remove any more land from the commercial sector. 
In the process, the politicians earn their legitimacy, and 
their names can be associated with the commissioning of a 
number of dam construction works or the clearance of land 
and canal building. They are thus, prepared to invest in 
small scale irrigation agriculture on the basis of an 
idealized notion of what it can achieve.
However, the findings of this study show that 'the reality' 
deviates from the 'ideal' by a very wide margin for a number 
of reasons. If investment in small scale irrigation 
agriculture is to become the vehicle for achieving 
distributive equity, the question has to be asked as to 
whether it is the most cost effective crop husbandry system 
for achieving the policy objectives of equity.
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The Investment Cost Subsidies
The Government has sought to implement its distributive 
equity objectives through massive use of subsidies on the 
development of the irrigation schemes. Unlike the 
commercial irrigation sector, where some, albeit inadequate, 
attempts have been made to recover the historic capital 
costs, no such attempt is made in the case of small scale 
schemes. All capital costs relating to dam construction, 
canal construction, pumping stations and infield 
development, are paid for in full by the State.
The State has devised an accounting procedure which allows 
it to carry out all investments on dams in rural areas 
without the need for consideration for economy. Under the 
'normal development vote' all investments of a general 
nature including conservation works, territorial canal 
construction and so forth are carried out in the communal 
areas at no cost to the recipients. The policy makers 
therefore end up justifying and regarding as the only public 
subsidy, the 75% subsidies paid for the actual water used by 
the farmers, with the farmers paying only 25%. This false 
accounting procedure has enabled the State to treat the 
overall subsidy as insignificant.
Before 1980, the government could afford to write off the 
capital costs because on average the small-size dams 
(capacity >5 million cubic metres) used to cost $50,000 to 
construct. Today the capital cost of the dams of the same 
size is much higher, both in real and nominal terms as Table 
6.2 shows.
Clearly, it will not always be possible in future to justify 
the dismissal of these costs as 'obligatory normal' 
development expenses, and to allow for non-repayment. The 
fact that these cost figures exclude subsequent expenditure 
on infield works, land preparation and clearance and, where 
applicable the cost of pumping stations, enables the schemes 
to continue to be presented as ' low cost'. This approach 
also allows the Department of Agriculture and Extension 
Services to press for further investments in irrigation;
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TABLE 6.2
CAPITAL COST CHANGES FOR SMALL DAMS
DAM 1980/81
ESTIMATES
$'000
ACTUAL MONEY 
PAID IN 
1984/85
$'000
1984/85 
COST AT 
1980/81 
PRICES
$'000
Nyanyadzi Nenhowe 422 8,500 5,780
Mondi Mataga 3 750 7,900 5,372
Silverstroom 4,000 16,400 11,152
Tshovane 310 5,500 3,740
Mlezu 285 1,025 697
Shangani-Nkayi 3 650 12,200 8,296
each time making sure that the mobilization of resources for 
all categories of capital costs are presented singly in a 
fragmented manner. Thus the overall cost implications for 
each scheme are always lost to the decision makers. Besides 
the presence of a dam has always been used successfully to 
establish a prima facie case for subsequent investment in 
canals, infield works and pumping stations.
TABLE 6.3
CAPITAL COST ESCALATION RATIO
YEAR
(SELECTED) 1970 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Index 100 267 319 385 519 758 1190 1992 3347
Annual % 
Increase 13 20 21 34 46 57 68 112
* Source:Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, 1984
According to Table 6.3, while the government continues to 
operate the partial cost accounting system that has the 
effect of misdirecting scarce investment resource towards 
inviable projects, the construction costs have continued to 
rise many fold since 1970. Given the inflationary trends in 
the economy and the current poor growth prospects, these 
costs will continue to rise, and if this open-ended subsidy 
policy continues, (which is likely), the distortions
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arising from this could have very severe effects on other 
sectors of the economy.
In addition to meeting the full cost of constructing the 
dams, the state bears the total cost of reticulating the 
water through expensive lined canals to the field edge. In 
1984 Agritex had estimated this cost as falling between 
$1500 and $2500 per hectare, depending on the design of the 
scheme. However, evidence from the field supported by the 
World Bank findings (World Bank Study 1983) casts doubts on 
such figures, and gives alternative costings of $10,000 per 
hectare for gravity fed schemes and over $15,000 for those 
schemes involving long distance supply transmission canals 
and requiring booster pumping, as is the case at the Middle 
Sabi and Mtambara.
In addition, the state is also responsible for the operation 
and maintenance costs of each and every scheme. However, 
the peasants are expected to pay a token fee towards meeting 
this cost element (Table 6.4) although the State still meets 
75% of the cost. The share of the cost paid by the peasants 
was fixed arbitrarily.
The charges reflect the governments desire to leave as much 
income as possible in the hands of the farmers, and have 
little to do with the need to make sure that the schemes are 
self financing. In 1983 alone the State spent $11,500,000 
on operation and maintenance of all the schemes. For 
gravity-fed systems (the least cost schemes) this came to 
just over $500 per ha inclusive of a few supportive 
services. For the schemes served by kilometres of canals 
fed by booster pumps the cost outlay was over $800 per ha. 
In sand abstraction schemes, where all water has to be 
pumped from deep wells in the river beds, the running cost 
was over $900 per ha, at 1983 prices. Why did the State not 
ask the farmers to meet at least the full cost of operating 
and maintaining the schemes?
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TABLE 6.4
THE (20 - 25%) OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE CHARGE MET BY
FARMERS. .($/HA),
DOUBLE SUMMER WINTER
CROPPING CROP CROP
(a) 145 90 55
(b) 72 45 30
(c) 30 30 30
Note:
The above levels of charges apply as follows:-
(a) Where the water supply to the scheme is assured
(b) Where sporadic water shortages are experienced
(c) On sand abstraction schemes: summer only or winter only 
schemes.
The answer lies partly in the understanding of government's 
desire to make the schemes work, at any cost, and partly in 
the not-so-high incomes realised by the peasants.
According to Agritex's own estimates, for example, most 
irrigators were only earning annually between $1 200 and 
$1500 per hectare gross, even with the subsidies. If 
operation and maintenance charges were to be levied on the 
basis of the amount of water used, the average rate charge 
would be $600 per ha per year, assuming a water requirement 
of 12,000 cubic metres/ha/year. This would leave the farmer 
with between $600 and $800 per hectare per year, before 
deductions for ploughing costs and other small services and 
the cost of seeds. On the basis of these figures, the net 
income per family is so small that in order to avoid the 
erosion of the income received by each family, the 
government has had to subsidize the running costs upwards of 
75%.
If the peasants on the schemes receive all the above state 
subsidies, how much subsidy outlay is received by the 
peasants practicing rainfed agriculture, the alternative to 
irrigation? Very little. A comparison of subsidy provision 
to peasants on the schemes and those practicing dryland
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farming shows that very few resources are allocated to
subsistence rainfed agriculture, as shown on Table 6.5.
TABLE 6.5
PUBLIC SUBSIDY OUTLAYS. A COMPARISON BETWEEN IRRIGATION AND
RAINFED PEASANT AGRICULTURE
ACTIVITY IRRIGATION
(%)
RAINFED
(%)
1. Dam Construction 100 60
2. Canal Construction 100 Nil
3. Land Clearance 100 Nil
4. Pumping Station 100 Nil
5. Infield Development 100 Nil
6. Extension Services 65 35
7. Other Supportive Services 100 Nil
8. Running Costs 75 Nil
9. Input Costs 60 20
I Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
According to Stoneman (1978), in 1978 the government was 
subsidizing dryland peasants at between $0.60 and $1 per 
family. Since then the real term level of subsidization has 
not changed. Rainfed agriculture is under supported, and 
remains under capitalized a feature which definitely 
prevents the potential of this sector from being realised. 
Because of the large number of families involved in dryland 
agriculture as compared to irrigation, the total state 
subsidy to dryland farming could constitute a huge outlay 
of resources, and this could be the reason for lack of 
support.
Clearly, in terms of investment, no equitable share of 
resources has taken place, on a per hectare or family basis 
and by implication, public investment in irrigation serves 
to widen the income gap among the peasantry class. Equality 
of opportunity or of access to opportunities for all 
peasants, does not seem to exist; and is surely not being 
promoted by irrigation agriculture.
Although statistical data are not available it is common 
knowledge in Zimbabwe, as observed during field work, that 
the beneficiaries of the irrigation subsidies are often the 
Village Development Committee Leaders, or district
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councilors. An extension officer interviewed, argued that 
it was often necessary to have community leaders on all 
schemes as they were more amenable to government policies, 
and that these leaders would persuade other peasants into 
the schemes, by example. The belief seems to have gained 
ground in government circles, that the success and/or 
failure of any government sponsored project will depend on 
the enthusiastic support or lack of it, of community leaders 
and prominent people in the villages. The fact that the 
proliferation of obviously well-to-do people in schemes 
designed to promote equity, could hinder the realization of 
the objective, as the well-to-do become even wealthier, 
becomes secondary. The Success* of the project for field 
officers in terms of visible activities is more important 
than the fulfillment of the policy objectives.
At the schemes themselves, the appearances of wealth and 
betterment arising from these subsidies has on the one hand 
increased jealousies between the peasants on the schemes and 
those on dryland agriculture. On the other hand, the fact 
that the peasants on the schemes have continued to hold on 
to their dryland crop and grazing rights in defiance of 
government laws and regulations, has increased land rights 
tensions among the peasants, with the dryland peasants 
voicing their concern at what they rightly see as ‘double' 
gains by the peasants on the schemes. The open ended use of 
subsidy in irrigation has denied the cliental peasants the 
opportunity to fully appreciate the true costs associated 
with irrigation agriculture. This fact alone removes the 
element of participation by peasants as purported by the 
'Growth with Equity' strategy in resource mobilization for 
the development process, and creates an internal dependency 
syndrome with the peasants entirely dependent on the state. 
All irrigation farmers entering new expensive schemes have 
come to expect the same package of subsidies, and cannot 
accept future policy deviations by the government from the 
precedence that has been set.
From the interviews conducted with both the peasants and 
government officials during field work, it became evident 
that small scale irrigation schemes as operated in Zimbabwe
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are very costly compared to rainfed agriculture, and tend 
to worsen rural income inequality and to exacerbate regional 
development imbalances. For example Table 6.6 shows that in 
terms of state investment, more development has taken place 
in Manicaland and Matebeleland South? then Masvingo and 
Midlands. The three provinces of Mashonaland are not 
important in terms of small scale irrigation development 
because Mashonaland has very high rainfall and is the area 
most covered by private commercial farms (Chapter 3) . 
Although there are a lot of schemes both gazetted and 
developed for dry Matebeleland South than for Masvingo and 
Midlands provinces respectively, most of Matebeleland South, 
Midlands and Masvingo schemes are either abandoned totally 
every drought year, or are only occupied during the rain 
season when the dams have some water. Only Manicaland has 
benefited significantly from State intervention in 
irrigation agriculture.
TABLE 6.6
DISTRIBUTION OF IRRIGATION OPPORTUNITIES BY PROVINCES
PROVINCE AREA IN 
GAZETTED
HA. PROPOSED
----  EXPANSION
DEV.
(HA)
NO OF
PLOT
HOLDERS
AVERAGE 
ALLOCATION 
PER FAMILY 
(HA)
Manicaland 9,458 2,189 1,300 2,149 1.02
Matebeleland(S) 3,625 1,161 NIL 1,173 0.99
Mashonaland(W) NIL 5 NIL 16 0.30
+Mashonaland
Central 300 48 NIL 60
00•o
Mashonaland
East NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
Matebeleland
North 622 79 7 220 0.36
Masvingo 1,005 418 185 1,062 0.39
Midlands 3,136 369 100 1,205 0.31
TOTAL 18,146 4,269 1,592 5,885 0.73
Note: + Abandoned schemes.
Source:Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement, 1984 
It has the highest number of all-season hectares so far 
developed, and proposed for expansion. While the average 
hectare allocated - per family for the whole country is 0,73
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hectares Manicaland alone has an allocation of over 1 
hectare per family. Five out of eight provinces have 
allocations below 0.73 ha. Recently, concerns have been 
expressed in parliament over the fact that Masvingo Province 
has more irrigation dams than any other province, and some 
MPs have openly campaigned that no new dams should be built 
in Masvingo until other provinces have had reasonable water 
supply.
Why has the state chosen to pursue a regionally unbalanced 
investment strategy in irrigation? Government officials 
interviewed during the field work explained Manicaland's 
apparent favoured position from this perspective: Since
Manicaland Province is highly mountainous and has most of 
the country's forest reserves, the land area available for 
peasantry agriculture is very small including the steep 
mountain slopes and river banks, and this has made 
Manicaland's major rivers like the Sabi River the most 
silted in the country. It was inevitable therefore that 
after 1980 Manicaland experienced the first wave of illegal 
squatting on commercial farms by thousands of land hungry 
peasants. In 1982 for example over 15,000 families 
illegally squatted on both commercial and forestry land and 
had to be forcibly evicted.
While illegal squatting has been Manicaland Province 
peasants' reaction to problems associated with unequal 
distribution of land, the use of irrigation to redress this 
was, to say the least, not appropriate. Hindsight shows 
that despite massive investments in irrigation, illegal 
squatting has not gone away, and has, if anything, tended 
to grow since 1980 at an alarming rate. As recent as 1986 
the Ministry responsible for agriculture has been fighting 
to curb the spread of the squatting 'disease' through the 
use of force. Today, the only factor restraining squatting 
is not the irrigation schemes but an array of draconian laws 
of eviction and prosecution, which in themselves are a clear 
admission by the government that it has failed to find a 
solution.
The high costs involved in irrigation coupled with the large
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and rising number of landless peasant families, have made it 
inevitable that objectives of viability and income equity 
had to be sacrificed in the bid to find them land. Hence 
the allocation of land on the basis of the national average 
of 0.73 ha per family nationwide, has no basis in viability 
and/or in distributive equity. Perhaps the greatest irony 
of the irrigation strategy is that it has not only failed to 
achieve income equity, and equity of opportunities among all 
peasants, but that by failing to achieve physical land 
redistribution goals (as only few families could, be settled 
(5885 by 1985) (Table 6.6), the strategy has created a new 
long-term problem. The high concentration of families (3 
families per hectare) on the irrigation schemes, not only 
means an erosion of the income as family size increases, but 
also sets in train the need for another round of costly 
resettlement of the residual population. It is unlikely 
that there will be more land for redistribution in future.
It can therefore be argued that the policy objective of 
releasing land pressure by settling large numbers of 
families on irrigation schemes is contradictory to the 
pursuit of equity. Clearly the policies governing 
irrigation agriculture development show all the hallmarks 
of a 'reactive' policy strategy that manifests itself in the 
now-all-too-familiar 'crisis planning' that typifies many 
Third World planning exercises. The policy strategy is not 
a well thought out investment framework imbued with the 
capacity to 'direct' investment in irrigation so as to 
achieve maximum equity and the self-perpetuation of this. 
For example, while responding to the symptoms of the 
squatter problem, the investment programmes are not designed 
to realise both short and long term objectives. Interviews 
with peasants show that today two in five of the peasants 
settled on each scheme abandon it every year.
One single event that has had a great contribution to the 
pursuit of irrigation agriculture is the 'one-in-five- 
years' drought event. The upsurge in the construction of 
so many small dams (Table 6.2) as upstream investments by 
government has been a reaction to the drought event as well 
as to other factors. The dam construction solution has
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meant that the search for alternative solutions to beat 
famine and starvation in drought prone areas has largely 
been abandoned. The fact that most of these dams cannot 
store water enough to last one dry season, is often 
overlooked, and where cognisance is taken of this fact, it 
often serves as the reason for constructing even more small 
dams, in the belief that a 'saturated' provision increases 
the volume of water available for irrigation. In the 
meantime the belief has gained ground at the policy making 
level that irrigation offers unquestionable, solutions to 
present and future famine problems, as evident in the 
setting up of the Farm Irrigation Fund in (1985) , as a 
vehicle for focusing attention on irrigation.
Past failures of the small scale irrigation policy have been 
blamed on the unacceptable racist leadership of the past 
rather than on the inherent weaknesses of the strategy and 
the apparent policy contradictions. If anything, the belief 
has been established that under the government of their 
choice, the peasants would turn 'failure into success'. 
While this may be true in certain circumstances, this 
simplistic notion has led policy makers to ignore such 
important factors as costs, marketing problems, and timely 
input availability, which invariably have a more direct 
effect on success or failure than political motivation.
Large quantities of human and capital resources continue to 
be poured into the 'irrigation void'. It clearly is 
relevant to ask who the real beneficiaries of this 
investment are? In order to answer this question it is 
necessary to examine the interests of various pressure 
groups in irrigation agriculture and the extent to which 
their own interests and preoccupations have been translated 
into the resultant irrigation investment policy of today.
Interest Groups in Small Scale Irrigation Agriculture
A look at the supportive structures for small scale 
irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, will show that there is a 
large number of interest groups involved, each with 
different affinities and approaches to the schemes. These 
groups, outlined in Fig. 6.1 promote irrigation for both
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selfish and altruistic reasons that are consistent with 
their view of what constitutes the needs of the peasants. 
The intensity with which each of these interest groups 
support the irrigation sector materially and policywise, is 
far different to that accorded to rainfed agriculture.
The Agronomists and Agricultural Policy Makers
The agronomists and agricultural extension officers from the 
Department of Agriculture Extension Services, support and 
promote public investment in small scale schemes more from 
the 'desert-shall-bloom* logic, than from what is possible 
within the limitations of resources. For example, 
interviewed agronomists expressed their strong belief that 
the solution to future food (crop) production problems in 
climatically marginal Natural Regions 4 and 5 (where 
incidentally most peasants live (Chapter 3)) can only be 
solved by massive irrigation intervention. Rainfed peasant 
agriculture is rejected wholesale (except in relation to 
livestock agriculture), as a meaningful alternative. Its 
role in crop agriculture is seen as a transition while the 
state is still engaged in upstream massive investments in 
numerous small dams needed for the implementation of a full 
scale peasantry agricultural transformation towards 
irrigation crop agriculture. The fact that the
unreliability of rainfall in the same regions could mean 
that in some years irrigation dams might not fill, and thus 
affect the continuity of irrigation agriculture, is often 
ignored. Even recent events during the 1982-1984 drought, 
when virtually all the small irrigation dams were dry, have 
failed to influence attitudes.
Ignored too is the cost involved in changing most of the 
rainfed agricultural land into irrigation flatlands 
connected by networks of canals.
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Fig. 6.1
THE INTEREST GROUPS IN SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION
Economist
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elites
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farmers
Legal
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engineers
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National
provincial
district
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non-governmental 
agencies________
Planners & 
administrators 
(Ministry of Finance)
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projects
AFC Agricultural Finance Corporation
AGRITEX Department of Agricultural & Extension Services
DWRD Department of Water Resources Development
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data
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While technologically that transformation is not impossible, 
it is doubtful whether resources needed to effect this, are 
available given the state of the economy (Chapter 3). It is 
even doubtful whether any attempt to achieve this irrigation 
transformation can be justified by the benefits that are 
expected to flow from this policy strategy. Clearly, the 
agriculturalists' preoccupation with output maximization 
often restricts their ability to see more broadly the issues 
involved. They seem to be unable to encompass not only the 
opportunity cost of the investment resources, but also the 
social consequences of what they are promoting, and of the 
uneven access to irrigation facilities.
What often makes the attainment of equity all the more 
difficult is the fact that agronomists tend to promote the 
growing of such crops as sugarcane (SE Lowveld) and rice 
(Tsholotsho in Matebeleland) which have high — water 
requirements and low tolerance for moisture stress. Plant 
breeding research aimed at producing drought -resistant 
rainfed crops is receiving less attention within the policy 
framework supporting irrigation advocacy, according to the 
Agritex officials interviewed. While the choice of 
irrigated crops is bad enough, the marketing of these crops 
often present major problems given the peripheral location 
of most of these schemes in relation to major markets. For 
nearly 70% of these schemes, the market is not less than 100 
kilometres from the scheme, and often the greater part of 
the journey is through hazardous seasonal roads? resulting 
in costly delays and the deterioration of the product.
The cash basis of most of the crops grown under irrigation, 
means that ultimately irrigation agriculture does not 
address the objectives of food self-sufficiency within each 
locality, unlike rainfed agriculture which is totally 
subsistence oriented. The production of cash crops under 
irrigation involves the need for credit, and farmers are 
urged to borrow up to $600 per growing season from the Farm 
Irrigation Fund to pay for high water bills ($145.00) (Table 
6.4) and for other inputs.
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The Agricultural Finance Corporation which administers the 
Farm Irrigation Fund, in addition to providing credit 
facilities to farmers of every category, confirmed that of 
the peasant farmers indebted to the Corporation over 90 
percent of them were those on the irrigation schemes. In 
fact the stringent rules governing the use of the Fund and 
the use of the stop order system (an arrangement that allows 
the bank direct access to the client's account for purpose 
of recovering debt, over a specified period of time), has 
had a negative effect. The great majority of tfre peasants 
on the schemes are now afraid to borrow from the Fund. 
Indeed in 1986 and 1987 not a single irrigator took out 
loans and the government has been involved in a major 
exercise to reformulate the rules and to try to interest the 
farmers in using the facility again. The peasants argue 
that the burden arising from interest payments on past debts 
has forced their operations to focus on debt repayment than 
on meaningful development. Indebtedness had created a 
dependency syndrome that was too difficult for farmers to 
break.
In the meantime, the politicians in collaboration with the 
agriculturalists, have decided to adopt a risk aversion 
strategy, by saturating the schemes with specialist 
personnel. This saturation is not directly linked to the 
extent to which the crop yields help to achieve equity. For 
example, the following is a typical manning level at the 
schemes:
1. A resident irrigation officer )
2. An irrigation assistant ) This provision is
3. A foreman ) for every 200
4. A handyman ) irrigation farmers,
5. A water bailiff ) compared to nothing
6. A fence ranger ) for rainfed farmers.
7. A snail ranger )
8. A field orderly )
9. One agricultural extension worker for every 50
irrigation farmers compared to one for 1 000 rainfed
peasant farmers.
10. One agricultural extension supervisor for every 3 00
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farmers on the schemes compared to one per district for 
rainfed agriculture.
11. One community developer for every 600 irrigation farmers 
as compared to one per district for rainfed agriculture.
12. One cooperative assistant for every 600 irrigation 
farmers compared to two per district for rainfed 
agriculture.
This high level of bureaucratization of the production 
process, inevitably leads to most of the needed investment 
resources being diverted to cater for the needs of the 
bureaucracy itself, and very little going into actual 
production. According to field evidence the following costs 
are being incurred on behalf of the civil servants on the 
schemes: Three grades of staff houses are required per
scheme.
(a) For field orderlies, a three bedroom house costing 
$24,000 each (1985 prices)
(b) For the irrigation assistants, extension supervisors, 
extension workers and cooperative assistants, a three 
bed-room house each costing $28 000 (1985 prices).
(c) For the irrigation officer, a house costing $35,000 
(1985 prices) to be built, and for 76 schemes this comes 
to $2.7 million.
(d) Teachers' houses at $18 000 each for a minimum of seven 
teachers at every school at each scheme.
When other infrastructural services, such as roads, clinics, 
telephones, schools and tractors are added to the above, it 
is clear that very little money actually reaches the 
farmers. It must be added, however, that the farmer has no 
choice in the provision of the listed support services. The 
provision is a government-determined package and is 
implemented as a matter of course. The marginalization of 
the farmer in the decision making process is further 
worsened by the plethora of what sometimes appear to be 
draconian by-laws governing the farmer's choice of crops, 
fertilizers and other inputs, determining when a farmer can 
plant as well as his tenurial security, to name a few 
(Appendices 2 to 6) . Clearly, the objective of achieving
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equity through the development process has become 
unattainable, in the light of many policy contradictions, on 
the one hand, and on the other, a nightmare for the 
peasants.
While relatively reasonable incomes at the schemes can be 
assured where there are markets and continuing high levels 
of subsidy like at the Nyanyadzi Scheme (Manicaland), the 
same support and saturation of technocratic help is not 
extended to the numerous rainfed agriculture farmers.
To the extent that this negates the very policy objective 
of achieving distributive equity the irrigation strategy as 
operated in Zimbabwe, has proven unsuitable.
The Engineering Bias
A further group with a strong interest in continued
irrigation is the engineering profession. Zimbabwe has a 
very large number of private engineering and construction
firms, and within Government there is the Department of
Water Resources Development which is totally dominated by 
engineers. In addition, since 1980 many foreign civil 
engineering companies have come to work in the country. 
While the private and foreign construction companies thrive 
very well in the existing environment favouring the
expansion of the irrigation sector generally, it is the 
Department of Water Resources Development that has had the 
greatest impact on the expansion as well as on the problems 
associated with small scale irrigation agriculture. The 
institutional arrangement is such that the Department of 
Water Resources is only responsible for the provision of 
dams and water to farmers up to the field edge, and the 
control and use of that water lies with the Department of 
Agriculture and Extension Services (Agritex).
Freed from the need for economy, the Department of Water 
Resources has pushed for capacity extension in terms of the 
provision of more water in response to increased acreage 
under irrigation, regardless of the costs involved. The 
fragmented institutional arrangement has created conditions
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whereby the search for alternative investment directions 
that could better achieve equity at lower costs, has been 
rendered almost impossible. The employment legitimacy of 
the water engineers lies in their being seen to be 
constructing many dams and water supply points, and there is 
no pressure upon them to adopt design options that reflect 
capital scarcity.
Nearly all the ten small to medium dams (6 of which are on 
Table 6.2) visited during field work had 'defective' designs 
either from the point of maximising the collection of water, 
or from the point of reducing both construction and 
recurrent costs. Since 1983, most of these dams, for 
example Mwenje, Tshovane and Mataga have been undergoing 
costly uprating and dredging works.
Clearly, the investment climate is one where the belief has 
gained acceptance that since a unit of water is needed to 
save plant life, it is axiomatic that every potential supply 
must be stored for plant needs, especially in drier areas. 
In the process of trying to 'capture' every drop of water in 
every stream, for irrigation purposes, the result has been 
an increase in the dams planned and those under 
construction. For example since 1982 over forty small to 
medium dams have been planned annually although only about 
fifteen per year have been tabled for financing.
On the other hand the irrigation department within Agritex, 
equally freed from the need for economy, has called for the 
uncontrolled expansion of investment into irrigation 
agriculture. In 1983 alone, at the peak of the three-year 
drought, Japan, West Germany, China, Italy and a number of 
UN agencies were involved in extensive feasibility studies 
aimed at the promotion of small scale irrigation schemes. 
West Germany's involvement in Masvingo Province, for 
example, has been responsible for the construction of the 
"Gutai Irrigation Cooperative Gardens" in Gutu District, 
which policy makers consider as a fine example of 
equity-based investment efforts. In the Midlands Province 
and South of Manicaland, various versions of the 'Gutai' 
concept are being tried with Japanese and Chinese
assistance.
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Questions of scheme viability, self-sustainability of 
schemes, and the search for alternatives, have not been 
allowed on the planning agenda. A very senior Agritex 
official summed up the mood within the department, during 
the setting up of the Farm Irrigation Fund in 1984 when he 
said,
"It must be accepted, in the assessment of projects 
applying for loans from the Farm Irrigation Fund that 
while most commercial schemes can be assessed in terms 
of economic viability... The situation regarding small 
holder schemes is different. Most of these schemes are 
not economically viable and rely on government grant 
aid".
(Deputy Director of Agritex 1985)
Investment in more schemes is a fait accompli, sanctioned 
by overwhelming political support. The governors of 
Midlands, Matebeleland South and Masvingo Provinces saw the 
future of agricultural expansion in their respective 
constituencies, as lying in "the unmitigated expansion of 
irrigation agriculture with the support of government".
The efficacy of the schemes in delivering distributive 
eguity is assumed but not proven. The collusion between the 
engineering and agronomic technocrats and the politicians 
means that for the foreseeable future the pressure to 
construct more schemes will override rationality in the 
allocation of scarce resources. At the same time, every dam 
or scheme constructed takes the peasant agriculture sector 
further from the equity objective.
The Political Imperative
Politics colours the whole investment spectrum in Zimbabwe, 
and by tradition, Zimbabwean politicians of every colour or 
ideological persuasion have historically expressed similar 
sentiments when it comes to irrigation agriculture. In the 
case of small scale schemes, the overwhelming urge to turn 
the dry semi-desert-scrubland into green grain fields seems
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to be irresistible, and this is further enhanced by the 
absence of alternative solutions to the high population 
growth rate of 3.2% per year, amongst the highest in the 
world.
As indicated by Carruthers (1983) irrigation is a rapid and 
dramatic form of public investment that a politician can 
promote, in that schemes can be planned and executed within 
a short period of time. Dams are named after him, canal 
opening or well pumping can be filmed or phptographed. 
Promotion of irrigation has benefited many politicians, and 
given the smallness of most schemes (average size 50 
hectares), it has been possible to complete many schemes 
within the politician's five-year term of office.
In Zimbabwe the pursuit of irrigation has had the added 
effect of bringing remote areas of the Zambezi and Limpopo 
Valleys, for the first time, under the effective 
jurisdictional control of the State. Prior to the 
introduction of irrigation in the Zambezi Valley, the Tonga 
Tribe lived virtually outside the effective political and 
administrative control of the State. The introduction of 
irrigation has resulted in an influx of non-Tongas moving 
into the region following the opening up of roads, clinics 
and schools, as well as district administration offices.
A report by Agritex officials indicated that the Tongas were 
not too happy about this second invasion of their 'land'. 
The first time the State moved into their 'land' during the 
construction of Kariba Dam (Chapter 7) resulted in many 
Tongas losing their land and being moved away without 
compensation. To the Tongas the State's attitude of trying 
to 'civilize' them through the introduction of irrigation 
amounts to unwelcome patronage. Naturally the Tongas of the 
Zambezi Valley and the Vendas of the Limpopo Valley will 
lose more of their land to the 'new comers' who have come 
from other parts of the country, and have better skills and 
a positive attitude to irrigation and are better able to 
benefit from irrigation agriculture than the Tongas.
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Donor Support
Perhaps the greatest support for the irrigation strategy has 
come from the numerous donors, who have financed and 
continue to support this strategy, for varying reasons. 
With the exception of the World Bank which insists on some 
cost-benefit analysis of every project proposal, and carries 
out its own studies, most bilateral donors tend to take an 
attitude supportive of government approaches. Overall the 
donors are more interested in the implementation of the 
projects then in the debate on 'equity1 issues which they 
rightly believe are within the purview of the Zimbabwean 
Government. But the fact that they invest in non-viable 
publicly subsidized schemes, amounts to a substantial 
involvement in the nation's debate on equity through 
investment. The reason why most of the donors do not follow 
the World Bank model, is to do more with the political 
nature of the aid being given. For most, the selling of 
technology, the achievement of solidarity and friendship 
must take precedence over project effectiveness. The giving 
of grants by donors to finance these schemes has 
inadvertently promoted a wrong notion among policy makers 
that these schemes are being developed at no cost to 
Zimbabwe, while the donors have remained ever anxious that 
the government should pick up all the resultant recurrent 
budgets, if the schemes are to remain everlasting symbols 
of friendship and solidarity.
Planning and Administrative Controls
Irrigation is a technology- intensive system of crop 
production which makes it imperative that both the producers 
and the production process are controlled (see Appendices 2 
to 6) . For example the new seeds require adherence to a 
definite irrigation and husbandry regime which can only be 
achieved, in the case of the peasants, through discipline 
imposed by the various civil servants working at the 
schemes, as discussed above. Control through the 
regimentation of the production process has been tried 
before without success (Roder 1965). The bye-laws in 
Appendices VI.2 to VI.6 show clearly that the relationship
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between the farmer and the technocrats is governed by the 
threats of eviction and loss of tenure, and not necessarily 
by the motivation (on the side of the farmer) to excel in 
order to achieve higher incomes.
Health inputs are conspicuous by their absence (Chapter 7).
In the South Eastern Lowveld, plans to curb the spread of 
water-based diseases have entered the planning framework 
by default and not by design.
Part of the reasons for the omission of health matters is 
related to the domination of the whole irrigation strategy 
by engineers, politicians, and agronomists and to the lack 
of an economic perspective. Water economists are needed to 
fight the growing trend towards 1water fundamentalism'. 
Evidence in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world has shown 
that water is no longer a gift from God, but a very costly 
commodity whose production must consume large scarce 
resources that have high opportunity costs. In deciding to 
invest in small scale irrigation, an economist, if given 
prominence in the planning process would seek to understand 
to what extent such investments would be financially viable 
or produce the objectives of government, and at what cost. 
Further the economist would analyse the comparative costs 
and benefits of a range of alternative strategies, given the 
amount of resources lost this way, without ever fulfilling 
the set objectives.
The Farmer
As Fig. 6.1 shows, of all the parties to the irrigation 
project, the farmer is perhaps the only one who must live 
with the success and/or failure of the schemes. It is 
however unfortunate that he/she is overwhelmed rvumerlecxtX^ 
, by the technocrats who claim to be operating on 
his/her behalf. The farmer is therefore, and in terms of 
decision making, marginalized. His general low level of 
education does not facilitate effective communication with 
the technocrats, most of whom have a paternalistic view of 
the farmer's role and a poor regard for the possible value 
of farmer participation in the planning process. The
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evident overmanning of technocrats at the schemes is a 
confirmation of this position. The farmer's interest is 
assumed to be better defined and protected by the 
technocrats, and the benefits accruing to him are those 
determined by the controlling technocrats. The planning 
horizon of the technocrats is determined by the five-year 
political cycle of the ministers, and as such does not take 
into consideration the long-term interest of the farmer. 
For example, all farmers who fail to produce crops at the 
expected output levels within the first five years of 
settlement are threatened with eviction. The short-term 
view is evident in the allocation of land to peasants, where 
each receives less than a hectare of irrigated farm land. 
Clearly, the long term welfare of the farmer and his 
expanding family, and the implied real decrease in income, 
would appear not to be the central concern of the planners.
With so many interest groups having a 'finger in the 
irrigation pie' and the enactment of so many bye-laws, it 
is inevitable that the irrigation strategy has become a 
classic "too many cooks spoil the broth" situation.
The full impact of all these interventions by the interested 
parties has been to confuse the farmer, and not to help him 
make his own choices, in the light of resources available to 
him. His rainfed counterpart, although equally marginalized 
has a much greater decision making freedom on farm 
organization and production and is not swamped by 
technocrats to the above degree.
The Benefits
Because of the multiple nature of government objectives, an 
assessment of the benefits of the irrigation strategy is 
very difficult. It is made even more difficult by the fact 
that most of the expected outcomes are unquantifiable, and 
as such the impact is not readily apparent, while the 
long-term nature of others makes it premature to assess them 
within a period of five years.
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For example, the high capacity of the schemes to carry large 
numbers of people per unit piece of land would seem, in the 
short term to fulfil the requirements for settling most of 
the landless peasants on these schemes, and thereby reduce 
land pressure on the overcrowded communal lands. 
Unfortunately the value of this benefit is limited by the 
fact that the population is growing at 3.2 percent per year, 
and in the absence of any alternatives to irrigation, this 
will make it necessary for another round of resettlement in 
the very near future on a much reduced land resource as 
earlier discussed. It will be remembered that part of the 
reason for the adoption of the irrigation strategy was to 
avoid having to pull land out of commercial production for 
resettlement purposes.
Whether the benefit of reducing land pressure is worthy of 
the amount of subsidy that goes into irrigation is another 
question? especially when it is considered that high levels 
of current investment outlays cannot preclude the future 
necessity for land redistribution. So far, the
beneficiaries have been "small in number terms" and all the 
effort towards irrigation has not been able to stem, 
substantially, the tide of squatting.
It cannot concretely be said that the areas where most 
peasants on the schemes came from, have experienced the 
benefit of more land. Most peasants on the schemes 
interviewed indicated that they continued to hold on to 
their communal cropping and grazing rights on the dryland 
areas.
The major benefit of any irrigation system must at the end 
of the day, be measured in terms of the crop yield realised 
by the participating farmers, as this forms a basis for 
higher incomes. Table 6.7, for example^ shows that for the 
maize crop, yields per hectare are higher under irrigation 
than under rainfed agriculture by up to 30%, and that gross 
incomes are three times higher under irrigation than under 
rainfed agriculture.
TABLE 6.7
A COMPARISON OF CROP OUTPUT AND INCOMES. PER HECTARE
IRRIGATION SECTOR RAINFED SECTOR
YIELD GROSS PROD. (LOSS) YIELD GROSS PROD. NET
(2001b) INCOME COST OR NET (2001b) INCOME COST PROFIT
BAGS PROFIT BAGS
$ $ $ $ $ $
60 * 900 439 469 20 300 3*0 270
100** 1 500 [4 425] 1 500 40 600 40 560
(2 925)
Note: * Denotes figures without subsidy
** Denotes figures that contain public subsidy 
[ ] Paid fully by the Government
Source:Derived from Assessment of field data 
If marketing problems could be overcome, the high yields 
could be a basis for much higher incomes. In fact yield 
figures have often been used by government officials, in 
isolation of the cost considerations, to justify the need 
to expand small scale peasantry irrigation. Clearly, in 
aggregate terms, output figures represent real benefits on 
the ‘without project' situation namely, the rainfed 
situation.
On the basis of Table 6.7 it is clear that the net profit 
margin for irrigation agriculture, without public subsidies 
is low. However when all public subsidies are computed into 
the figures for both sectors, irrigation losses make rainfed 
agriculture an attractive option, except for the fact that 
it is the state that bears most of the losses of irrigation 
agriculture and not the farmer. Clearly, only under heavy 
state subsidy can irrigation, in yield terms, be an 
effective substitute for rainfed agriculture.
What Table 6.7 does not tell us is that for rainfed 
agriculture to produce the same number of bags produced 
under irrigation per hectare, one and half to two hectares 
will be required. Land is an expensive finite resource, 
which does not stretch in order to accommodate the ever 
increasing demand for land. When the rate of growth of the 
population is also taken into account, it is clear that land
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redistribution alone cannot be seen as a long term permanent 
policy for addressing issues of equity. This factor alone, 
makes the rainfed option and its demand for more land, a 
less attractive solution in the long run. Both the rainfed 
and the irrigation options do not preclude the need for yet 
another land redistribution exercise.
In income terms, the irrigation option rewards the farmers, 
albeit under subsidy, with much higher incomes per hectare 
than the state-supported rainfed option. However, it is 
important to note that both the rainfed and the irrigation 
incomes remain within the subsistence level and their 
differences, a mere reflection of the degree of subsistence. 
This is a classic catch 22 situation, whereby each strategy 
selected to address the equity problem seems not to solve 
the fundamental problem: the irrigation option is very
costly, and does not have room for containing the expanding 
population? the low cost rainfed option demands more land 
than is available, and likewise it requires that the State 
resettle excess population elsewhere.
Within the peasantry sector, the irrigation option has 
served to widen the income gap between those on the schemes 
and those outside the schemes. This is despite the fact 
that incomes obtained from irrigation under state subsidy, 
cannot form the basis for the advancement of peasants into 
higher production relations and the chances for much higher 
incomes. It is also clear that the irrigation incomes do 
not in anyway reduce the wide gap between the peasants as a 
whole and the commercial agricultural sector.
When these incomes are compared with the income of the 
domestic worker, the lowest paid category of work in 
Zimbabwe (the domestic worker realises a net of $1 140 per 
year, 1985 salaries) the peasant both on the irrigation 
scheme and on rainfed agriculture receive similar income. 
This partly explains the reason behind the influx of some 
peasants into cities looking for jobs that do not require 
skills, such as domestic work, baby sitting, gardening and 
all ranges of manual jobs, as opposed to working on the 
land.
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What is the alternative?
Clearly, the small scale irrigation option is very limited. 
It is too costly and requires a continuous input of state 
subsidies to keep the schemes producing, at the expense of 
alternative investment opportunities. The number of people 
benefiting is far too small for the amount of resources 
spent. The opportunity cost of the scarce resources lost 
to a non viable investment option are considerable.
The rainfed option is equally unsatisfactory. This option's 
capacity to afford peasants higher incomes and hence greater 
equity, is limited by the fact that, in order for the 
peasants to realise the same output as those got under 
irrigation, nearly twice as much land, under existing 
technology is required.
It is tempting, looking into the future to suggest that part 
of the answer could be the development and the greater use 
of a technology that would make dryland agriculture produce 
much higher yields on limited land sizes, using very little 
water. This technology would obviate the need for costly 
resettlement programmes, and certainly reduce the need for 
subsidized irrigation agriculture. That type of technology 
is arguably within the country's grasp. Verification of 
this possibility calls for further research work. Caution 
is however called for. Solutions to the problems of 
inequitable distribution of income cannot be purely 
technical. Another alternative deserving study is regional 
food transfers involving food crops from wetlands and animal 
products from dry areas. This option holds promise for the 
future, if issues of transport, and political commitment can 
be tackled to ensure that effective distribution of both 
cereals and animal products can reach the needy at prices 
they can afford, without disruption. More research must be 
carried out on this option, before implementation is 
recommended.
The present study cannot answer a number of questions until 
there has been research and/or answers to a number of 
problem areas. For example, the pursuit of equity using
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whatever developmental strategy is bound to fail until there 
are successful family planning and population control 
measures in operation. Planning for a fast increasing 
population like the Zimbabwean one renders every effort made 
ineffective over time, and the resources used, wasted. 
Future research must seek to find answers to the ever rising 
urban and national unemployment problems, and also address 
the problems of finding alternative employment opportunities 
away from agriculture. Research would also be required to 
assess the viability of a "land-for-all" policy strategy, 
which currently has been responsible for huge resources 
being ploughed into both irrigation and the resettlement 
programmes. There are no easy answers.
The study clearly recognizes, however, that the requirement 
of the present settlement policy with its initial emphasis 
on the need to provide for subsistence, is not only the root 
cause of much of the over population on irrigation schemes. 
That same policy is also responsible for the faulty approach 
to development elsewhere on the dryland, where the focus is 
on ways of conditioning dryland areas to provide for 
increasing population densities regardless of the quality of 
the land and its natural carrying capacity.
The inability of the irrigation schemes to increase income 
distribution, arises from the fact that policy formulation 
takes its point of departure from what is officially 
perceived as constituting the requirements of peasants. The 
fus and them* syndrome that emerges has dominated project 
assessment at the planning stage, and is responsible for the 
public error of regarding small scale irrigation agriculture 
as the suitable vehicle for the conveyancing of equity. The 
study certainly raises more questions than answers. In the 
end, solutions to the plight of the peasants must be sought 
within the context of the survival and/or progress of the 
national economy as a whole.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN 
WATER AND IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters it has been shown that the search 
for economic efficiency (as defined by the Pareto Criterion) 
from public and private investment in commercial irrigation 
agriculture is often an illuso-r^ goal. Moreover, irrigation 
has become a very costly investment strategy. Equally 
illusOtrv) are the policy goals designed to realize equitable 
distribution of benefits from public investment in 
irrigation for small scale peasantry agriculture. This 
outcome makes irrigation agriculture one of the most 
uneconomic agricultural systems in the country, the 
continued operation of which can only be traced to the wide 
range of vested interests and the public subsidies involved.
Clearly these outcomes have been based only on the analysis 
of quantifiable and monetized streams of costs and benefits. 
It is a universally accepted fact that investments in water 
and irrigation agriculture will always confer upon the 
benefiting (and losing) communities externality effects of 
a social and environmental nature. The fact that these 
effects are residual in relation to the quantifiable 
effects, means that, they are not the objective outcome of 
the deliberate policy intervention, but the inevitable 
unplanned consequences of the investment process. The scale 
and nature of the impact of negative spill-over effects from 
irrigation projects can vary markedly, depending not only on 
the physical characteristics of the areas involved, but also 
on dam design and management practices.
It is normal for people of any nation to expect that the 
activities of their governments should support life and 
promote the sustainability of life's supportive system, like 
the natural resources. In this respect the aim of an
fcCs
investment policy has clearly take into consideration, 
measures to eradicate or reduce the scale of the social and 
environmental effects associated with each irrigation
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project to levels considered 'acceptable* to society. 
Clearly, problems regarding the definition of "acceptable" 
and questions of who should determine this subjective level 
of suffering are central to the whole environmental planning 
debate. The complexity of the problems involved emerges 
more clearly when it is considered that those who make 
decisions about investment, and these are mostly the 
urban-based public officials, do not reside in the same 
affected environment as those who are affected by the side 
effects of these decisions, mostly the peasants and farm 
workers. Public officials' sensitivity to these effects 
are therefore diminished by both spatial distance from, and 
the lack of first hand experience of any of the effects.
At the project design stage, there is no legislation or 
policy directive requiring public officials to even discuss 
these effects. The practice has been characterised by the 
need to maximize output regardless of the effects (socially 
and environmentally) this process may produce. In fact, the 
view that the resultant effects were the inevitable 'tax' to 
be paid for advancement has become ingrained in the thinking 
of the decision makers. Admittedly, any investment in a 
production system that interacts with the complex human and 
biological systems, must require difficult trade offs to be 
made. But lumping together of all effects as "necessary" 
'tax' to be borne by society, no longer involves any trade 
offs at all. The resulting 'no decision' situation is in 
fact a policy decision that have little regard for anything 
other than output maximization.
♦
The search for solutions to social and environmental effects 
is further complicated by the fact that as yet unknown 
side-effects cannot be included in any computation. Many 
potentially important externality effects from irrigation 
development have not yet become apparent in Zimbabwe, 
although their presence in other countries provides a strong 
prima facie case for their inclusion in project appraisals. 
Moreover even those externalities which have become evident 
are only now being analysed and crudely costed. Scientific 
predictive knowledge in this field is still in its infancy. 
Thus, unless the planning for, and the prediction of, social
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and environmental effects precedes actual construction of 
water and irrigation works by five to ten years, several of 
the adverse effects are bound to occur when there is little 
preparedness among Zimbabwean planners.
In the meantime, in the absence of any substantive 
information on the spatial scale of these externality 
effects, there is a need to attempt (qualitatively, and where 
possible quantitatively) to assess the structure of the 
effects and to draw out the implications they have for 
public investment in irrigation agriculture. The discussion 
takes into consideration the fact that these effects often 
extend much further than the planning area itself. Such an 
analytical task is difficult, and made worse by the dominant 
role of engineers in the water and irrigation industry and 
their natural propensity to construct. This may mean that 
the solution to the increasing social and environmental 
effects will not feature greatly at the design stage, 
without fundamental changes to the current practice.
In fact, the approach in government is based on correcting 
the effects after they have become manifest, instead of 
adopting an "effects avoidance" strategy. Clearly, such 
ex-post corrections will normally be more difficult and 
costly to execute than properly designed ex-ante 
amelioration measures. The only exception to the lack of 
ex-ante analysis is the recently set up Mushandike Dam 
Monitoring Unit (1984/1985). The setting up of the unit is 
in part due to this study which raised a number of important 
questions during the field work. The critical lack of data 
was also exposed. Subsequent discussions with Blair Centre 
researchers triggered interest that culminated in the 
establishment of the Mushandike Dam Monitoring Unit. Prior 
to this, Blair Centre's activities were only directed 
towards the clinical study of pathogens and to the 
evaluation of experimental preventative measures. The 
Mushandike Unit, when fully operational will be unique in 
that it will be the only experiment in the country designed 
to study the effects of including externality awareness at 
the design stage and the use of design techniques to reduce 
such effects as bilharzia and malaria. Beyond this, the
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Unit will hopefully attempt to quantify, as far as possible, 
the health related effects both in monetary values and in 
pathological terms. In addition, it plans to monitor the 
usual ex-post corrective measures. It will take many years 
before useful conclusions can be available from this 
experiment, for wider applications.
Although it will not be feasible for this study to consider 
all the known possible spill-over costs and benefits of 
public investment in water and irrigation agriculture, the 
frequency, magnitude and nature of these effects warrant 
some consideration of the most important of them. They are 
included in this study with the full realization that there 
are inherent quantification problems which cannot be solved 
here. Such analytical problems which are well documented 
(Carruthers 1975, Blackie 1984) cannot, however, justify the 
neglect in current literature and development efforts of 
externalities which are distributed unevenly and unequally 
over the physical and the social space, so affecting the 
relative real benefits from developing the schemes. It is 
hoped that this exercise will sensitize the decision makers 
to move towards the need to include social and environmental 
effects in the planning of these schemes and towards the 
need to reduce or eradicate these effects, where they are 
already manifest.
The Socio-Economic and Environmental Effects
The focus of this discussion on the socio-economic and 
environmental effects of water and irrigation development is 
not whether irrigation schemes should have been built at 
all, but rather to outline the externalities which have 
arisen or will potentially do so, and to consider what 
practical steps could have been taken at the initiation of 
the schemes to prevent or keep the deleterious effects to 
the minimum.
Internationally, a lot of practical ex-post studies in the 
Third World carried out mostly under the auspices of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
United Nations (Biswas 1978), have made it possible to draw
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up an inventory of some of the common externality effects 
especially those related to water borne diseases (Feacham 
1977, White et alia 1972). The practical importance of such 
studies have unfortunately come too late for those countries 
where the effects had become epidemic; and for those 
entering into irrigation agriculture, the lessons and the 
prescriptions contained in the studies have either been 
viewed as too restrictive to the investment process, or like 
in Zimbabwe, considered as the inevitable cost of 
advancement.
First Order Environmental Effects
First order effects are the more direct and immediate 
products of water development projects, while the second and 
third order effects occur at a much later time scale (the 
difference between the two being more a function of time 
than intensity of occurrence)^ and are often but not always 
a consequence of the first order effects. Table 7.1 does 
not contain all the effects of water and irrigation 
investment in Zimbabwe, but only those observed during field 
work.
There are many outstanding social and environmental effects 
that are known throughout the world, but not quantified in 
Zimbabwe. For example the effects of the building of large 
scale dams in Egypt (Aswan), Ghana (Volta), Nigeria 
(Kainji), USA (Hoover) and many other countries, have been 
relatively well documented. The social costs of the 
displacement of people, and the types of diseases induced by 
water bodies have at least been crudely enumerated. 
Moreover, other problems such as salinity and water logging 
are also identified in the literature; as illustrated by 
Davidson (1965) on the Australian experience. While it is 
true that rich countries like the USA and Australia have 
been unable to avoid the social and environmental effects of 
large water impoundments, they are however better able to 
meet the high cost of the needed corrective measures than 
the poor Third World countries like Zimbabwe.
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TABLE 7.1
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF IRRIGATION
DEVELOPMENT
ORDER ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC SOCIAL
1st Order
(Direct)
l.Dam
siltation
2.Evaporation 
water loss
l.Rise in 
Public Debt
2.Rise in 
budgetary 
subsidy
1.Spread of 
water related 
diseases
2.Disruption of 
communities 
due to removal 
and
resettlement
3.Land loss 3.Increased 
to loss of
inundation foreign
exchange due 
to imports of 
inputs
4.Progressive 4.Increased 
soil salinity dependence 
and sterility on foreign
banks
Loss of
production
and
continuity
4.Can cause 
tribal
conflicts in 
resettlement 
area
5.Disruption 
of communi 
cation and 
other 
facilities 
due to 
inundation
5.High com­
pensation 
costs
5.Can increase 
income 
inequality 
between the 
scheme and dry 
land farms
6.High of cost 
of removal and 
resettlement of 
displaced people
7.Loss of produc­
tion and produc­
tive land
8.High cost of 
correcting disease 
effects
2nd Order
(less
Direct)
1.Creation of 
a new micro­
climate and 
diseases
l.High import 
cost of 
insecticide 
fertilizers 
and
machinery
l.Over crowding 
at schemes and 
inversion by 
second stage 
diseases, due 
to insanitary 
conditions
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3rd Order 
(long term)
.Induce earth- 2.Increase in 2.Division of 
quakes around cost of families
dams disease
corrective
measurers
3.Sedimentation 3.Widen 3.Increase in
and poor regional jealousies
scenic view income between irri-
disparity gation and
r a i n f e d
farmers
.Over
irrigation
affecting
soil
structure
.Introduction 
of weeds
4.High cost 
of rerouting 
(Dam)
disrupted
services
5.Possible net 
losses in the 
production 
process, and 
problems of 
mono-culture
4.Growing more 
of cash crops 
and less food 
crops leading 
to continua­
tion of famine
5.Continued 
increase in 
income gap
6.Spread of 
water borne 
diseases 
beyond the 
schemes
1.Reduced 
life of 
due to 
siltation
1.Long term 
dams budgetary
subsidy losses 
and commitment 
to imports
Increase in 
over crowding 
and abandon­
ment of 
schemes; and 
the need for 
more new 
schemes
•Costly 
dredging and 
weed control
.Abandoned 
due to 
salinization 
and water 
logging
2.More dams to 
replace those 
silted
3.Budgetary 
commitment to 
correcting 
expanded 
costly water 
borne disease 
infested area
2.Long term 
increase in 
clinics and 
hospital 
provision
3.Disease 
can become 
chronic or 
fatal. Loss of 
life.
1.Irreversible 4.Long term
changes in 
land value, 
and loss of 
scenic value
distortion of 
the economy 
and regional 
income
distribution
4.Income 
inequality 
fossilized
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5.Bad long term 5.Poisoning of 
dependence on human and
external cash animal life by
crop markets molluscicides 
and high and weed
risks killers
6.Ground and 
surface water 
polluted by 
fertilizer 
chemicals from 
the schemes
Source:Derived from field data
Table 7.1, a product of field work experience in Zimbabwe, 
attempts to categorize the effects into three broad but 
related areas of: environmental? economic; and social
effects. The effects are further grouped into first order 
effects down to the third order effects on a scale of 
diminishing direct impact. The divisions are arbitrary and 
drawn for the convenience of analysis. Attempts have been 
made to highlight, be it qualitatively, some of the effects, 
so as to bring forward their individual contribution to the 
overall impact on the costs and benefits of water and 
irrigation developments.
Following Adams and Adams (1986), the construction of a dam 
involves a deliberate human intervention into the natural 
physical state of a river. Environmental direct effects 
occur in two areas; up stream of the dam in the form of a 
permanent reservoir, and down stream where the presence of 
the dam transforms the existing pattern of high and low 
flows both between seasons and between years. Effects are 
primarily on the physical system of the rivers (discharge, 
sediment load, geomorphology etc) but there are also 
complex webs of other effects on biological systems and 
socio-economic effects as shown on Table 7.1.
Zimbabwe experiences a very high degree of soil erosion 
(because of the wide spread occurrence of fragile sandy 
soils and erratic rainfall system (chapter 3)), which 
inevitably raises fundamental questions about river silt 
load and dam siltation. The questions are central or ought 
to be central, to the decision making process regarding
5.Possible 
earth quakes 
and loss of 
life
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investment in dams and irrigation agriculture. The value of 
a dam to irrigation agriculture must depend on the dam's 
ability to store and to provide water continuously, and at 
little supply (failure) risk, for many years (time horizon 
of 50 years is^standard minimum). The longer the period the 
dam can be utilized to realize the discounted net returns 
(lower capital costs), per unit of supply, the higher its 
value to irrigation agriculture. The single most critical 
threat to the long term capacity of a dam is the problem of 
siltation. Clearly, the higher the rates of siltation, the 
less likely it is that the dam will be useful for 50 years.
The overcrowded catchments of the Sabi River and its 
tributaries, and those of most smaller rivers rising within 
the country's Communal Areas in Natural Regions 4 and 5 (see 
chapter 3) , yield large quantities of soil deposits into 
those rivers. In the case of the Sabi River, the high level 
of soil erosion in the mountainous catchment area of the 
Eastern Highlands, has prevented the construction, since 
1947, of the proposed Condo and Chitowe Dams. Recent 
estimates from the Department of Water Resources Development 
and from an on-going study by the British team of experts, 
put sand deposits in the middle and lower reaches of the 
Sabi River (sites of both Condo and Chitowe Dams 
respectively) at an average depth of 5 metres. The same 
estimates argue that if the two dams were built, they could 
silt up in a space of 5 to 10 years.
Since each dam is estimated, at 1984 prices, to cost $1.5 
billion, the resulting loss from siltation would be 
astronomical, especially since it would happen before the 
dams have been able to repay the capital cost. The 
government is, for political reasons, however determined to 
go ahead with the construction of these two dams, so as to 
cater for the expansion of irrigation at both Chisumbanje 
(an addition of 28,000 ha to the present 400 ha) and Middle 
Sabi (an increase of 4 000 ha) irrigation schemes. Since 
this level of expansion is not feasible, using the current 
costly river pumping methods, the government is committed to 
the construction of one or both of the dams in the immediate 
future.
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In line with this commitment, a team of British scientists 
have been asked to carry out a detailed study of the 
siltation problem of the river Sabi and to recommend to the 
government the possible solutions to the problem. Manicaland 
Province is the most densely populated province, and the 
smallest in size, and yet a large percentage of the province 
is covered by mountain ranges stretching into Mozambique. 
Land area for cultivation is scarce and limited to river 
valleys and slopes of mountains. A pessimistic and yet 
realistic scenario whereby the British study would recommend 
the removal of large numbers of people and livestock from 
the catchment area in order to remove the causes of the high 
incidence of soil erosion, would run into a political mine 
field. Such a removal would not be voluntary and would 
involve a considerable reduction of the population of 
Manicaland province. It is only possible to resettle these 
removed people outside Manicaland itself. It is obvious 
that Manicaland people and politicians will resist such an 
obviously sensible and clearly the only long term practical 
solution to the siltation problem. A historical precedent 
against such a solution has already been set. When the 
Tangwena Tribesmen refused to leave the upper reaches of the 
Sabi River in the Gaeresi Area, between 1969 and 1974, a 
serious case arose that raised both domestic and 
international criticism against the government of the day 
which had ordered their forcible removal. The present 
government is certainly unlikely to repeat this.
Away from the silt-laden Sabi River example, historical 
factors (discussed in Chapter 3) have been responsible for 
the low silt load that has so far entered major irrigation 
dams such as Lake Kyle, Lake MacDougall, Bangala Dam, Lake 
Macllwaine, Siya Dam and Ruti Dam, to name a few. The very 
early forcible removal of African peasant farmers after 
1890, and more so in accordance with the terms of the 1930 
Land Apportionment Act, from the Highveld (the source and 
watershed of most rivers) as it became European Land, 
reduced the density of occupation and intensity of 
cultivation in the catchment zone. It is not clear, at the 
time of writing, the extent to which current resettlement 
programmes will in future alter this historical, albeit,
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ironic benefit, regarding the absence of silt in the above 
named dams. Experience shows that, in a trade-off between 
curbing soil erosion and providing more land for food 
production through resettlement, the latter is always 
chosen. This is particularly the case since, the central 
questions of who benefits and equity are given a much 
greater weighting today than was the case in both the 1890s 
and 1930s.
While the 1930 land legislation laws have largely benefited 
large-scale irrigation dams and municipal water supply 
systems, the situation regarding small size dams in communal 
areas is less attractive. Most of these multi-purpose small 
dams have local water catchment ares, often constituting the 
over cultivated and overgrazed treeless hillsides. The 
result has clearly been a sharp increase in the rate of 
siltation. The average life for the majority of these dams 
is under ten years. In any case, most of these dams offer 
only one season irrigation water, andAmajority of them are 
empty or nearly so before the end of every dry season. The 
siltation problem further reduces their usefulness, and 
clearly raises questions of the correctness of an investment 
policy that seeks to expand the rate of these dams, in the 
absence of any erosion control measures. It is also clear 
that solutions to this problem cannot be found within the 
current preoccupation with capacity extension, as this tends 
to increase the problem both in terms of lost opportunities, 
and in terms of the higher cost of correcting the problem.
There is no data on the cost of dredging of dams in Zimbabwe 
generally, although observations would suggest that several 
millions of dollars are spent per year. If the cost of 
uprating the dam instead of dredging, is anything to go by, 
the dredging exercise is very costly. The engineers have 
often reacted to the silt problem in two ways: constructing 
new dams? or increasing the height of the wall of an old 
dam, instead of dredging. For example, the cost of 
increasing the Mwenje Dam wall, by some extra six feet in 
1984/85 came to just under $5 million, a figure that was 
twice the original cost of constructing the dam. By all 
indications, this is far too high a cost per extra foot of
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wall height, especially when it is considered that the extra 
capacity created would be lost later to siltation within a 
few years. Moreover there is clearly a limit to this costly 
uprating exercise. Very often peasants have been organised 
within the context of the "Food For Work Programme" to 
dredge dried up small dams for portions of food. The fact 
that the opportunity cost of this labour is often considered 
by officials, as nearly zero, has lulled policy-makers into 
believing that siltation can be solvedat very little cost to 
government. But as more of the suitable dam^sites are fast 
developed and silted up, the time is not farAwhen expensive 
dredging cannot be avoided as a solution. Recent appeals by 
the government leadership that the whole population of the 
country should engage in tree planting, especially over the 
catchment areas, and the fact that a National Tree Planting 
Day has been set aside, are steps in the right direction. 
A lot more needs to be done beyond these clearly ex-post, 
often expensive measures.
Another significant direct environmental effect observed, 
apart from the siltation problem, is water loss due to 
evaporation. Evaporation, a function of wind velocity, 
water surface area and temperature, affects more the 
effective capacity of a dam while evapotranspiration 
necessary for plant growth, affects water application rates. 
Zimbabwe*s climatic conditions, especially in the drier 
areas where most irrigation schemes are concentrated, tend 
to exacerbate these two processes. In the irrigation fields 
of the South-Eastern Lowveld for example, the combination of 
high temperatures during the nine summer months 
(Chiredzi/Triangle an average of 32°C) and the mild three 
winter months (21°C average), and the fast flowing South 
Easterly winds that descend from the Eastern Highland, mean 
that evaporation water losses on the expansive water 
surfaces of the large irrigation dams in the area, is upward 
of seven metres per dam per year on average. This means, in 
volume terms, a loss of nearly a third of the total 
installed capacity of each dam.
At the small to medium size dams in natural regions IV and 
V (Chapter 3) where similar conditions obtain, the water
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loss represents on average two fifth of the effective 
capacity. This is part of the reason why most of these small 
dams are empty during every dry season, at a time when their 
waters are most needed for small scale irrigation 
agriculture. The planners and decision makers have again 
reacted to the water loss by seepage, siltation or 
evaporation, in typical fashion; namely the construction of 
extra dams. Clearly this capacity extension has only added 
more volumes of water that are subject to evaporation, and 
the real benefit of constructing these dams has, in each 
case, been reduced.
Apart from the engineering solution of additional capacity, 
attempts to reduce evaporation have sought to use chemical 
molluscicides. The application of chemicals, most of them 
imported from overseas, has so far proved to be of limited 
value and prohibitively expensive. As a result most efforts 
in this direction have proved futile and have thus remained 
experimental. One of the reasons for the low application of 
evaporation control techniques is the very low cost of water 
to the final consumer, which has clearly acted as a 
disincentive for the application, by individual farmers, of 
chemical molluscicides.
At the field level the very low water price coupled with 
evapotranspiration losses have induced over application of 
water, and by so doing has raised the possibilities of water 
logging occurring on most farms. The farmers have typically 
reacted to their ignorance of the true evapotranspiration 
requirements of the crops, by applying more water than the 
normal levels required for plant growth in the belief that 
every drop is essential in countering water losses. The 
dominantly used and inexpensive flood irrigation method 
makes the application easy and the setting-in of the water 
logging and salinity problems become a mere question of 
time. The total quantity of water lost due to over 
application and more so due to evapotranspiration cannot be 
known without further investment in costly technology 
designed to measure the loss. In addition, extra people 
would have to be employed to advice farmers on how to 
control water applications and on water release time
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schedules. The search for such a technology would have to 
be economically justified while experiments tried elsewhere 
have proved unsuccessful. At present, there doesn't seem to 
be any technical way of reducing water loss by 
evapotranspiration arising from over application other than 
through night irrigation, whose efficacy has not either been 
studied or verified. Besides, night application is 
unpopular because of the lighting problems and the dangers 
of real over flooding, and is not convenient for the 
workers.
In the case of seepage losses, incurred mostly during 
storage and transmission, the solutions are known. The 
large scale irrigation schemes experience very little water 
loss due to seepage because water transmission is through 
lined canals, right to the edge of the field, and in most 
farms like the Hippo Valley and Triangle Estates, this 
includes the infield transmission canals. Unfortunately 
most canals carrying water to small-scale schemes are 
unlined and water losses are estimated to be very 
considerable. The cost of lining is prohibitively high.
No attempts have been made in Zimbabwe to calculate the real 
economic value of the vast amounts of water lost by either 
of the ways discussed above and no attempt is made to do so 
in this study. More research work is needed in this area 
before any concrete proposals for water-loss-reduction can 
be considered for implementation.
While water loss is indeed an important consideration, the 
economic implications of over— application can be very 
serious. Apart from serious water logging problems, over 
application can cause the more serious problem of soil 
salinity or soil sterility. All soils contain salts in 
varying degrees of concentration as a result of the 
geo-chemical weathering processes. If salt levels in the 
soil become too high, especially closer to the surface, the 
land becomes toxic to plant life, and needs vast amounts of 
clean water to flush the salts through the soil. Ground 
water provides the main reserve and source of salts 
circulating in the soil profile. It is therefore
235
agriculturally important that the water table beneath 
potentially saline soils is kept as low as possible. This 
is both a technical and a planning prerequisite in such 
countries as the Soviet Union, where salinity problems are 
common in the semi-arid regions. In Zimbabwe, over­
application of irrigation water especially at the small 
scales schemes, tends to lead to a rise in the water table, 
concentrating salts in the upper zones of the soils. This 
salt interferes with the plant’s ability to absorb oxygen 
and moisture, and the land could become effectively dead.
While Zimbabwe’s short history of commercial irrigation has 
been relatively untroubled by salinization problems, 
evidence of small quantities of sodic elements have been 
identified at the laboratory level in some soils associated 
with irrigation agriculture (Blackie 1984) . All 
indications show that most soils of the country have 
relatively low salt concentration except for the Kalahari 
Sandstones of Matebeleland North Province and the drier 
Southern Lowveld. Over irrigation and waterlogging has been 
reported at several schemes, especially at the small scale 
schemes. The increase in the number of these schemes, 
almost all practicing poor irrigation methods, also 
increases the likelihood of widespread salinization in the 
long-term. The fact that most of these schemes practice 
flooding irrigation methods, makes that eventuality 
probable, in the absence of any counter measures, or any 
degree of awareness of this danger by the farmers.
The use of the flooding irrigation techniques, for example, 
involves difficulties in determining with any confidence the 
quantities of water which are applied. By comparison, 
sprinkler techniques are much easier to control but are much 
more expensive. Officials at Triangle and Hippo Valley 
Estates and those from the Regional Water Authority 
indicated that the dangers of waterlogging increased during 
the rainy season, because of the high incidence of rainfall 
soon after heavy irrigation water application. In the 
Matebeleland South Province, around Gwanda and Beitbridge 
closer to the Botswana border, a number of small scale 
schemes were abandoned in the past partly because the water­
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logging had badly affected the fertility of the sandy-loam 
soils. Unfortunately these dangers have not acted as a 
sufficient warning to the farmer, and have not deterred the 
planners from establishing more schemes without proper 
drainage systems.
Fullstone (Blackie 1984) reported cases where saline waters 
used in irrigation, especially borehole water, have produced 
conditions of sodicity within ten years. The fact that the 
incidence of salinity and sodicity is still very low has led 
to the perceived apathy among Zimbabwean farmers and 
decision makersabcue issues relating to the construction of 
drainage canals, or the adoption of attitudes that would 
prevent the eventual arrival of salinity problems. Given 
that most of Zimbabwe's soils are shallow, the long-term 
implication must be that once the salinity process starts at 
the base of the soil, it would prove difficult to remove.
Examples of the dangers of salinity in other countries serve 
as a timely reminder of the magnitude of the problem and its 
impact.
For example, at one time, Pakistan was losing 24,280 ha, of 
fertile cropland every year as a result of salinity, and 
nearly 10 percent of Peruvian agricultural area was sterile 
due to salinization by 1977 (Widstrand, 1978). Although 
there is no information on soil type and the duration of 
irrigation for the two examples, in order to compare with 
the conditions in Zimbabwe, it is nevertheless possible that 
these conditions and effects could occur in the country in 
the long-term.
The cost of removing salt water from the soil once salinity 
conditions have occurred, is forbidding. For example, in 
the USA, Californian irrigation farmers have for a number of 
years now, been battling with the salt problem. Large 
tracts of land are abandoned because the cost of removing 
salt from the land is both prohibitive and wasteful of 
scarce resources, especially in water deficit areas. 
Construction of canals to carry away saline waters is 
expensive, and there is also the need for the not readily
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available clean water to flush out the salts. According to 
Pringle (1981) , the cost of the canal proposed to carry 
salty water from Californian's Valleys back to the sea would 
be at US$ 1.2 billion (1981 estimates). There is clearly 
every incentive for Zimbabwe to take precautionary measures 
now, designed to prevent salinity from ever starting on any 
significant scale. This, naturally, must include a much 
higher price of water and higher prices for crops produced 
if farmers are ever to adopt water-* use efficiency 
technologies.
Public investment policy is generally interested in the size 
of land the water from the dam will bring into production. 
All efforts, and indeed the technical exercise of benefit 
calculation regard the land under irrigated crops as a 
benefit and an indication of achievement. Politicians often 
put greater weight on the area of the land rather than the 
resultant yield. However, little consideration is given to 
the equally valuable land, that must be lost in the flood 
zone of the numerous dams built and those to be built. 
Clearly, land losses resulting from inundation have been 
ignored by policy makers, as representing real cost. This 
loss is of a significant nature and cannot continue to be 
ignored, especially in the light of the number of large and 
small dams that have been planned for the next few years. 
For example, it is believed that the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam in Egypt led to the loss of nearly as much 
land as was brought into cultivation by irrigation. The 
Aswan Dam example is illustrative of the likely outcome of 
the present strategy of constructing numerous dams in 
Zimbabwe depending on site differences.
The only time when this issue enters the planning process is 
when issues of compensation are raised. For example, the 
proposed Chitowe Dam on the Sabi River will result in a lake 
covering over 15 square kilometres of land. Inundated in 
the flood zone will be the present Chitowe Small Scale 
Irrigation Scheme, and all its infrastructure. The monetary 
value of the Chitowe Scheme has not been calculated, but it 
is a reasonable estimate that, including the irreversible 
loss of crop output from the scheme, the value could well
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exceed ten million dollars. What is often not made clear in 
the trade-off is the fact that bringing the new land into 
production would involve the provision of costly 
infrastructural services.
In the case of Mazwikadei Dam, the 3 000 ha to be brought 
under irrigation is far smaller than the 12,000 ha that will 
be lost in the flood zone. A lot of infrastructure such as 
roads and bridges are going to be lost. The rerouting of 
telephone and electrical lines as well as the 30 km road 
detour will cost a lot of money. At 1984 estimates, the 
cost of laying telephone wires was $25 per 500m while that 
of road surfacing was put at $400 per km. To these costs 
must be added $120,000 total compensation claims by farmers 
(based on the $10,000 per ha cost of land in 1984).
What the planning process has not considered at all is the 
need to search for alternatives to irrigation, alternatives 
that could result in less dams being constructed, and less 
land being lost to inundation.
Second and Third Order Environmental Effects
The construction of large water bodies, has in the long 
term, the effect of changing a purely terrestrial system 
into an aquatic system. The changes mean that the local 
micro-climate takes on a different character, that is often 
not fully understood or whose long-term effects are not 
obvious at the planning stage. For example, the Kariba Lake 
has induced an equatorial climate in a typical tropical 
environment, with the consequent introduction of life forms 
hither to unknown in the area. Veterinary officials would 
in fact argue that the recurrence of tsetse flies in the 
area is largely due to changes in the climate induced by the 
lake. Lake Kyle has similar effects although on a reduced 
scale. However, not all of these effects are necessarily 
detrimental. Very little research has been carried out about 
the effect of the Lake Kariba or Lake Kyle.
The University of Zimbabwe has recently opened a study Unit 
on the Kariba Dam, and since the work of the Unit is at a
\
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very early stage it was not possible to get an informed view 
from the Unit.
Still a lot of the effects of large water impoundments are 
yet to come to the surface. For example, on the 18th of 
July 1986 (The Zimbabwe Herald, 20th July 1986) tremors from 
an earthquake around the Kariba was felt in Karoi and Harare 
over 200 km away. The quake had a magnitude of 5.1 on the 
Reichter Scale, and scientists argued that it was associated 
with the refilling of the lake after 4 years of drought and 
very low water level. If the Kariba Dam were to break as a 
result of these now frequent tremors, the consequences down 
stream could be catastrophic. The worst scenario would be 
the consequent bursting downstream of the Kabora Basa Dam in 
Mozambique and the destruction of land, infrastructure, and 
more importantly, the loss of human life.
Although the other dams in the country have not yet 
experienced any tremors, the Kariba has shown that the 
possibility cannot be ruled out, especially for those dams 
that are to be built along fault lines, like Chitowe and 
Condo Dams in the Eastern Highlands.
One effect that is very much a subject of public debate in 
the country is the arrival of foreign weeds on most dams. 
The weeds, eichornia and pistia, are believed to be of South 
American origin (The Zimbabwe Herald, 6\4\86).
The weeds have the following effects:
a. The weeds spread over the water surface forming
a thick carpet which prevents oxygen (air) and 
sunshine from reaching other aquatic life below. 
This affects fish production and fish food;
b. The water surrounding the weeds is affected by
the rotting leaves, turning into brackish water, 
unsuitable for human consumption?
c. More important for irrigation, the weeds are
sucked into the water pumping machinery and
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pipes carrying water from dams. The process of 
removal is both time consuming and difficult. 
The life of the pumping stations and the pipes 
is reduced by this constant blockage; and
d. They make access to water for irrigation very
difficult apart from increasing the cost of 
maintaining affected canals.
For example, the weeds have seriously affected Lake 
Mcllwaine, Darwendale Dam, and Hallam Dam, dams that supply 
water to the city of Harare and surrounding commercial 
irrigation farms. According to the Zimbabwe Herald report 
of the 15th May 1986, the cost of spraying chemicals 
(glyphosate) on the weeds using a plane was put at $178.50 
per hectare. Initially, the government had allocated 
$100,000 for this operation in April 1986 and by June 1986 
a further $110,000 had to be made available as the initial 
allocation proved inadequate for the fight against the 
weeds. A helicopter and a light plane were initially hired 
for the work. When the use of the plane and the helicopter 
proved costly and unsuccessful, the army using cranes and 
other weed-cutters, moved in, and still the weed proved 
intractable. The weed continued to grow along river 
courses. By June 1986, only 756 tons of the weeds had been 
removed after nearly six months of continuous operations 
(The Zimbabwe Herald June 1986). The on-set of winter in 
June 1986 meant that the weeds became dormant, and the 
physical operations of removing them had to be suspended 
until October 1986 when the weeds were expected to start 
growing again with the on-set of the rainy season. This has 
become the pattern of operations annually. At the start of 
every season, the weeds will have spread into new areas as 
well as covering with the same original intensity, the areas 
previously cleared.
The likelihood of this menace affecting all large dams of 
the country cannot be ruled out. If that were to happen, 
the cost of attempting to remove the weeds would continue to 
rise. Clearly the fact that has to be faced sooner than 
later is that the weed can no longer be eradicated, and this
241
will put into question the rationale for costly and yet 
futile attempts at eradication. The benefits to be derived 
from temporary amelioration, will need to be assessed soon 
before more resources are "thrown” at the problem, and 
alternative methods sought.
In the frantic fight against the weed, the government has 
lost sight of the long-term effects of the chemicals being 
used, both on other more useful aquatic life and on human 
life. It is obvious that the application of the chemicals 
has not been preceded by any research into the side effects. 
The nature of the crisis management that has resulted in 
this case is likely to be applied elsewhere should the weeds 
spread to other dams not yet affected. The example above is 
indicative of what happens when no precautionary measures 
are taken as part of an investment strategy. Such essential 
ex-ante measures do not enter the planning process at the 
time investment decisions are taken. This is largely 
because the irrigation advocacy environment within which 
policy decisions are made, does not allow environmental 
concerns to be introduced (Chapter 6).
Apart from the weed problem, the introduction of new crops 
into areas where they were never grown before, and the year 
round cultivation system at most large irrigation schemes 
has introduced pests hitherto unknown, or has made the known 
pests multiply many fold. For example, the introduction of 
cotton at irrigation schemes in the south-eastern lowveld, 
has led to the year-round increase in cotton attacking 
pests. The government has been forced to take draconian 
measures in order to control the pests from becoming an 
epidemic. It is now a criminal offence for any farmer who 
fails to plough down or cut all the old crop remains after 
harvest, by the stipulated dates, and the fines are heavy. 
In some cases a farmer who fails to harvest his cotton at 
the stipulated time, risks having his crop destroyed without 
any compensation. It is unfortunate that no study has yet 
been done to determine the obvious significant costs of 
importing insecticides not only for cotton but other crops, 
or for the hiring of the planes used in the control 
measures.
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Likewise, the growing of winter wheat in the same area has 
been hit by the sudden increase in the population of quelia 
birds; described by the Zimbabwe Herald as "... the 
feathered scourge of Africa" (The Zimbabwe Herald, 8th May 
1986, p6.) . According to the Department of National Parks 
and Wild Life, the birds destroyed at least $5 million worth 
of cereals in 1985 alone. One farmer was quoted as having 
lost $15,000 worth of grain before the control team moved in 
(Zimbabwe Herald, 8th May 1986) . In 1985 alone the 
estimated 500 million birds destroyed 11,000 tones of wheat.
Eradication of the birds has proved both difficult and very , 
costly. The bird is known to fly up to 30 km from roots to 
feeding grounds, and unlike the locusts, its flight cannot 
be detected by radar. The use of queletox poison (FAO 
recommended) costs $1 ,000 a barrel (1985 prices). For the 
two months of May to July in 1985, the department spent 
$150,000, and during that period, spraying killed over 150 
million birds. When South Africa, to the south, complained 
about these birds, it became clear that a regional approach 
was called for in trying to combat the birds. The problem 
is however hardly controlled by the kill rate that was being 
registered in 1985, and yet the cost of importing 
insecticides has continued to rise.
Most of these out bursts of pests are taking place at the 
schemes in the absence of any natural biological control 
systems. If the extra costs required to eradicate these 
pests are taken into consideration, irrigation agriculture, 
already marginally profitable, would become even less 
attractive, because these extra costs reduce the benefits 
from irrigation agriculture. There is therefore a need that 
these costs are considered during the ex-ante appraisal of 
the investment projects. Anticipatory measures, based on 
historical data, should be included in the planning system, 
so that, for those crops susceptible to pest problems, the 
calculation of their profitability would take into 
consideration the extra costs for pest eradication and crop 
losses.
Social Effects
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Apart from causing a number of environmental externalities 
investment in water and irrigation agriculture can cause 
many social costs many of which may be unquantifiable (see 
Table 7.1) but are nevertheless real. The negative effects 
on social systems include ., for example, the deliberate 
removal of people from the flood plain and areas adjacent 
to the dams. Evacuations and subsequent resettlements have 
caused the breakdown of communities, disoriented the 
society's patterns of production and the traditional life 
support system, and lowered morale. The removal of the 
Tongas from the shores of the Zambezi River at the time of 
the construction of the Kariba Dam in 1960, was carried out 
in accordance with the 1930 Act; without the necessary 
sociological and psychological preparations, and with a lack 
of compensation. Rubin and Warren (1968), in their study of 
the Tongas, showed that these tribesmen were resettled in 
less hospitable areas, and were forced to start completely 
afresh to develop an entirely different socio-economic 
system employing completely different production relations. 
The Tonga's social hierarchy structures were completely 
destroyed, and they had to realign allegiance to not always 
hospitable tribes. Moreover, the feeding centres that were 
set up by officials, and the makeshift camps where they 
crowded, became disease transmission centres. Within the 
first two years of resettlement, over 10 percent of them 
died.
Elsewhere in the country, the experience of the Tongas, was 
repeated over and over through the removal of peasants when 
their land became "European Land" and in order to make way 
for commercial schemes. Very few peasants so displaced were 
allowed to settle on the schemes developed. The current 
pragmatic policies of government towards land redistribution 
could perhaps imply that while there will be more prior 
consultations and pre-planning before evacuations are 
carried out, the end result will probably not differ 
materially from pre-independence strategies. If the recent 
case of Chief Seke's Dema Tribe is anything to go by, 
traumas and the pains will not be very different from those
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suffered by the Tongas. The Dema people (100 families) are 
to be evacuated from the flood plain of a proposed dam 50 km 
south-east of Harare, and to be settled in the Beatrice 
District over 80 km south-west of Harare. The peasants are 
refusing to move stating as reason for their refusal the 
following:
"some of the farmers argued that they could not 
leave the area because their ancestors' graves 
were in the area ....
and these needed yearly rituals on the 
sites...."
(The Zimbabwe Herald, 21st July 1986).
Since the government is determined to go ahead with the 
construction of the dam, the peasants' wishes will not come 
to much. Already there were arguments as to the level of 
compensation that has to be paid for the destroyed huts. 
While the fixing of value of the huts will cause a lot of 
disagreements, the peasants' lack of title deeds over the 
land to be inundated means no compensation is being paid for 
the lost land. Again the government will have to make 
arbitrary offers that may well not match the values of the 
properties to be lost, and the pain of being up-rooted from 
a familiar environment.
The Spread of Diseases
Probably, the worst and certainly the most obvious and 
immediate direct externality effect associated with 
investment in water and irrigation agriculture is the spread 
of malaria and bilharzia, both within the schemes themselves 
and among surrounding communities. The phenomena is equally 
apparent on both commercial and small-scale schemes. 
Although these two diseases were known in the country long 
before the advent of irrigation projects, the expansion of 
such developments has undoubtedly been a major contributor 
to their spatial spread and their greatly increased 
incidence. They have now reached epidemic proportions 
particularly around the schemes themselves. Moreover the 
high population mobility and interaction has meant that 
these diseases have began to spread further afield into 
areas hitherto unaffected (see Fig I and II). Prior to the
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introduction of dams, the vectors that pass malaria 
(anopheles mosquitoes) and bilharzia (fresh water snails 
which carry S Haematobium and S Mansoni) were kept in check 
by the prevailing seasonality of the climate. During the 
short rainy season, the vectors proliferated, but during the 
following long dry season (nine months) and during 
intermitted periods of drought, most of these died. In this 
way acceptable, manageable vector population levels were 
maintained naturally. But the construction of large static 
water bodies, and the accompanying development of 
permanently cultivated fields, had made it possible for the 
vectors to continue to multiply throughout the year, in the 
absence of any natural control measures. Inevitably the 
incidence of infection has likewise increased, and the 
problems have been exacerbated since irrigation has made it 
possible to concentrate large numbers of people around each 
scheme. This has tended, particularly in the case of 
bilharzia, ' further fcoincrease the number of potential 
disease carriers moving with the infection into areas away 
from the schemes. Gilmary, Riddell, and Sanders in 1979 
(Chandiwana 1983) found that, apart from malaria and 
bilharzia, other secondary contagious diseases, such as 
diarrhoea, typhoid, dysentery, trachoma and scabies (no 
doubt aided by the ever present unsanitary conditions), were 
an ever present menace and a cause of many deaths at the 
irrigation schemes.
While bilharzia causes debilitating effects and creates a 
favorable environment for secondary infection, it does not 
directly kill human beings. However, this is not true of 
malaria which probably accounts for the highest proportions 
of deaths of children at the schemes, the other major cause 
of increased mortality rates being a host of secondary 
diseases to which weakened individuals become prey. No 
statistical figures are available, but the level of infant 
mortality is known to be higher than the national average 
of 20 percent per thousand per year. If other external 
factors such as the poor sanitary conditions and
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malnutrition, all prevalent at most irrigation schemes, are 
taken into account, cumulative health problems are
considerable.
The spatial dispersion of bilharzia as shown on Fig I and 
Fig II, indicates that while S Haematobium has become a 
nationwide disease, its spread is less in the low rainfall 
areas of Matebeleland, but the incidence increases markedly 
as we move towards the wetter east and north-east. However, 
S Mansoni displays different spatial preference.
Concentrations around Harare and the south eastern part of 
the country are clearly associated with large scale
commercial irrigation agriculture. Nearly two-thirds of the 
country is yet free of S Mansoni, and again Matebeleland 
experiences the least effect because of the absence of 
perennial surface waters and large scale irrigation.
Since infection transmission can only be effected through 
contact with water, the correlationship between availability 
of water (as rainfall or in dams) and the incidence of
infection is well established. The greater use of flood 
irrigation now, more than in the past in Zimbabwe, increases 
the opportunities for body contact with contaminated water. 
On small scale schemes, the absence of lined canals and the 
presence of abundant weed growth means that the snail 
population has a suitable habitat within which to multiply 
and so carry on the infection chain. Permanent water 
availability removes the natural checks on the increase of 
vector populations which dry seasons and droughts provide. 
As long as irrigation agriculture development continues to 
expand along presently planned lines, especially given that 
little or no preventative measures are included at the 
design stage, bilharzia and malaria will continue to 
flourish. In the case of bilharzia, the fact that it does 
not kill makes it easy for public officials to ignore it. 
Moreover, adult victims rarely report the disease because 
its symptoms, such as urinating with blood, etc. affect 
intimate and taboo parts of the human body. Thus the spread 
of the disease continues unabated.
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Data on the spatial spread of malaria is difficult to 
obtain. Table 7.2 and Fig III, based on the Malaria Blood 
Slide Submissions of 1982/83 give some indications of the 
potential regional pattern of infection. However, the data 
is suspect and is by no means comprehensive. It is used 
here as indicative of spread only, but cannot be taken to 
reflect the absolute relationships.
TABLE 7.2
REGIONAL MALARIA INCIDENCE, 1982/83 (BASED ON MAJiARIA BLOOD 
SLIDE SUBMISSION TO HOSPITALS)
PERCENT
PROVINCE NO. EXAMINED NO POSITIVE POSITIVE
Masvingo 3 504 1 571 45
Midlands 1 896 174 9
Manicaland 1 245 218 18
Mashonaland 5 862 1 012 17
Matebeleland 3 738 1 601 43
v
Source:Ministry of Health, Government of Zimbabwe, 1984.
There is need for caution in the interpretation of the above 
data. The sample size examined from region to region was 
not uniform and not always statistically significant.
The relatively low incidence in Mashonaland and Manicaland 
can be explained by the altitude and generally low 
temperatures in winter? such conditions do not favour the 
multiplication of mosquitoes. However, the situation in 
Masvingo with the highest apparent incidence of malaria 
infection, is a clear indication of the importance of the 
combination of high temperatures and the presence of 
expansive water bodies, especially around Chiredzi and 
Triangle. In Matebeleland, despite the absence of major 
irrigation schemes, the presence of the Zambezi Valley and 
its high temperatures is responsible for the abnormally high 
incidence, in a province that is naturally too dry to be a 
suitable habitat for mosquitoes. Clearly, the high level of 
positive samples in Masvingo is in all probability a good 
reflection of the impact of the numerous large dams and 
large scale irrigation schemes, on the spread of malaria.
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Fig. Ill
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The Socio-Economic Cost of Malaria and Bilharzia
Comprehensive data on the socio-economic costs of malaria 
and bilharzia is not available in Zimbabwe, their impact can 
only be inferred from overseas experience, supplemented by 
field analysis and limited information available in the 
country. Data on economic costs assembled by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) for many countries have largely 
been general in nature. The quoted financial figures often 
refer to the costs incurred in attempts to eradicate either 
malaria and or bilharzia, in addition to costs associated 
with research. While the recorded financial costs are 
generally very high, and for those countries concerned, 
represent a major diversion of scarce resources from other 
beneficial uses, they represent however, only a fraction of 
the overall economic cost which these diseases impose on the 
affected economies.
A full analysis of the economic cost of malaria is made more 
complex by the fact that malaria occurs in combination with 
secondary infections; many of these are promoted by factors 
which have little to do with irrigation per se, but stem 
from the more general problems of low rural incomes and poor 
living conditions. Thus, malnutrition and pneumonia are 
very common features in all peasant families. When these 
combine with malaria the result can be fatal. It is clear 
that the cost of medicine needed for curing malaria has 
clearly to be added to the cost of curing the accompanying 
secondary diseases, but this raises problems of separating 
those costs relating to malaria alone and those to secondary 
forms of infection. Import bills can be valuable source of 
cost data relating to the cost of importing medicines, 
preventative drugs and insecticides. Unfortunately, there 
has been no deliberate effort in Zimbabwe to separate, these 
bills. Likewise, pesticides import data can only yield a 
very partial insight, since they include pesticides which 
are used to control other pests including animal and crop 
pests. Any effort to separate malaria related data from 
these bills would produce results that at best are only 
rough estimates.
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Unrecorded estimates by the Ministry of Health officials put 
the cost of importing malaria drugs upwards of $500,000 per 
year, the greater part of this in foreign currency, while 
that spent on importing insecticides plus the cost of 
controlling mosquitoes is put at above $2 million annually. 
These figures do not however indicate, in the case of the 
drugs, how much of the imported medicine per year is 
actually used, and how much stays on the shelves of shops 
for years. Besides, the import bill figures reflect only 
what has been bought, which in turn is a reflection of the 
foreign currency allocation procedures, and not of demand, 
and certainly not a reflection of the cost to be paid to 
reduce or eradicate malaria. Clearly import data alone 
cannot be used as an indicator of the cost of the disease.
Any attempt to assess the full costs (which is not made here 
because of lack of data) should involve the production of 
monetary estimates of the increased need for medicare in the 
absence of import controls, including the provision of 
clinics and hospitals, increased staff numbers, the cost of 
training malaria specialists, and the cost of malaria 
related research. However, such data would still be unable 
to determine the full damage in human terms. No monetary 
value can adequately measure the worth of lost lives, or the 
declining quality of life which the disease imposes on the 
sufferer. The victim's willingness to pay a higher price 
than that paid by the state, in order to get rid of the 
threat of death and suffering, is likewise a poor measure 
since it is proscribed by the victim's inability to pay. 
This means medical receipts of individual medical purchases 
cannot be used as the price the individual is prepared to 
pay to get rid of malaria. The fact that medication for the 
poor receives public subsidies further complicates both the 
data collection process and the analysis. Inevitably, it 
becomes a public sector choice as to whether disease 
reduction is worth the investment involved.
Hypothetically, it could be argued from the view point of 
the economy as a whole, that the cost of death from malaria 
for an irrigation worker is the lost value of his labour to 
the economy minus the savings in compensation. However,
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such opportunity cost calculations apart from raising 
ethical questions, have little meaning given the high level 
of unemployment in the country and thus the low real value 
of labour. Moreover, malaria affects even the unemployed 
and children, which renders the analysis still less 
meaningful. In such circumstances, it is quite possible for 
malaria to yield net apparent economic benefits to the 
economy, since each death reduces the consumption of goods, 
services and government grants. In the same vein, the 
statutory minimum wage for irrigation workers of $95 per 
month (1985/86) can be regarded as being more than adequate 
compensation to the workers, given their near zero 
opportunity cost. But this mechanistic approach to the 
problem is so devoid of empathy that it has no chance of 
ever being considered as part of the planners* approach to 
project appraisal, least of all in a socialist society.
Unlike malaria, bilharzia has been studied at length at the 
Blair Research Station in Harare, at the De Beers and at 
Chiredzi Research Stations. A great deal of research work 
by Evans, Shift, Clarke, Barnish, Makura and Chandiwana 
(Chandiwana 1984) has centered on the experimental use of 
chemical molluscicides and other control measures. The 
studies have not yet moved away from the medical bias to the 
assessment of the economic implications of bilharzia. As 
was the case for malaria, no cost data has been compiled on 
bilharzia, nor has a register been kept, of the additional 
medical and research costs which bilharzia has imposed on 
the economy. The spread of the disease throughout the 
country (Fig I and II) means that nearly every clinic and 
hospital has to spend a certain amount of time and money on 
bilharzia. In fact, bilharzia has long stopped being purely 
an irrigation related disease, and is now a nation-wide 
menace. The high cost of collecting data on costs nation­
wide is a major constraint, especially in the absence of a 
tradition or a conscious effect to collect data, and so is 
the lack of trained personnel to do such a job. As such, 
the study examines a few research works and foreign 
experiences as indications of the seriousness of the disease 
and its economic impact.
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For example, the Blair Research Station*s Research Unit at 
Mushandike Dam and irrigation schemes is trying to answer 
some of the problems raised here. Such experiments are 
naturally long term and very expensive. For example, a nine 
year experiment on the control of bilharzia at Triangle and 
Hippo Valley irrigation schemes cost US$696,000 or US$249 
per km2 covered, in 1979/80.
Table 7.3 is an example of the costs of some of these 
studies. To these figures must be added the cost of 
actually implementing the result and outcomes of these 
studies nation wide, plus the cost of medication just as in 
the case of malaria. The problems here are similar to those 
discussed under malaria.
TABLE 7.3
COST OF EXPERIMENTATION
TIME PERIOD RESEARCHER ANNUAL TOTAL UP TO YEAR
COST COST
(US$)
10 Years Evans 800,000 8 Million 1983
10 Years Shift/Clarke 54,800 540,000 1973
9 Years Shift/Clarke 696,000 6.3 Million 1979/80
Source:Ministry of Health, Government of ZimbabweI i9S4^-J
unfortunately no other cost data is available in the 
country. Officials running the private Chiredzi Hospital, 
the only hospital in the country that has more than ninety 
percent of its patients as irrigation workers, refused to 
answer questions relating to cost of medication, cost of 
importation of drugs, and the provision of clinical data 
relating to frequency of infection among the workers. Two 
visits to the hospital failed to produce any results and all 
questionnaires were returned unfilled.
Studies carried out on the economic cost of bilharzia in 
other countries are considered below. For example, Farroq 
(In Obeng 1978) has analysed the loss of labour productivity 
and the costs of bilharzia control. He puts the economic 
cost of bilharzia at several millions of US dollars. His 
methodology is to turn the cost of control into the economic 
loss due to bilharzia. However, the weakness of this
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methodology which argues that bilharzia weakens the body and 
thereby reduces work effort and output, and by implication 
productivity, lies in the blanket assumption that all such 
physical weakness can be attributed to bilharzia. Ignored 
by Faroq and other researchers who share the same views are 
important factors that have been observed at most schemes in 
Zimbabwe, and naturally elsewhere. These include sheer 
laziness, loss of stamina arising from previous work 
conditions, poor living conditions at most labour camps, 
illnesses and malnutrition. Moreover the efficiency effect 
of bilharzia is not uniform among all workers? the effect 
varies with the duration of exposure to infection plus 
individual immunity responses. Clinical evidence suggest 
that the disease displays a symptomatic severity gradient 
ranging from mild, moderate to very severe. The implication 
of the gradient is that the efficiency effects of bilharzia 
are likely to vary according to differences in physiology.
Following Prescott (1979), the use of macro estimates of 
economic loss is rejected here. The aggregate figures 
produced have not stood the test of micro analysis. For 
example, by assuming that Egypt would save US$650 million if 
it eradicated bilharzia, macro analysis has assumed a 
costless eradication process. Micro analytical work by 
Prescott (1979), Weisbrood (1973/74) and many others, did 
not find significant results to support the much publicized 
hypothesis that bilharzia affects labour productivity and by 
implication profitability. Admittedly, all these studies 
did not look at the relationship between the worm load in 
each person and labour productivity, and the ease with which 
secondary effects can affect a bilharzia carrying person.
In Zimbabwe, attempts at assembling aggregate figures of the 
economic cost of bilharzia must include the cost of 
molluscicides and other related costs. This inevitably is 
a partial picture, and to this must be added such 
unquantifiable elements as the debilitating effects which 
leave suffers prey to secondary diseases. Taken together 
all these cost elements are a sufficiently high figure to 
deserve much greater attention by decision makers at project 
designing stage.
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The eradication of both malaria and bilharzia has not yet 
become a conscious national policy, and the rate at which 
irrigation schemes are being built can only negate the 
adoption of such a policy. This implies therefore that 
national effort must be directed either towards the 
reduction in the expansion of investment in new schemes, or 
the inclusion at the project design stage of measures aimed 
at curbing both malaria and bilharzia. The later approach 
would obviate costly future expenditure on ex-post control 
measures.
However, it is ironic that the government has chosen, more 
by default than conscious design, to employ ex-post 
corrective measures in dealing with this problem. The focus 
has always been on the application of insecticides and 
pesticides? this has not only triggered resistance in 
mosquitoes, but also caused potentially harmful side effects 
to human beings. For example, women in the Sebungwe Valley 
have recently been found to have DDT in their breast milk, 
three years after DDT was sprayed in the area (The 
Zimbabwean Herald, July 1986) .
TABLE 7.4
CASES OF MOSQUITO RESISTANCE TO INSECTICIDES IN THE WORLD 
BY 1980 (PRECIPITATED BY INDIRECT SELECTION PRESSURE. BY 
AGRICULTURAL INSECTICIDES)
SPECIES COUNTRY CROP INSECTICIDE
RESISTANCE
1. Anopheles 
Acconitus
Java Various crops 
and rice
Dieldrin
DDT
2. A.Albimanus El Salvador
Nicaragua
Cotton* and Parathion
and
Malathion
Fenitroth-
ion
Propoxur, 
Carbaryl
Mexico,
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Cotton* DDT and 
Dieldrin
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3. A.Culcifacaes India
(Haryana)
4. A.Gambiae
5. A.Melas
Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, Nigeria 
Mali, Togo, 
Sudan, Burkina 
Faso, Senegal
Zaire
6. A.Pharaoensis Egypt, Sudan
7. A.Quandri- 
maculatus
8. Sacharovi
9. A.Ainensis
10. A.Maculi- 
pennis
USA
Mexico
Coffee, Cacao 
Groundnuts 
Cotton*, 
Cotton*, 
Various crops
Bananas
Cotton*
Other crops
Cotton*
Cotton*
Greece, Turkey Cotton* Rice
China 
Romania,
11. A.Melanoonsu Turkey 
-balpinus
12. A.Rufipes Mali
13. Aedes Aegypt Tahiti
14. Aedes
Nigromaculis
USA
15. Culexpipiens USA 
Fatigans
Rice
All crops
All crops
Cotton*
Coconut
Various
crops
Various
crops
Malathion
Dieldrin
Dieldrin
DDT
DDT
DDT
Dieldrin
DDT
Dieldrin
D D T ,
Dieldrin
D D T ,
Dieldrin
Ocando, Op
Dieldrin
Dieldrin
Dieldrin
Dieldrin
DDT,
Dieldrin
OP
OP
Source: Bull, D, A Growing Problem, Pesticides and the Third 
World, Oxfam, Page 34, 1982
Table 7.4 shows a global picture of the cases of mosquitoes' 
resistance to some of the most powerful insecticides. An 
F.A.O. report (Ceres 1980) quotes that, the anopheles 
mosquito is resistant to over eight major insecticides. 
While greater application of chemicals has met with greater 
mosquito adaptability, the resultant failures have spurred 
manufacturing companies to search for even much more 
powerful chemicals. The search for a super killing drug has 
led to the production of biocides which are known or 
suspected carcinogens and mutagens, whose long-term
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continued use introduce a new dimension to problems related 
to dealing with environmental effects of irrigation 
agriculture.
The cost implication for Zimbabwe's cash crop based 
irrigation strategy are obvious. For example, the 
replacement of DDT with a more powerful malathion increases 
the farmers' costs by as much as seven times, while the use 
of the carbonate propoxur increases the cost by up to 27 
times (Bull 1982) . Only very rich farmers (not found in 
Zimbabwe) and multinational agribusinesses can afford to 
switch to these more expensive types of drugs. Clearly any 
ex-post measures that the country might choose to adopt are 
full of difficulties and very expensive. Indeed, even 
clinical treatment at hospitals like Chiredzi have to be 
regarded as palliative, because of the high rate of second 
and successive infection. The drain from the exchequer must 
clearly increase with the increase in the number of dams and 
irrigation schemes developed each year.
In conclusion it is clear that the amount of work carried 
out to identify and ameliorate the social and environmental 
externalities arising from irrigation is disproportionately 
small when viewed against the scale of the current and 
potential problems. The appreciation of potential problems 
has been slight, and the commitment by decision makers to 
their appraisal or monitoring has been minimal. Irrigation 
agriculture in Zimbabwe stands today as a classic example of 
socially and environmentally blind development. In 
suggesting lessons to be learned, the temptation is to call 
for the inclusion in the planning process of a sound 
environmental impact procedure (Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) as employed in most developed countries. 
In many ways, however, the EIA is an inadequate straw to 
clutch at in the search for more environmentally and 
socially sensitive approaches to irrigation development.
Certainly there is a lot of logic in the use of the EIA 
framework, primarily because it is the only currently 
acceptable way of putting social and environmental issues 
onto the project planning agenda at all. Dams and
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irrigation projects are planned by engineers and demanded by 
politicians. None of these have any interest in the 
environment other than as something to be used for the 
benefit of people, and the EIA can bring particular issues 
to their attention which would otherwise certainly be 
ignored or remain unperceived. In particular there is a 
need for substantially greater investment in the collection 
of social and environmental data, with a stronger focus on 
longer time scales. This should not only involve detailed 
pre-project investigations and the preparations of social 
and environmental impact statements, but should also contain 
specific provision for continuous monitoring and for follow- 
up studies in the form of social and environmental audits.
These recommendations are made here with the full 
realisation that the prerequisite to their adoption is the 
missing political willingness and commitment to such a 
procedure, even if it should come to mean less dams and less 
irrigation schemes. In the absence of this, social and 
environmental provisions will simply be grafted onto an 
existing project appraisal system as an after thought, 
occupying a very peripheral position, as is the case at 
present, to the decision making process.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
In this study an attempt has been made to evaluate the past 
and present public policies for the development of irrigated 
agriculture and to assess the consequences of implementation 
practice. Both public policies for the production of bulk 
water supply capacity, and the subsequent investment in 
irrigation infrastructure, by both state agencies and 
private producers have been assessed. Throughout, the 
performance of the state in producing water, and that of the 
irrigation sector (commercial and peasantry) has been 
analysed in terms of economic efficiency and equity.
Conceptually, the framework of cost-benefit analysis was 
adopted, but clearly this had to be adapted to deal not only 
with the particular socio-economic and political context 
within which Zimbabwean investment policy must operate, but 
also with considerable data defects. Theoretically, cost- 
benefit analysis would require that both the public and the 
private sector investments in water and irrigation projects 
must generate net benefits. However, as was discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 5, in most countries, and certainly in 
Zimbabwe, the question of who obtains these net benefits is 
a relevant consideration.
The rationale behind the adopted theoretical framework is 
based on the fact that the investment of scarce resources 
into irrigation and water projects represents a cost to 
society in lost opportunity terms. Therefore it is very 
important that both the investment capital and the resultant 
fixed capital assets are used optimally. Given that 
•optimality* is a difficult concept to define and still more 
difficult to achieve, the baseline requirement must be that 
the chosen projects at least produce benefits which exceed 
the discounted total investment and running costs. While 
this is a requirement crucial for all forms of investment in 
any less developed country where capital is a scarce factor 
of production, it becomes particularly pertinent in the
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water case since the developed capital facilities are use- 
specific? the capital therefore becomes locked in and cannot 
be employed to produce other goods more highly valued by the 
farmers and consumers.
The advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of the 
cost-benefit framework, particularly for the commercial 
irrigation sector, were discussed fully in Chapter 2, and 
need not be repeated here. In the case of the peasantry 
sector, the use of the cost-effective analysis method was to 
find out if the chosen projects had achieved the set policy 
objectives of equity at least cost. While the full cost- 
benefit analysis or cost-effective analysis for any of the 
projects involved, was not carried out, the use of the 
macro-analytical approach is to ensure a consistency of 
analysis, and as comprehensive an assessment as is feasible 
given data defects. The normal procedure of assessing each 
project individually and then drawing generalizations from 
the results of all the projects was not followed here
because of the paucity (indeed in some areas the complete 
absence of) important items of data.
The results of a study of this type must inevitably be
somewhat speculative. However, what evidence there is 
clearly points to a number of issues which must be addressed 
if the efficiency, efficacy and equity of investment in 
irrigation and agricultural productivity are to be improved. 
The analysis of the economic and investment policy issues 
was carried out against the background of an economy that is 
experiencing sector-wide declines both in the short and long
term. The negative economic growth rates are the key
factors constraining the generation of resources needed for 
investment in water and irrigation agriculture. This factor 
puts a premium on, and increases the opportunity cost of any 
investment resources that are generated.
It must therefore be considered, at least in theory, that 
the scarce investment resources would be directed towards 
those water and irrigation projects where they would realise 
optimum benefits. However, in the real world, scarcity of 
investment resources has not often been associated with the
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need to realise •optimality' largely because of political 
considerations. As the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 
shows, the allocation of scarce investment resources has 
often defied economic rationality, certainly it has defied 
optimality as defined by welfare economics. The allocations 
are inevitably sub-optimal in Pareto terms, especially since 
allocation is based on a less rigid criteria. The results 
from this form of allocation are even more dubious as the 
benefits and the costs are undiscounted. The result has 
been the development of uneconomic projects, and the 
premature development of bulk capacity water supply 
facilities, ahead of any economic demand.
Apart from the above negative economic background, the study 
also had to be conducted against the backdrop of a society 
that is in a process of recovering from the effects of the 
structural dislocation caused by the 15 years civil war, a 
society that is still experiencing wide ranging imbalances, 
which are a carryover from the past. These imbalances have 
resulted in extremely uneven distribution of income, and 
spatial inequalities, particularly between the people of 
European and African origins, reflecting a correspondingly 
skewed distribution of the means of production and uneven 
access to development opportunities in the past. But 
inequality in terms of access to high quality land shows 
that a few private domestic farmers and external
agribusiness concerns, have had a greater control over most 
of the best agricultural land (Chapter 3). Over 40 percent 
of the over 700,000 peasant farming families are
experiencing landlessness and general poverty.
The central point at issue is whether investment in
irrigation agriculture is the best way for the country to 
fulfil its dual objectives of economic growth and equity.
The existence of three separate sectors (the commercial, the 
peasantry, and the water development sector), all responding 
to, and indeed controlled by, different policy objectives, 
havecomplicated the appraisal and made it more difficult to 
produce one generalised set of conclusions, valid for all
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times and for all forms of irrigation.
Public Investment in Water
It has been shown in the study that public investment in raw 
bulk water supply was not based on any economic efficiency 
criteria, that could, at least in theory, bring about the 
optimal allocation of investment resources between competing 
water projects. Theoretically, allocation efficiency, in 
determining the level of investment in water projects, 
requires that public development agencies employ efficiency 
pricing systems, in the allocation of resources. Although 
application of efficiency in practice will always be 
difficult given the problems of definition and 
implementation, any attempt to relate water production costs 
to the prices charged for this water, would constitute a 
great improvement for a country that is experiencing 
investment capital constraints, and is financing most of the 
investment from borrowed resources.
At present, in the absence of any irrigation water demand 
forecasting, public investment in new bulk water storage 
facilities is not directly liked to any expressed economic 
demand for water by farmers. There has been no research in 
the country, to establish the actual relationship, for all 
existing storage facilities, between storage capacity and 
water use-efficiency at the farm level. This information is 
very important in indicating the maximum number of farmers 
that could be served from existing facilities, before any 
new dams were constructed. Investment in additional supply 
facilities would then reflect incremental demand for water, 
which in turn would reflect the extra benefits to be 
realised by the farmers using the additional water 
resources, sold at a price reflecting the cost of producing 
the water.
The findings of the study show that existing investment 
policy has tended to lead to the premature development of 
capacity, in the sense that the problems of crop failure 
and/or famine or droughts, have come to be seen as problems 
of the absence of dams with enough water capacity for
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irrigation purposes. Solutions to problems of landlessness, 
regional backwardness and rural poverty and deprivation, 
have also come to be sought through the development of 
irrigation agriculture. Investment requirements are 
determined administratively on the physical potential 
criteria, rather than on the basis of attempting to optimise 
the returns on the capital invested. Less attention was 
paid to maximizing output of agricultural returns using 
existing water storage facilities. It has been shown that 
this bias towards premature over-provision is due to a 
number of factors:-
First, in the past additional supply facilities were 
developed easily and cheaply, for very few farmers, thus 
lessening the need for economy in investment. It may 
well have cost more to ensure that available supplies 
were used to best advantage than it did to provide new 
dams. Such a situation no longer exists. In the 
tropical developing countries of Africa which have 
marked dry and wet seasons, and whose agriculture partly 
depends on irrigation, water is in the transition from 
being a virtually free good to becoming an expensive 
manufactured product, the competition for which is 
increasingly intense. In Zimbabwe this is evident from 
the high amount of capital resources on the national 
budget, that are increasingly directed towards water 
production.
Second, water provision for irrigation agriculture has 
always been dominated by pro-irrigation public bodies 
with a vested interest in maintaining the construction 
of large dams and output from irrigation, such as the 
Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and Development, 
the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, and the Regional 
Water Authority. The position taken by these public 
agencies is reminiscent of the activities and operations 
of the Corps of Engineers in the United States of 
America up to the mid 1960s (MacKean 1958, Hirschleifer 
et al 1960, and Maas 1962) . Moreover, the executive 
agencies, (the Regional Water Authority, the District 
Development fund and the Department of Water
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Development) , are freed from the need to make profit and 
from the financial constraints that inhibit the 
operations of other sectors in the economy.
There has, therefore, been even less pressure to provide 
storage facilities using cost-minimizing techniques. 
The position has been made worse by the absence in these 
agencies of an analytical framework within which to 
evaluate and prioritise investment options. At the base 
of this problem is the organizations' lack of 
professional capability to carry out efficient 
investment functions, and to formulate policy and 
institutional alternatives. The agencies have so far 
failed to take into account a wide range of conflicting 
economic and social objectives, that call for 
appropriate balancing and explicit evaluation of trade­
offs. Instead, in an attempt to guard against 
unexpectedly rapid increases in future water 
requirements and cyclical droughts, they have normally 
allowed capacity construction to take place well ahead 
of expressed demand by farmers. In the establishment of 
these supply safety margins, no attempt has been made to 
relate the high cost of investment against expected 
benefits.
Third, the prior appropriation water right system (Water 
Act, 1976) enshrines the rights of riparian farmers to 
existing water supplies in perpetuity, and at low 
historic prices. No reference is made to the farmers' 
water-use efficiency or to the equitable and efficient 
allocation of the available water between increasingly 
competitive agricultural demands. This permanently 
fossilizes old, possibly inefficient, uses, and 
therefore new demands can only be met through the 
development of further storage facilities, but these new 
consumers are provided with supplies at similarly low 
prices. This way, a self perpetuating cycle has been 
established and possibilities of challenging the water 
right system, without alienating the farmers, are 
politically slim, given the fact that farmers acting 
together are a powerful political 'constituent'.
266
Fourth, most of the public water development agencies 
are run by engineers, trained to construct dams rather 
than to ensure that the need for more dams is minimized. 
The dominance by the engineers of the advisory and 
policy formulation functions has led to the observed 
over emphasis on capacity extension, as a solution to 
water supply bottle-necks, and to the neglect of 
efficient water use measures designed to reduce the need 
for new facilities. To date the engineers have failed 
to perceive that non-construction measures exist which 
could increase the effective use of water in existing 
storage facilities, and thus allow a balance to be 
achieved between demands and available supplies. 
Technical and financial assistance from overseas has 
tended to reinforce the existing preoccupation with the 
'monument syndrome', largely because donor agencies, 
like the host government perceive mutually beneficial 
political capital in the construction of dams. Foreign 
debt burdens arising from investment in dams, have often 
been passed on to other sectors of the economy.
The absence of an efficient project selection criterion 
means that decisions that are made and the projects that are 
chosen are largely based on non-e.c.oi~»oro»c: criteria. As a 
result, a number of non-economic features can be observed:-
1) The choice of capacity extension schemes almost always 
falls on those that yield economies of scale. The 
implied advantage is however, always lost because of the 
fact that the resultant water resources are not always 
used efficiently, because the water pricing system does 
not promote efficiency. Discounted cash flow techniques 
and other optimising techniques are not used at all. 
This is largely because engineers are not trained in 
them. Where donor agencies offer these services, their 
efficacy is undermined by the fact that no dam 
construction project has ever been rejected on the basis 
of failing to pass the efficiency test. All water 
projects, good or bad, end up being developed.
2) As the rate of inflation has been rising rapidly,
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engineers have often argued with the Treasury, for the 
need to build as many planned dams as soon as possible, 
since building them in future would cost more. They 
ignore, or fail to see, the fact that inflation is 
irrelevant to the argument, and the fact that the very 
high number of these projects all planned in a single 
fiscal year is inflationary.
3) In the absence of demand forecasting the apparent need 
for new facilities is determined by crude extrapolation 
methods; by pressure from farmers? or simply by the need 
to be seen to be doing something.
4) The 'once and for all times' price setting system 
reflected the need to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover costs as measured in accounting terms. Price 
levels were not adjusted for inflation nor were they set 
to reflect the scarcity of water or the high cost of 
producing it. Demand control through the price 
mechanism has not been considered as the Ministry of 
Energy and Water Resources and Development's function. 
The preoccupation has tended to be with the lowering of 
prices of water and attracting greater use of water. 
This is largely because, despite the high per unit cost 
of production, water has been treated in social service 
terms. For some reason, water officials exhibited a 
high degree of hesitation to annoy farmers through high 
(but essential) water charges, although there was little 
evidence to suggest that the farmers would resist such 
charges. This implies that vital data on the individual 
farmer's ability to pay and/or willingness to pay has 
not been collected, nor is there any plan to use such 
information in the formulation of future water pricing 
policies.
Investment in repairs of leakages, particularly for the 
peasantry sector where water is in fact supplied through 
unlined canals, is far less than that directed to capacity 
extension. While it may be appreciated that canal lining 
may be expensive, a clear cut cost relationship between the 
cost of lining and the economic value of the water lost by
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not lining, needs to be established and used when the 'to 
construct or not to construct1 decisions are being taken. 
This procedure is not followed at present.
At the farm, farmers have not been dissuaded from the water 
flooding irrigation technique (60% of commercial irrigation 
schemes and over 95% of peasant schemes) which allows for 
over application and greater water losses. This is despite 
the fact that officials are aware of the alternative water- 
use efficient sprinkler system, which although expensive to 
install can reduce drastically water wastage.
The sprinkler system has the added advantage of delaying the 
likelihood of leaching and water-logged conditions setting 
in, helping to prevent the future occurrence of soil 
salinization, which in future would cost much more to 
correct as shown by the California example (Pringle, 1982). 
There is however, little private incentive for water 
economy, where water prices have not necessitated the 
development of technologies to increase water use efficiency 
at the farm level, nor have the farmers been imbued with a 
water management consciousness. In the case of small scale 
farmers, the fact that water is provided almost free, means 
that the incentive for conservation must be zero, while that 
for over use and/or application is unconstrained. The 
result is the false perception, by all farmers engaged in 
irrigation, that water is plentiful, a perception which 
reinforces the tendency for demand to be artificially 
escalated.
The neglect of investment cost minimization and water use 
management techniques can partly be explained by the high 
level of institutional fragmentation (Chapter 3 and 4). In 
the absence of common operational guide-lines, the Regional 
Water Authority has pursued its own policy to develop the 
Sabi-Lundi Valleys for commercial irrigation, with little or 
no coordination with the Ministry of Energy and Water's 
investment strategy. The independence of the Authority from 
Central Government control has meant that the Authority 
often promoted the advancement of its own parochial 
interests, with little regard to whether its investment
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fitted or complemented other sectoral development efforts in 
the region. If anything, the Authority has tended to set up 
congenially beneficial operational procedures between itself 
and the cliental farmers, that could not be duplicated 
elsewhere in the economy.
At the national level, the Ministry of Energy and Water*s 
activities were normally defined solely in terms of 
providing dams, the subsequent responsibility for water end- 
uses lay with the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, and the 
Department of Rural Development. Since these departments 
were more agronomically inclined, the responsibility for 
instituting water use management practices became no one' s 
responsibility.
Among the water officials, it is, for example assumed, in 
the absence of any research evidence, that the introduction 
of any management techniques would be widely unpopular and 
resisted by farmers, and that if the introduction of such 
mechanisms were price-led, there would be a public outcry by 
farmers and politicians from farming constituencies.
Recommendations on water pricing
Most of the recommendations made below will largely remain 
an act of faith, until there is real political commitment to 
reviewing the existing investment policies and practices 
affecting water and irrigation.
It is recommended that, if investment efficiency is to be 
realised, the current costly duplication of administrative 
structures should be ended. This can either be done by 
creating a single body (the Water and Irrigation Development 
Authority) that combines water and irrigation development 
responsibilities. The body would be autonomous or semi- 
autonomous with the operational requirement that it makes 
profit from water sales, and that it finances all the 
expansion of additional water facilities and irrigation 
agriculture from its own savings. An exception to the 
commercial criteria could be made where demonstrable 
political considerations of equity would demand that cheap
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or zero priced supplies are provided for peasant farmers, 
however in this case some physical controls would be needed 
to ensure that water misuse did not occur.
Any policy that is leaning towards charging economic prices 
for the water, would not only increase revenue levels, but, 
in the process, the policy would inevitably induce water use 
management awareness among farmers. This in turn would 
induce more efficient use of existing facilities and thus 
would lower the demand or delay the construction of new 
facilities. The proposed body would also have the incentive 
to employ all technical methods such as demand forecasting 
models, and extrapolation methods in its effort to achieve 
efficiency. The present system where revenue returns are 
not realised by the water bodies, but by Treasury, would be 
abandoned. Technological efficiency may therefore be able 
to increase yield in existing dams and in the process curb 
the need for capacity extension.
But these economic advantages would also have costs. 
Inevitably there would be some shrinkage of the area under 
irrigation, and this will in turn result in some income and 
job losses.
In determining prices to be charged to the farmers, the 
bottom line should always be the need to ensure that schemes 
developed do not collapse for lack of resources.
Under these conditions, the possibility of drawing up a 
social contract between the state and the peasant farmers, 
could arise, whereby the state would direct most of the 
donor grant aid resources towards covering most of the 
capital costs, and the farmers paying fully for the 
operation and maintenance costs in perpetuity.
In the case of the commercial irrigation sector, the low 
water prices have allowed the growth of unconstrained demand 
for water. Farmers have therefore often been able to 
procure more water under the water right system, than they 
actually need. In Mashonaland, the prevalence of small 
private dams (Chapter 3) , has come to mean that in good
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rainfall years, less water is taken by farmers from the 
large dams than they are entitled to under their 'right' 
agreement. But since under the current water pricing policy 
farmers are only required to pay for what they actually use 
and not for what they are entitled to take, large quantities 
of water are thus sub-optimally allocated, and revenue is 
lost to the state. A revised pricing system based on 
economic prices, should induce farmers to relinquish rights 
to some of their entitlement to bring 'right' levels close 
to actual use. In this way it would be possible to 
reallocate the released waters to new farmers, and thus 
obviate the need for investing in new costly dams. The 
growth of a water market should be encouraged and its 
operational mechanisms assessed, by future research work.
While the great majority of farmers have now shifted towards 
low cost, but wasteful flood irrigation, a revised price 
structure should induce farmers to invest more into those 
spray or drip irrigation technologies that would cut down 
wasteful water use. In the long term, these proposals would 
remove the necessity for water rationing during drought 
years as more water would have been conserved by careful 
use. For example, during the 1982-84 drought, the low water 
price allowed over use and wastage of water to continue, 
such that by mid 1983, most irrigation schemes had to be 
closed or were forced to operate at half capacity. These 
measures, while they effectively dealt with the severe 
problems encountered at the peak of the drought, were 
however not part of a conscious demand management policy. 
The need for control has always arisen by default as a 
manifestation of crisis management and as a result of the 
lack of a permanent overall water management policy. This 
problem, far from being restricted to irrigation, is also 
prevalent in the urban domestic and industrial water supply 
system, where temporary water restrictions in dry months are 
followed by the absence of any in wet months; therefore 
leading to constant supply bottle-necks.
The pursuit of efficiency must mean the need for the 
revision of the present irrigation agriculture policy. But 
change is not a costless process, so the cost-benefit
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analysis of the proposed change needs to be examined and 
assessed.
Investment in Small Scale Peasant Schemes
Public policy on the development of small scale irrigation 
sector schemes was shown to be subsidy based; most costs are 
not recovered from the beneficiaries, and the state pays 
over 80 percent of the operation and maintenance costs at 
every scheme. The historical reasons for the establishment 
of these schemes, namely the accommodation of the displaced 
and landless peasants, was discussed in Chapter 3. Present 
day enthusiasm for small-scale irrigation is ironically 
based on similar reasons despite changes in the political 
situation. Economic considerations have often appeared as 
an after-thought or by default and only when it was 
discovered that the schemes were becoming an unbearable 
financial liability to the Treasury.
Chapter 6 has discussed the practice and implications of the 
subsidy-based policy. It was also shown that state subsidy 
went beyond capital outlays to embrace the ever increasing 
service costs. The open-ended subsidy-based investment 
policy must assume that small scale irrigation represents 
the optimal method of tackling gross inequality in income, 
poverty and landlessness all of which affect the peasants. 
In other words, the existing rainfed peasantry agriculture 
is considered by policy makers as the undesirable state from 
which peasant farmers must be moved, and the irrigation 
subsector, as the future ideal.
This conclusion is determined by the fact that, in dollar 
terms per hectare, government is spending on small scale 
schemes an average of approximately $5,000 per year (1983/84 
prices), whereas it spends less than $2 (1983/84 prices) per 
ha per year on rainfed farmers: a ratio of 2,500 to 1 in 
favour of irrigation agriculture. In purely financial 
comparative terms therefore, the policy has set a prima 
facie case for irrigation agriculture development, at the 
expense of rainfed agriculture.
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Chapter 6 has also shown that the officials of the 
Department of Rural Development, freed from the necessity 
for economy in investment, have gone ahead and developed, in 
a period of five years, nearly 80 small scale schemes, 
almost all of which are uneconomic. The officials make no 
pretence about the fact that most of their schemes are 
uneconomic, and incapable of sustaining themselves in 
perpetuity.
Indeed the argument at public meetings was that these 
schemes should not be judged on the basis of their economic 
viability but on equity grounds. The thinking was that, the 
heavy subsidy input would enable these schemes, in total, to 
deliver income equity to the beneficiaries. It has become 
clear that the achievement of equity and its sustenance 
through these schemes would continue to require the payment 
of more subsidies from the state.
In addition irrigation uses large numbers of expert labour 
per scheme compared to the peasant farmers on rainfed lands. 
The level of state subsidy, already high, will continue to 
increase, largely because of the spiral rise in the rate of 
inflation and the high interest rates and debt service ratio 
on borrowed capital. In the absence of these subsidies, 
small scale irrigation produces the same or even less 
benefits when compared with rainfed agriculture, and that in 
numerical terms, the numbet of families benefiting from 
irrigation subsidies are far fewer than those outside the 
schemes.
It is axiomatic that any large scale capital investment must 
involve intertemporaL (or intergenerational) choices, 
choices between consumption and savings, or alternative 
investment directions, overtime. By choosing to use 
subsidies in the development of small scale irrigation and 
water schemes, the government has implicitly chosen to allow 
consumption to take precedence over saving in the short-run 
and inevitably this reduces the level of resources available 
for other investments. On the other hand, the present 
pattern of investment is sure to leave a legacy of 
uneconomic and inefficient projects for the future
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generations, a legacy in whose making they will have had no 
say. This is more likely to happen with irrigation 
agriculture development where the physical transformation of 
the land is semi-permanent rendering the land unusable for 
any other purpose without costly corrections. It is clear, 
therefore that given the foregoing assessment, the present 
policy rejection of allocative efficiency as an investment 
criterion can only lead to future bankruptcy of the schemes 
and heavy cost burdens for the state.
The study has shown that subsidy-based investments tend to 
be tied to time tables reflecting the political cycles of 
the politicians involved. This political exploitation of 
the process of development is not unique to Zimbabwe. 
Reference has been made to similar cases in the USA.
Typical of political expediency, the government ignored two 
warnings that were available to it, against such a policy. 
Historical evidence within Zimbabwe (Roder 1965) showed that 
the strategy had failed before. Farmers were often very
unwilling to accept any future changes to the privileges
subsidies conferred. This is likely to happen again, 
especially if the proposed final takeover of schemes' 
management by the peasants is to be accompanied by the 
removal of state subsidies. Already, of the 76 schemes in 
1984, only 54 were reported to be operative while 22 of them 
(nearly 30%) were out of action at the beginning of 1986 due 
to a combination of technical and managerial problems. 
Where the schemes were out of operation either due to 
prevailing technical difficulties or future abandonment, the 
capital resources invested in them was inevitably lost.
While withdrawal of subsidies will be politically unpopular, 
even vote-losing, it may in reality, be the only way to save 
the economy from a long term heavy liability. The Treasury 
has already shown its unwillingness, indeed, its inability 
to continue to finance uneconomic projects.
With respect to the failure of small scale irrigation
schemes to alleviate land hunger (Chapter 6) and
consequently rural poverty, there is a need to explore
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alternatives to irrigation. It is recommended here that the 
government should investigate the possibility of instituting 
as part of the land reform policy, a land sharing policy 
requiring that commercial farmers lease a certain percentage 
of their land to peasants (on both rainfed and irrigation 
farms) . Evidence of this strategy can be seen in the 
limited programme of ARDAfs core-periphery model where by 
ARDA provides technical assistance to adjacent resettlement 
schemes. This recommendation would fulfil positively, two 
government development objectives. This would enable 
current landless peasants from overcrowded communal lands to 
utilize the existing unused capacity (Stoneman, 1978) on 
most commercial farms, and thus allow those remaining in the
to
communal areas to be able currentlyAadjust their land use
practices so as to realise high economic returns from their 
investments.
A 'land-for-all1 policy is suicidal and can not be fulfilled 
by any government. Instead, the policy should seek to make 
land available to those who can use it efficiently. For 
this to happen, it is recommended that a land-tax should be 
put in place, given the failure of the land market to 
release land, so as to force farmers to sell excess and 
under-utilized land to those who can use it. The use of a 
Land-tax will ensure that land would not be held purely for 
speculative purposes only. There is a need for further 
study before it can be implemented, and the study should 
also examine why the land market has failed to release land 
to higher value uses. The inevitable future need for land 
for resettlement would largely be eliminated this way. Away 
from the land issue the government would need to improve all 
other sectors of the economy, so that the unemployed or the 
excess out of the land are absorbed by other sectors of the 
economy.
The costs involved in implementing such a policy would be 
minimal compared to current irrigation costs. In line with 
this policy recommendation, commercial agriculture would not 
be affected negatively, but complement the efforts of the 
peasantry sector.
Other Subsidies
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Traditionally, and historically, Zimbabwe*s agricultural 
sector, particularly the commercial sector, has enjoyed a 
very high level of infrastructural service provision at 
government expense. The present government has not altered 
this nature of service provision, and if anything, 
incremental policy changes have tended to strengthen this 
level of provision. Chapter 6 has shown that a whole range 
of supportive services must accompany the development of 
each small scale scheme. The level of provision is far 
higher than that found in the rest of the economy especially 
the rainfed sector. It would therefore appear, that on the 
basis of publicly supported developments, there is gross 
inequality of service provision between peasants on the 
schemes and those on rainfed agriculture. The fact that 
this differential is a result of deliberate public policy, 
implies that the subsidy-based irrigation policy, far from 
'equalizing* rural incomes, has the opposite effect.
The range of subsidized infrastructural services for the 
commercial sector were discussed in Chapter 5. The main 
weakness behind the policy, was that the farmers (peasant 
and commercial) who could have been able and most probably 
willing to pay for most of the services they receive, were 
not made to do so.
The study recommends that all commercial irrigation farmers 
must be required to pay for all the services they receive. 
In the case of peasant farmers, their ability to pay must be 
assessed in relation to the income they receive, such that, 
farmers earning higher incomes meet fully all costs accruing 
to them. The state would only continue to help those who 
are in real need of help, and at that, only for a short time 
until they are able to meet their own costs. The current 
open subsidy policy on inputs and services cannot be allowed 
to continue as it fails to take account of changes in the 
incomfes of farmers and their ability to pay.
Of course the public pro-irrigation technocrats whose 
employment security and promotion prospects are enhanced by
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the push for more dams and irrigation schemes, will resist 
any changes that may appear to threaten their vested 
interests. But a long-term analysis would show that their 
interests are best served by seeking economy, and efficiency 
in investment.
The Benefits from Commercial Irrigation Agriculture
Theoretically, commercial irrigation agriculture should lead 
to a number of economic benefits; first, it is expected to 
enable the country to earn substantial foreign currency from 
the exports of the crops grown. Second, the production 
under irrigation of crops that would otherwise not grow in 
the country saves foreign currency losses from the 
importation of these crops (import substitution benefit). 
Third, irrigation agriculture is associated with the 
increase of employment opportunities, and offers year-round 
employment. Fourth, in its relationship with other sectors 
of the economy, irrigation is expected to provide a sounder 
(than rainfed agriculture) raw material base for the agro­
industries in the local economy (high linkage advantage). 
Above all, as discussed in Chapter 5, irrigation agriculture 
is expected to increase crop output beyond those obtained 
under rainfed conditions, and to enhance regional 
development as well as acting as a stop-gap against famine 
caused by droughts. Theoretically therefore, commercial 
irrigation agriculture must enable the economy to expand, 
and in the process must improve the wealth and welfare of 
the farmers and workers greatly.
In many respects, the study has shown that this ideal 
picture (theoretical) has been responsible for attracting 
many investors and government into commercial irrigation 
agriculture, in the belief that the ideal was achievable. 
Besides, the use of cost-benefit analysis (where they are 
used) in aiding investment decision-making, often assumes 
that the ideal economic situation would prevail. While the 
real investment experience in the field of commercial 
irrigation from both the United States of America (Pringle, 
1982) and Australia (Davidson, 1969) would suggest much 
wider divergences and deviations from the theoretically
278
optimal or ideal, governments from the rest of the world 
including the two countries above have not relented in the 
pursuit of the ideal and often elusive, benefits. However, 
recent changes in pricing policies have seen the 
introduction of tradeable water permits and increased unit 
abstraction charges in the rich nations. Future studies 
should examine these changes in relation to possible 
application in Zimbabwe.
This study on the Zimbabwean attempt, has shown that a whole 
host of factors have prevented the 'full* realization of the 
ideal set of benefits. Before providing a summary of some 
of the factors identified in Chapter 5, it is important to 
note that, in the absence of some very important items of 
data, the assessment took a macro-view of the industry, and 
in the process lost the advantages of a micro-analysis. The 
missing project specific micro-data includes data on private 
production cost outlays and on net income earnings per farm 
or agribusiness. Farmers were unwilling to cooperate in 
providing the required data. Their suspicion and 
uncooperative attitude became evident when they knew the 
researcher was a government employee? possibly for reasons 
of taxation.
In the absence of micro-data the study concentrated on a 
macro analysis of the whole commercial irrigation sector, in 
order to produce generalizations that reflected the benefits 
realised by the whole sector. Identified benefits showed 
that while crop output was higher under irrigation, for 
those crops that were grown both under irrigation and 
rainfed conditions like tea, coffee, tobacco and cotton, the 
marginal increases due to irrigation appeared not to be 
substantial.
Future research will need to focus on improvements in 
production technology, and in seed culture, under rainfed 
conditions, in order to assess whether, in theory at least, 
the small difference due to irrigation could be realised 
under improved rainfed agriculture. It is possible that the 
use of irrigation for very marginal increments in output 
levels may have precluded the future use of agro­
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technological innovations in the rainfed agricultural 
sector.
In future, before expanding irrigation agriculture for crops 
that do well under rainfed conditions, technical solutions 
should be sought first that will enable the achievement of 
the same benefits under rainfed conditions. This way, the 
full potential of less costly rainfed agriculture could be 
realised, leaving irrigation to high water demanding crops 
such as wheat, rice and sugar cane. The choice between a 
technological solution to crop production, and irrigation, 
has got to be based on the comparative economic benefits 
that could be realised in pursuing each investment path.
The dominant multinational agribusinesses have the capacity 
to develop such technologies. The aim should be to develop 
seeds or crop species that, under rainfed conditions, would 
use less water, ripen over a shorter period, and achieve 
higher yields. Zimbabwean researchers have in the past 
produced a maize crop variety (R200) that has a short 
growing season and high yielding advantages. The new maize 
is doing well in drier areas where the rainfall season is 
very short.
Although it was not possible to show the actual individual 
profitability of the farmers and of the large scale schemes, 
the general information available from agricultural 
statistics (Chapter 5) shows high levels of commercial 
farmers* indebtedness (Chavunduka 1982). Stoneman (1981) 
concurs with these findings when he argues that only 5 
percent of all the commercial farmers were able to pay tax, 
and that these are mostly multinational companies, who are 
at the same time responsible for the production of 60 
percent of the entire commercial crop. On the basis of this 
information, it has been speculated in this study that only 
very few commercial irrigators were profitable most of the 
time. But since the greater part of commercial irrigation 
agriculture is directed towards the export market, 
profitability is predicated on the attractiveness of the 
world market prices and on their stability over time.
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Part of the explanation for the assumed low levels of 
profitability and even bankruptcy was explained by the fact 
that commercial irrigation agriculture was dominated by high 
value cash export crops for which high international prices 
could not be assured from year to year. The most affected 
crops are sugar, tea and coffee. While sugar could rely on 
revenue from domestic and regional sales to cover running 
costs, its export record has been very poor since 1980. The 
low domestic demand for both tea and coffee (because of a 
poor domestic market) and a poor export market has meant 
that producers have had to be subsidized by the state in 
order to continue in production. The situation is made 
worse by the fact that Zimbabwe is a small producer and a 
price-taker for all the crops it exports.
The study has argued that the farmers have continued to 
produce these crops largely because the government has 
allowed producers generous tax concessions, and has often 
written off bad debts of most farmers to the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation and other finance houses. In the USA, 
similar measures were instituted to encourage farmers to 
remain on the land, as part of the frontier policy (McKean, 
1958). In addition a number of inputs such as fertilizers, 
water and insecticides are sold to farmers at subsidized 
prices. An array of supportive services such as research, 
extension and transport, developed at the state*s expense 
have enabled to reduce the full cost impact of the factor 
costs on every farmer's resources.
The study has also argued that the government has been 
seeking guaranteed quota marketing agreements and futures 
markets whose price levels are much higher and guaranteed 
than those on the spot market. However, the conditions 
listed above are temporary in nature. The government has 
been looking at the economics of producing all inputs within 
Zimbabwe to save on foreign exchange losses. However such 
a solution will still need to address the foreign exchange 
requirements for the production of these inputs, as well as 
the economic size of such industries to the size of the home 
market, and the possibility of selling surplus in the 
regional markets of both the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
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and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC).
There is also a need to move away from crops that have 
little or no domestic demand in favour of those that can 
produce raw materials for local industries and can provide 
food to meet domestic requirements. A raw materials export- 
led irrigation strategy can only be a recipe for doom, 
especially when crops produced at high cost in Zimbabwe 
compete on the world market with those cheaply produced from 
the major producing countries. There will be a need for 
substantial beneficiation in order to increase the value 
added realised by Zimbabwe from growing these crops. 
However substantial cuts have to be incurred up front 
establishing these beneficiating industries, and this will 
require a lot of foreign currency that the country has not 
got. The case for tobacco has to be viewed with respect to 
the growing international anti-smoking campaigns, which 
although insignificant at the moment, could in future 
produce the devastating effects similar to those that have 
hit the asbestos mining industry.
Despite the negative implications of an export-led 
irrigation agriculture, at present, to try and move away 
from it would raise problems of what else to export to 
obtain foreign exchange, especially when the minerals 
industry is equally suffering from price recession, and the 
livestock industry is beset by the continuous outbreak of 
the foot and mouth disease. Cash crops have traditionally 
been the backbone of the country's economy, and only 
recently has manufacturing featured and performed better 
than agriculture in the share of the national growth 
domestic product (Chapter 3). For these reasons, the state 
is unlikely to move away from supporting the export-led 
irrigation agriculture strategy? even if it is proven (see 
Chapter 5) that the commercial irrigation industry remains 
a high risk investment area. Recent positive trends in the 
horticulture industry point to profitable alternatives which 
need replication on a wider scale.
Many producers live in hope that international prices for
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these crops would improve again. For example, the 1985 tea 
sales reduction by India pushed up the price of tea on the 
world market. Such intermittent price windfalls do not 
provide the basis for a stable price policy or for a long­
term investment strategy. The prospects for crop price rise 
on the international market, in the long term, remain bleak.
From a foreign exchange point of view, the study showed 
(using crude statistical data), that the purchasing power 
provided by agricultural exports rarely kept pace with the 
price of agricultural machinery imported from abroad. As a 
result, the increasing volume of cash crops sales has not 
been able to improve the country's declining foreign 
exchange reserves. The country has increasingly come to 
rely on expensive foreign loans and commodity import 
programmes in order to be able to procure the required 
agricultural machinery. The consequences of this situation 
is that ever larger quantities of agricultural products must 
be exported in order to import a constant quantity of farm 
inputs.
Even a good price year brings problems, for it encourages 
investors to increase the output of a crop, although there 
is no guarantee that the price will be sustained; and there 
is every chance that the price will fall if all exporting 
countries increased their production.
The study has identified that, besides the importation of 
farm inputs, a significant part of the foreign exchange 
earned by the export of these crops is remitted out of the 
country. This is largely because irrigation cash crop 
production is in the hands of a few multinationals such as 
Hullets and Tate and Lyle for sugar, Nestle for coffee, 
Brooke Bond for tea, Cargill for cotton, and B.A.T. for 
tobacco. In ■Z/jwbcxb^e,fcWse corp0r<a .^'LGns C c A eroC all the 
production, distribution, processing and marketing. It has 
been argued by Hines (1983) that while companies experience 
losses at the production level, therefore the demand for tax 
concessions and for state subsidies, the profits are 
recouped overseas from distribution, marketing and 
processing. Re-investment in the country of location does
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not often happen on a scale that could form the basis for 
the expansion of the industry. There are therefore real net 
outflows being experienced by the economy, which constitute 
a significant loss. The exception is in the case of cotton 
production where the greater part of the crop is used for 
the local production of clothes and fabric for export to the 
neighbouring countries.
Sugar production has been carried out with the aim of 
providing a greater linkage within the local economy through 
the final processing of domestic sugar (50 percent of 
output) requirements; and through the production of ethanol 
for blending with petrol, in order to reduce oil imports. 
The problem with ethanol production is that it tends to 
demand more land to be removed from food production for 
sugar; the cost of developing new land and irrigation 
facilities is very high. For example, the proposed ethanol 
plant at Chisumbanje would require the use of over 35,000 
hectares at a cost of nearly one billion dollars at 1984 
prices. At present the international cost of crude oil is 
between US $10-15 per barrel (1985 prices) and the trend is 
for a downward price structure for some time to come. The 
real production cost of alcohol was estimated at between US 
$64 and US $75 a barrel (Hines, 1983), a cost that is about 
6 to 7 times the cost of importing crude oil today. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, the benefit of producing ethanol is 
limited by the fact that only 20 percent of the blended 
petrol is ethanol. Apart from the few private car owners 
who use petrol, the country*s transport network, the rail 
system and the industries as well as the farming industry 
use diesel oil. Ethanol is therefore not directly relevant 
in the productive sectors of the economy which consume over 
85 percent of the nation's fuel energy.
With regard to employment benefits from commercial 
irrigation, the results of the study as analysed in Chapter 
5 are not totally encouraging. Historically, commercial 
irrigation in Zimbabwe is based on a labour intensive 
production system with a very low level of capital 
formation. Even the types of crops chosen: cotton, tobacco, 
tea and sugar cane, reflected the human labour preference as
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the means of production. Although capitalization of the 
production system was possible, from very early on, in cost 
terms, it was found that it was cheaper to use human labour 
than automization of the production system. This was 
largely because there was a very large unskilled labour 
force of landless or displaced peasants following the 1930 
Land Apportionment Act (Chapter 3). The wage levels of the 
farm workers were also very low, reflecting what was regarded 
as the opportunity cost of that labour. It may be 
uneconomic, in cost-benefit cost terms at least, jfor farmers 
to automize the production system. But over the 50 years of 
commercial irrigation, employment benefits have not 
increased much, and less so during the period under review 
because, among other factors, the increase in the wage 
levels.
Commercial irrigation has now come to rely heavily on the 
seasonal and/or temporary contract labour, because, unlike 
the permanent labour, contract labour was not covered by the 
statutory instruments of the Minimum Wage Act of 1980. This 
shift from permanent labour has been made all the more easy 
by the existence of thousands of refugees from Mozambique, 
who are forced by their plight to accept wage levels far 
lower than those acceptable to Zimbabwean workers.
From the point of view of local workers, the statutory wage 
increases^,although real and beneficial, in opportunity cost 
terms did not represent the basis for the economic 
advancement of the workers. If the criterion of 'effective 
income' was used, that is, income that enables an average 
family of 6 to subsist, as measured by the poverty datum 
line, the wage levels remained below the national poverty 
datum line of low income people. This means that the 
incomes remained thoroughly subsistent, with little or no 
scope for savings. The level of the wages reflected the 
policy preoccupation with the satisfaction of the 
procurement of the means of subsistence, than with the 
movement of workers beyond subsistence. The continued 
deterioration of the Zimbabwean dollar in terms of 
purchasing power in the local market, has not helped in 
strengthening the workers' purchasing power. The farm
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workers are therefore not part of the effective market for 
goods and services produced in the economy.
It is obvious that the study has raised more questions than 
answers. It must be accepted that not all the problems 
identified can be solved easily. It would not be easy 
therefore to recommend any solutions for the way forward as 
any such recommendation could be too simplistic, in the 
absence of a more thorough study of several important areas, 
which are identified in a subsequent section of the chapter.
The Benefits to Small-scale Producers; The Ecruitv Question
The benefits of public investment in water and small scale 
schemes were shown to be very difficult to grasp in equity 
terms. The small scale sector required a wide range of 
public assistance beyond the mere provision of water and, as 
such, whatever benefits have been associated with peasantry 
sector irrigation, could not certainly be attributed to the 
provision of water alone. The fact that this assistance 
took the form of open-ended public subsidies raises 
questions regarding the continuation of an investment policy 
based on subsidies in the long term. The value of the 
benefits in net terms has been found to be limited, and only 
possible under conditions of subsidies, implying that these 
schemes were unable to financially sustain themselves, both 
in the short and long term without state subsidies. This 
conclusion raises the question as to whether the real aim of 
establishing these schemes had anything to do with the 
provision of income equity. This question becomes more 
poignant when it is realized that, the schemes have if 
anything widened the income gap between those farmers 
receiving subsidized incomes on the schemes, and the unaided 
rainfed based farmers.
Chapter 6 has shown that from the government's point of 
view, the greatest benefit was seen as the greatest number 
of families who could be settled on a small piece of land. 
Irrigation has the capacity to absorb a family per 0.73 
hectare, and this means effectively two families per 
hectare. In this respect, irrigation was seen to provide
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the answer to the political questions of land scarcity, 
overcrowding in communal lands, illegal squatting on private 
land and the question of famine. Although irrigation 
schemes could help reduce population pressure in communal 
lands, the pursuit of this objective through irrigation was 
shown to be of limited advantage given that the population 
was growing at a rapid rate of 3.2 percent per year (one of 
the highest in the world) far higher than the rate of growth 
of the economy. Besides, the fact that there is no urban 
and industrial alternative employment opportunities means 
that the government will have to face the question of land- 
population pressure again in the long run.
In fact, the pursuit of the objective of land pressure 
release through irrigation had led to the allocation of
uneconomic land sizes to families, and in the process, 
sacrificed the basis for an economic allocation. As a 
result, the small plot sizes per family failed to reflect 
any serious intention by the state to try and upgrade the 
livelihood of the farmers and their families, for all times. 
Although the incomes farmers received were high compared to 
those received by farmers practicing rainfed agriculture, 
the fact that these incomes were only as high as they were 
because of the massive injection of public subsidies, was no 
cause for comfort. The inevitable removal of these
subsidies in future would certainly be followed by large 
scale abandonment and collapse of most schemes and loss of 
income.
But while subsidies last, the farmers on irrigation schemes 
must feel privileged compared to those practicing rainfed 
agriculture. Since not all peasants would be chosen to
enter irrigation, in equity terms, the choice of those who
enter must raise the question of the fairness of the choice 
criteria. Inevitably the losers would be unhappy, firstly 
because they are denied access to high income, and secondly, 
because state support to irrigation must mean a reduction of 
investment resources directed to rainfed agriculture. It 
could be possible in future that communities that once lived 
in harmony, could experience some hostilities towards each 
other as a result of the unfair distribution of wealth
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arising from these irrigation schemes. Even at this early 
stage, the study could identify areas of friction, mostly 
around the practice by irrigation farmers, of holding onto 
the grazing rights in the rainfed sector, in addition to the 
jealousies over the services provided to all the irrigation 
schemes.
The question of who benefits, given the numerous number of 
eligible applicants raised difficult political decisions. 
The study provides no answers for these questions. If 
consideration was made of the high cost of investment per 
hectare (Chapter 6), one would wonder whether equity could 
not be best achieved perhaps by the improvement of the low 
cost rainfed agriculture, which had a much wider coverage. 
It was already pointed out in Chapters 5 and 6 that the full 
potential of rainfed agriculture had not been fully 
exploited. The area of technological inputs that could help 
increase yields still needed to be studied fully. Amin 
(1976) and others have however cautioned against putting 
greater faith in technological improvements following the 
failure of the Green Revolution to provide benefits to all 
farmers. Socio-economic factors not addressed by this study 
will have to be tackled ahead of any introduction of 
technological innovations.
Questions of equity in terms of land and income allocation 
could not be fully answered by the data available to the 
study. Even if the data were adequate, it is doubtful 
whether that allocative equity could be achieved without 
sacrificing the existing high crop output from the 
commercial agricultural sector. Given the rapid increase in 
rural population, any ‘ideal* equitable distribution of land 
today would have very limited rewards in future; especially 
when it is considered that land is a fixed asset. The 
alternative must be sought in the improvement and expansion 
of other sectors of the economy such as the manufacturing 
sector. Both rainfed and small scale irrigation agriculture 
should form part of a complementing development strategy. 
Irrigation should be resorted to, only where its benefits 
outweigh the costs, and developed in such a way that it fits 
in with other developments around the schemes, in a
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coordinated manner.
The Social and Environmental Effects
Apart from discussing the problems associated with monetary 
costs and benefits, the study has also attempted to show, on 
the basis of limited data, that irrigation agriculture has 
exacerbated, and in some cases introduced negative social 
and environmental effects. It was shown in Chapter 7 that 
prominent among these were the introduction of mosquitoes 
and malaria into areas hitherto unaffected. With respect to 
the prevalence of bilharzia, irrigation agriculture had made 
it possible, in the absence of natural biological control 
mechanisms, for the snail population to multiply throughout 
the year. The greater use of flood irrigation with its high 
rate of water-human body contact, had increased the level of 
infection among irrigation workers.
The high degree of population movement away from the 
schemes, had helped to spread the disease into rainfed 
agriculture, especially in the absence of properly regulated 
sanitation systems. The increase in disease incidence had 
in turn been responsible for the high public expenditure on 
building clinics and hospitals as well as on the importation 
or production of curative drugs, that would not have 
occurred otherwise. Although there was no data on the 
actual cost of drugs, Ministry of Health officials believed 
that it was very significant. The fact that both malaria 
and bilharzia apart from attacking the human body, acted as 
body-resistance weakening agents, thus allowing the invasion 
of the body by other equally dangerous illnesses, did not 
help in the attempt to quantify the effects.
The investment policy had not in the past (and at present) 
taken into account these effects as part of the real cost of 
implementing an irrigation agricultural strategy for
development. The reasons for ignoring such effects in cost
calculations was identified as partly to do with the
predominance of engineers and the total absence of
economists, social scientists and medical professionals in 
the make-up of the policy makers. The engineers had tended
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to be guided by the desire to produce superior structural 
designs with little or no regard to whether these structures 
aided or reduced the incidence of water borne diseases. 
Besides, it was often thought that it was not the
responsibility of engineers to worry about the environmental
and social effects, as these issues were considered to be 
the Ministry of Health’s sole concern. The politicians 
worsened the situation by regarding these externality costs
as the necessary price to be paid for agricultural
advancement. Investment planning for irrigation therefore 
was not sensitive to the possible occurrence of these 
externalities. These views and many others have provided an 
excuse for not doing anything.
Insensitivity to these adverse externalities can also be 
attributed to the fact that the policy makers were far 
removed from the site where these effects occurred, and 
therefore could not develop a realistic appreciation of the 
gravity of these effects. The workers, on the other hand, 
bore the brunt of these effects, but had no input into the 
decisions that determined public investment in water and 
irrigation. The absence of consultation by policy makers of 
irrigation workers on these important issues could be 
interpreted as a sign of a callous disregard of the workers' 
welfare.
The fact that these first order disease effects could not at 
least in theory be quantified, could not excuse policy 
makers from not attempting to minimize their effects at the 
field level. It was unforgivable that drainage on small 
scale schemes was inadequate or absent resulting in the 
development of dangerous bilharzia habitats.
Second order effects like the high cost of building 
hospitals and clinics as well as the purchase of curative 
drugs had not stopped investment in irrigation. The 
building of clinics had been viewed as part of a normal 
nationwide programme of providing health facilities, and not 
as a specific response to an abnormally high incidence of 
bilharzia or malaria around irrigation schemes. The costs 
involved were not directly attributed to the presence of
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irrigation schemes; therefore in the absence of this 
important link, public investment in water and irrigation 
continued to be carried out with little or no reflection of 
the impact of the dangerous side effects.
Problems of siltation, on the other hand, had continued to 
worsen. With regards to waterlogging there was evidence 
that most small scale schemes with poor drainage were prone 
to waterlogging, and that the presence of irrigation 
officers at every scheme had reduced the incidence from 
becoming widespread.
All these factors did not in any way excuse official neglect 
of the social and environmental effects associated with 
irrigation agriculture. The winners or beneficiaries were 
not prepared to compensate the losers, and the conferring of 
these real costs on the losers must become a policy concern 
in future. This is largely because the planned increase in 
investment in water and irrigation, largely within the same 
provinces of Masvingo, Matebeleland, Manicaland and 
Mashonaland will continue to worsen both regional income 
disparities and increase the social and environmental costs 
on the losers.
The study recommends that an attempt should be made by 
agencies responsible for project implementation to collect 
data on external costs and as far as is possible, that 
project choice should use not only economic criteria, but 
criteria aimed at reducing these external effects and their 
impact? and that project design should incorporate efforts 
to reduce environmental effects.
With regard to the social effects, the study recommends 
that the establishment of the proposed single Water and 
Irrigation Authority (WIA) discussed earlier in this 
chapter, should go a long way to reducing social effects. 
The Authority should be required to incorporate social and 
environmental factors in addition to the economic and 
financial factors when choosing projects. A project should, 
in future be expected to fulfil social and environmental 
objectives apart from the usual economic objectives.
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The land distribution issue is closely linked to income 
equity and has got to be addressed by politicians, instead 
of pushing it to the technical departments who are ill 
equipped to handle this matter.
This requirement is not always resorted to because of 
existing policy inertia towards change and the dominant 
controlling effect of the policy process by those benefiting 
from the present uneconomic investment relations. However, 
the hope is that the worsening economic situation in the 
country coupled with heavy public indebtedness to foreign 
banks and the poor balance of payments position could, in 
the long run, force upon government the necessity for 
economy in all sectors.
Future Research Needs
An alternative investment strategy that will take into 
account both the requirements for economy and high 
productivity and high incomes, is difficult to visualize let 
alone implement in the absence of adequate planning data. 
Cases have been noted in this study, where analysis of the 
investment structure could not be made due to lack of 
information. These include the inability to carry out a 
project by project cost-benefit analysis; the absence of 
data on the current relationship between the level of water 
supply, and the use of water; the absence of private 
commercial irrigation cost outlay data; and lack of data on 
the extent to which current water capacity is underutilized, 
as well as the absence of quantified information on the 
benefits accruing to the peasants, or quantified data on the 
cost of water borne diseases. Research into these aspects 
and a concerted effort at data collection must of necessity 
be conducted within the water and irrigation industries 
themselves.
Research work must not be just theoretical, it must require 
the active cooperation, and participation of the water and 
irrigation industries themselves. For example official 
research into the effect of high water prices cannot
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contribute anything to the farmers' responses, or to water 
demand forecasting, unless the Ministry responsible for 
water removes the existing subsidy on the price of water. 
The same would also apply to studies on wheat self- 
sufficiency in a climate of consumer price subsidy. Nor can 
the effect of subsidy removal be assessed until attempts 
have been made to study income levels, and abilities to pay 
by the farmers, and how these vary. Similarly, evaluations 
on the effect of cutting down on investment in bulk water 
capacity extension must involve the cooperation of 
engineers.
Because the practice of water development and irrigation 
agriculture cannot take place without the support of or 
without affecting other sectors,theinterdependency 
means that in order to fully understand the 
problems of water and irrigation agriculture, a lot more 
research into the related sectors (not discussed fully here) 
has to be carried out. A number of areas for further 
research effort in which economists and other professions, 
can jointly contribute is discussed below. The list is by 
no means exhaustive:
1. The Land Tenure Issues and Rural Incomes
Public investment in water and the subsequent investment 
in irrigation agriculture, are all deliberate 
manipulations of nature in order to increase crop yields 
or wealth, derived from agriculture. This intervention 
or manipulation presupposes that natural rainfall has 
become an inadequate basis for agriculture development.
Yet there is no information or data necessary for the 
mapping out of regions with excessive population 
pressure and those with less. There is therefore an 
urgent need for research to determine the existing areas 
of high and low population pressure. Such research 
would help government policy makers with information 
pertaining: to regional crop specialization? to the
carrying capacity of different soils and also provide 
leads as to the best or optimal land allocation system.
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This way it would be possible to avoid the current 
wasteful and expensive attempts through both irrigation 
and the land resettlement (Chapter 3) , all of which 
clearly cannot provide the needed safety-valve for the 
communal areas. Given that there are definite limits to 
the extent to which irrigation can substantially relieve 
land pressure, research work in this direction would 
definitely appear to be paramount. It is hoped that, 
such research would be able to define the scale and 
relevance of not only irrigation agriculture, but also 
of rainfed agriculture and other tenurial systems, 
within a coordinated and complementing agricultural 
reform.
Since there is insufficient land for distribution to 
everyone without causing economic disruption, and since 
the indigenous system is frequently unable to provide 
the family with tenurial security it provided during the 
period of land abundance when population was small, this 
means that emphasis must shift from land opportunities 
to employment opportunities. The more land is carved up 
into very small parcels, under small scale irrigation 
the greater the likelihood of diminishing productivity.
Whatever short-term benefits are realised, the high 
rural population growth rate alone would surely offset 
these current efforts within a few years. Efforts to 
reduce the population growth rate at the national level, 
must be put in place. There is therefore an urgent need 
for research to seek long-term solutions in the 
identification of alternative permanent non-farm based 
employment opportunities in the rural economy. Such 
research should consider the possibility of setting up 
food processing industries, repair metal workshops, fish 
farming, poultry, etc. The research should provide 
insight as to how such small scale concerns could become 
viable, and the scale of public assistance that may be 
needed. This direction could hold much more promise 
than the present overcrowded irrigation schemes.
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2. Analysis of Water Use Efficiency in Agriculture
The understanding of the variables determining water 
consumption at the farm level is crucial if water demand 
projections are to be made at all. This information is 
also crucial in indicating regions or areas where 
capacity extension would be needed. There is therefore 
need for research to be carried out in order to 
determine the quantity of water that is used per hectare 
per different crop per given type of soil and per 
region, as well as estimates of moisture retention 
capacities of different soils. This information would 
be helpful in assessing the true economic quantity of 
extra water needed, and could help farmers and policy 
makers in identifying aspects of water management that 
could be introduced to cut off water waste. As a spin 
off of this research, it should be possible, on the 
basis of the information available on crop-water 
requirement, to suggest further research areas where 
technological intervention can help produce crop 
varieties that either ripen early, or use less water per 
growing season. This could lead to less and less 
dependence on costly irrigation and water schemes, and 
lead to the promotion of crops that are largely 
dependent on the available rainfall.
Of more immediate urgency, is the need for research on 
the likely implications of the growing tendency by all 
types of farmers, of using flooding irrigation methods. 
If this information is not provided soon the 
consequences (salinization and leaching as well as 
waterlogging) could be irreversible, and where the 
attempt to reverse these are carried out, the cost could 
be forbidding. The Californian irrigation agriculture 
problems (Pringle 1982) have shown just how difficult it 
is to correct such mistakes.
Research is also required on the variations in water use 
within and between sectors, including the domestic and 
the industrial sectors. In this way it would be 
possible to calculate the opportunity cost of using
expensive water for irrigation agriculture at current 
prices.
Organizational Issues
Public implementing agencies are presently fragmented 
and uncoordinated in their efforts. This study has 
already recommended the setting up of a single 
autonomous body responsible for both water and 
irrigation development. There is therefore a need for 
research that will enable the policy makers to establish 
the efficacy and efficiency of such a body in delivering 
the intended benefits of irrigation development.
Of immediate concern is the need for research on the 
possible effects of removing the public managerial 
support from small scale irrigation farmers, as a 
prelude to the setting up of the proposed single 
authority.
The urgency for this piece of research arises from the 
fact that the state is already beginning to feel the 
financial effects of over-manning the schemes. The 
farmers are likely to be asked to bear the total burden 
of managing the schemes, at a time when they may be ill- 
prepared. Although such research may be theoretical 
initially, it may hold key answers to what would 
actually happen if the state was not involved at all. 
Such answers could prove useful for planners and policy 
makers, who may be interested in the future direction, 
development and the management of the water and 
irrigation industry.
An Evaluation of the Political and Legal Constraints
The study has indicated that politics is, at the end of 
the day, the most crucial stumbling block to the 
achievement of economic efficiency in investment in both 
the water and irrigation industries. Political 
expediency is responsible for the subsidization of the 
inviable schemes, because of the short term benefits
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such subsidies could provide. Politicians are much more 
inclined to use subsidies as a way of overcoming 
perceived obstacles for the sake of political capital, 
which incidentally is often associated with benefits 
that accrue in the short term. Sound investment 
strategies that lead to a much more secure long term 
future are ignored.
As such, there is a need to carry out a study that will 
help identify those legal, political and other non­
economic factors constraining operational and investment 
efficiency. Such work would look at the possibility of 
evolving an investment strategy that would minimize 
undue political interference, but remaining politically 
acceptable. The results of such research may well 
remain theoretical, if there is no political willingness 
to accept change. Such research must be seen to be 
strengthening the role of politicians in development, 
and not substituting it? but should outline clearly the 
various paths open to them and the implications of 
choosing alternative directions.
The existing prior appropriation water law has been 
noted for fossilizing inequitable and most probably 
inefficient water rights. Until a study is carried out 
with the aim of assessing the legal system's unfairness, 
and its limiting effect on new entrants to irrigation 
farming, it would be difficult to propose new policy 
measures that ensure efficient use of water from each 
existing storage facility. This research, if carried 
out, could form the basis for the revision of the water 
right system, and as an offshoot of the study, provide 
information regarding the potential volumes of water to 
be saved by such revision. One possible effect of such 
information is that it could delay the need to construct 
new dams by several years or decades, and also open, for 
the first time, possibilities of a water market, or 
privatisation of water supplies.
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5. Food Self-Sufficiency and Cash Crops
Zimbabwe's commercial irrigation agriculture was shown 
in Chapter 4 and 5 to be export cash crop based and 
therefore to be directly linked more to the 
international market than to the local economy.
The country produces its staple crop, maize, under 
rainfed conditions, and in good years, can achieve food 
self sufficiency. The country has an erratic rainfall 
regime, and droughts can occur once or twice per decade, 
apart from the fact that there are certain provinces 
that experience permanent rainfall deficits. The past 
three years of drought (1982-1984) have shown that, 
contrary to official assertions, irrigation agriculture 
did not help at all in the fight against famine and in 
reducing regional food deficits. If anything the 
agribusiness corporations involved continued to put all 
their land to the full production of the usual export 
cash crops.
In the light of this, there is need for research to 
determine the effects of putting the whole or the 
greater part of irrigation agriculture to food 
production in rainfall deficit areas, permanently or 
mostly during droughts. Wheat production is mostly for 
domestic consumption? but local yields have fallen 
behind demand, and the state has been forced to operate 
a wasteful twin policy of subsidizing wheat production 
(Farm Irrigation Fund, 1985) and of subsidizing the 
consumer. A study is needed to look at the best way of 
achieving wheat self-sufficiency, without expanding the 
land under irrigation, by examining an incentive package 
that would force producers to remove some land from cash 
crop production to wheat production. This way the state 
would be able to be advised on the options available for 
achieving high wheat yields without the need for new 
costly capital investment in water capacity extension or 
expansion of land under irrigation. The cost-benefit 
analysis of such a study will also have to show the 
opportunity cost of the shift in the farming system? so
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as to justify the use of the land for wheat production. 
The research may well find that the wheat so produced 
may be still too expensive, necessitating the continued 
use of consumer subsidies. In this regard the study 
should look at the likely technological innovative 
changes that could help to produce a wheat variety whose 
yield per hectare could be much higher than the present 
4.5 ton per ha, as well as the possibilities of 
realising self sufficiency if the yield were to reach 6 
ton per ha (closer to 7 ton per ha in Europe) on the 
same land under wheat now.
6. Regional Food Transfers
As indicated in Chapter One, one area of possible future 
research is in the area of national/regional food 
transfer. As a concept, this implies the movement of 
cereal grains from surplus (specialising in grain 
production) to deficit areas (specialising in other 
equally important agricultural products such as 
livestock or fish, etc). The resultant trade between 
and among areas or regions producing different products 
suited to their climatic conditions, could remove the 
need for every peasant to produce both livestock and 
cereal products, sometimes in unsuitable climatic 
conditions.
Already SADCC has set up in Zimbabwe, a Regional Early 
Warning System served by a network of National Systems, 
providing the ten member states of SADCC with 
information on the status of supply and demand for 
cereals. A Study is also under way to set up a Regional 
Food Reserve Project on the basis of establishing 
storage facilities in all countries and facilitation 
mechanisms for regional trade in grains (food 
transfers).
Future research should examine the extent to which both 
the Early Warning and Food Reserve projects could be 
made to be effective in terms of delivering food to 
households and the effect on the participation of 
peasants and the extent to which these programmes can
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also address equity considerations, and thereby reduce 
the need for irrigation. It will also be important to 
extend the analysis to the possible movement of other 
food products (e.g. animal products) other than cereals 
within the food transfers equation.
7. The Externality Effects
The total absence of data on the role of external 
effects on investment must be corrected by research work 
which aims at linking the quantifiable costs and the 
social and environmental costs as criteria for project 
assessment. The findings of such a study would alert 
policy makers and the public to the impact of the 
externality effects both in money and in social terms, 
and this way help to increase the need to curb or 
control these effects. The country can no longer 
continue to treat these as the price to be paid for 
advancement. The setting up of the Mushandike Pilot 
Study arising from this study can only be a step in the 
right direction. Recent discussions with officials from 
Blair Research Centre (Harare) revealed that work was 
under way-fuLt^ document quantitatively the monetary 
effects of these externalities, (especially the 
diseases^, within the limitations of methodology.
As a final note it is however perhaps regrettable that 
in Zimbabwe interest in water and irrigation development 
has largely remained advocatiVand agronomic in nature, 
lacking the essential critical appraisal insights 
necessary for economic efficiency in investment. Even 
the existing agronomic information has not been 
coordinated and published for public use. Widespread 
sharing of information has not taken place, in 
particular between the researchers, and those government 
officers who should use such information. As a result 
individual research efforts are likely to duplicate some 
of the work already done, although this might be a mute 
point. Ideally, efforts should not be spared in the 
development of common research methodologies, and the 
development of project appraisal methods to be used by
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all government officials and researchers. This proposal 
is important when it is considered that Zimbabwe is 
experiencing resource bottlenecks.
The success and indeed the coming into being of all the 
proposed research areas, will depend to a large extent 
on the creation of research units within or associated 
with the executive agencies of government. These 
research units will have the responsibility of reviewing 
and linking current practice, in the field of government 
investment, to improvements resulting from research. 
Results from private research interests should find 
their way to public agencies.
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APPENDIX (11
SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN ZIMBABWE
AREA, HA
IRRIGATION COMMUNAL PROP. NO. OF
SCHEMES AREA GAZETTED DEVELOPED EXPAN. PLOT
HOLDERS
MANICALAND 
PROVINCE
Deure Sabi 318 263 (150) 312
Murambinda Sabi 60 35 - 27
Mutema Mutema 520 283 - 338
Tawona Mutema 320 149 ( 50) 213
Chibuwe Kuskavanhu 770 326 - 257
Nyamaropa Nyamaropa 770 406 (500) 314
Nyanyadzi Muusha 2 980 423 (500) 424
Chakowa Mutambara 1 100 84 - 109
Mutambara* Mutambara* 400 135 - 123
Maranke* Maranke 1 620 40 - -
Nyachowa* Zimunya 200 45 - 32
Bondi Sabi * (600)
Sub Total 9 458 2 189 (1300) 2 149
MATEBELELAND
SOUTH
Bili Machuchuta 40 21 ( 35)
Jalunganga Maramani 121 45 - ( 75)
Kwalu Siyoka 120 46 - ( 75)
Shashi Maramani 1 210 128 - 70
Tongwe* Mtetengwe 40 27 - 30
Duncal Umzingwane 38 15 - 18
Mzinyatini* Mzinyatini 53 32 - 40
Silalabhwa Insuza 1 000 350 - 135
Konkoni Shashi 100 36 - ( 60)
Makwe Makwe - 202 - 240
Masholomoshe Matshotshe 400 40 - 50
Ruster's 
Gorge Shashi 70 27 ( 45)
Sibasa Dibilishaba 125 60 - ( 100)
Sukwe Dibilishaba 30 22 - ( 28)
Mbebeswana Semukwe 8 6 - 16
Mambale Mambale 28 14 - ( 23)
Maitengwe Maitengwe 60 20 - ( 33)
Chikwara-
kwara Chipise 182 60 - ( 100)
Sub Total 
173
3 625 1 161 1
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MASHONALAND
WEST
Gache Gache - 5 - 16
MASHONALAND
CENTRAL
Gutsa+ Gutsa 200 36 — —
Chapoto+ Dande 100 12 - -
Nyagandat Uzumba - - - -
Nyakasoro+ Pfungwe mm *
Sub Total 300 48 _ 60
Nabusenga Siabuhwa - 3 - ( 10)
Zinapi Nkai 477 16 - ( 30)
Tshongokwe Lupane 38 21 7 ( 70)
Fanisoni Nkai 65 10 - ( 30)
Cheziya Wankie 7 4 - ( 13)
Lambo Wankie 14 2 - ( 7)
Likosi Wankie 21 12 - ( 10)
Vleirt Majolo - 4 -
Siamatelele Siamatelele 7
Sub Total 622 79 7 220
VICTORIA
PROVINCE
Masvuvungwa Chibi 60 ( 200)
Makonese Chibi - 56 - ( 240)
Banga* Chibi - 5 (35) 41
Chilonga Matibi I 525 120 - 222
Manj inj i Sangwe 109 40 - 30
Muteyo Sangwe - 15 - 52
Rapangwana Sangwe - 10 - 40
Gudo's Pool Sangwe - 13 — ( 43)
St Joseph Sangwe - 6 - 23
Malikangot Matibi II 265 24 - -
Mapanzura Masvingo 106 48 - ( 160)
Tambara Bikita - 19 - -
Roswa (N) Bikita - - (80) -
Fuve (N) - - - (40) -
Dabgwa (N) *** (30)
Sub Total 1 005 418 185 1 062
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MIDLANDS
PROVINCE
Mondi
Matanga Mberengwa 20 7 - ( 15)
Nyahoni
Mwerahari/
Sabi North 128 22
"
25
Sachipiri Mharira 190 25 — 40
Shagari Lower Gweru 30 26 - 120
Mtorahuku Chiwundura 20 15 - 150
Mabodza
Mabwe/
Chiwundura 14 12 * 120
Matema Runde 1 110 48 - 60
Ngondoma Zhombe 1 090 25 - 80
Senkwazi Zhombe 110 30 - 40
Hozori Silobela 80 7 - 50
Exchange Exchange 160 60 (100) 250
Mhende Chirumanzu 184 80 - -
Dangura* - 8 - -
Charandura* - 4 - -
Sub Total 3 136 369 (100) 1 205
GRAND TOTAL 18 146 4 269 (1592) 5 825
* Community Scheme
+ Community Scheme
(N) New Scheme Under Planning
- Under number of plotholders, figures in brackets
indicate the average number of families expected to
occupy the scheme
Total number of families 5 825
Source: Department of Rural .Development Draft Policy Paper
on Irrigation Schmes in Communal Areas 1983.
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APPENDIX (2 )
CONDITIONS GOVERNING USE/OCCUPATION OF AN IRRIGABLE AREA
1. The holding will not be subdivided, sublet or under 
utilised without the necessary authority having been 
obtained.
2. The holding will be cropped fully in summer and fully 
or proportionately in winter depending on the water 
supply situation in the winter months.
3. The irrigator will observe all the conservation and
irrigation methods as directed and advised by the
appropriate authority.
4. Only the recommended crops and cultural practices will 
be allowed on the holding.
5. The irrigator will observe the correct use of
fertilizers and manure; insecticides, herbicides and
pesticides in the interests of all other irrigators at 
the same scheme.
6. No irrigator can hold land at an irrigation scheme while
at the same time he holds land at another irrigation
scheme, a dryland area or a resettlement area. Should 
the irrigator opt to go to another irrigation scheme, a 
dryland or a resettlement area, he is then required to 
relinquish his holding for re-allocation. The holding 
should be surrendered to the relevant authorities for 
re-allocation. This condition can be varied only with 
the authority of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rural Development.
7. An irrigator wishing to engage in any form of business
at an irrigation scheme must register such a business
with the appropriate authorities.
8. Irrigators with cattle will observe the regulations 
relating to depasturing, dipping and controlled grazing 
as directed and advised by the appropriate authority.
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9. Irrigators will observe the rules and regulations that 
may be evolved at the local level, by the management 
committees.
10. In the case of individuals or communities:
(a) No individual or community will engage in 
irrigation without the necessary water right having 
been applied for and granted by the Water court.
(b) Strict observance of the water right will be 
necessary to ensure that it is not exceeded. Water 
right papers will be made available to the 
appropriate authorities for inspection and 
checking.
(c) Individuals or communities will be responsible for 
discipline within their schemes and will observe 
all other conditions and regulations as laid down 
from time to time by the appropriate authority.
11. An irrigator who shall have been evicted from an 
Irrigation Scheme for any reason whatsoever, will within 
14 days of such an order being given, appeal to the 
local village court in the first instance for a redress, 
failing which he may then appeal to a higher court as 
the case may be. Should the appeal fail, or should 
there be no appeal at all, such an irrigator will not be 
permitted to hold land at any other Irrigation Scheme.
Source: Derude 1983
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APPENDIX (3)
Permit Number .............
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO RESIDE
Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "The MINISTER"), in 
terms of Section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155), to
..............................  (hereinafter referred to as
"the HOLDER").
The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to reside on the
residential site .........................................
(hereinafter referred to as "the said site"). This permit 
is subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time 
during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, 
without notice, replace it with some other form of 
agreement on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine.
2. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, 
the MINISTER decides that the holder has failed to 
comply with any of its terms and conditions.
3. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this 
permit any time and under such conditions as he thinks 
fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the 
MINISTER may determine.
4. The said site shall be used for residential purposes for 
the accommodation of the HOLDER and his immediate family 
only.
5. The HOLDER shall maintain the said site in a clean, 
sanitary and tidy condition and shall comply with any 
instructions that the MINISTER may issue for the upkeep 
of the said site and the prevention of nuisance and the 
maintenance of sanitary conditions.
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6. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges 
which may be levied on the said site by competent 
authority.
7. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person 
to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial 
operations on the said site.
8. The MINISTER, or any person authorised by him, shall 
have the right, free of charge and without compensation, 
to lay, construct and maintain roads, boreholes, 
pipelines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and 
ancillary works upon or under the said site.
9. On the expiry or revocation of this permit no 
compensation shall be payable to the HOLDER for any 
improvements effected by him on the said site;
PROVIDED that the HOLDER shall be entitled, within a 
period of three months after the expiry or revocation 
of the permit, to remove any building and improvements 
constructed or effected by him on the said site.
Any buildings or improvements that are not removed by 
the HOLDER within the said period of three months shall 
become the property of the MINISTER, whomay deal with 
them as he thinks fit.
10. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the 
MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on the 
behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public 
service as he may designate.
11. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER 
permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or depasture stock 
on the irrigation scheme is revoked, the MINISTER may, 
in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit.
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Issued at............................ this.............day
of............ 19...
(Designated Official) 
on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rural Development, in terms of Statutory 
Instrument 247 of 1980.
Source: Derude 1983
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APPENDIX (41
Permit Number .............
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE
Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "The MINISTER"), in 
terms of Section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155), to
"the HOLDER").
The MINISTER permits the HOLDER to cultivate an area of
sketch plan attached hereto (hereinafter referred to as "the
holding").
This permit is subject to the following terms and 
conditions:
1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the 
boundaries or location of the land which may be
cultivated in terms of this permit the decision of the
MINISTER shall be final.
2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time 
during the currency thereof including any renewal may 
without notice, replace it with some other form of
agreement on such terms and conditions as he may
determine.
3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, 
the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to 
comply with any of its terms or conditions or has failed 
to make proper use use of the holding.
4. The MINISTER may, for any purpose, revoke this permit 
at any time under such conditions as he thinks fit on 
payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the 
MINISTER may determine.
(hereinafter referred to as
Irrigation Scheme approximately 
area, known as ................
........... hectares in
and as indicated on the
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5. The holding shall be used solely for agricultural 
purposes for the HOLDER'S exclusive benefit.
6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall
(i) personally, actively and continuously carry on 
agricultural activities on the holding to the 
satisfaction of the MINISTER.
(ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and 
regulations made unddr, the Natural Resources Act 
(Chapter 150), the Animal Health Act (chapter 121) , 
the Noxious Weeks Act (chaper 127) and all other 
relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and 
livestock management and shall further comply with 
all instructions which the MINISTER may issue for:
(a) the prevention of damage to the sources and 
courses of streams;
(b) the prevention and control of plant and animal 
pests and diseases;
(c) the control or eradication of any plants 
harmful to crops and livestock.
7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall
permanently and personally reside on the residential 
site allocated to him by the MINISTER.
8. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall
renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate any land or 
depasture cattle in any communal land.
9. The HOLDER shall not construct or erect, nor permit nor 
cause to be constructed or erected, any building or 
other structure on the holding.
10. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges
which are levied upon the holding by competent
authority.
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11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written consent 
of the MINISTER engage in any other occupation or 
employment during the currency of this permit.
12. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person 
to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial 
operations on the holdings.
13. The HOLDER shall permit any rights of way necessary to 
give access to other holdings should he be required to 
do so by the MINISTER.
14. The MINISTER, or any person authorised by him, shall 
have the right, free of charge and without compensation 
to lay, construct and maintain roads, boreholes, 
pipelines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and 
ancillary works upon or under the holding.
15. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the 
MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on 
behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public 
service as he may designate.
16. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER,
permitting the HOLDER to reside or depasture stock on
the Irrigation Scheme is revoked, the MINISTER may in
his sole discretion immediately revoke this permit.
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Issued at............................ this............. day
of............ 19.. .
(Designated Official) 
on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rural Development, in terms of Statutory 
Instrument 247 of 1980.
Source: Derude 1983
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APPENDIX (5)
Permit Number .............
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO DEPASTURE STOCK
Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter referred to as "The MINISTER"), in 
terms of Section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155), to
..............................  (hereinafter referred to as
"the HOLDER").
The MINISTER permits the HOLDER to depasture stock, not
exceeding in number the equivalent of ....................
livestock units on the Irrigation Scheme known as
..................  (hereinafter referred to as "the said
scheme).
For the purposes of this permit the categories of stock 
shown in the first column shall be equal to the number of 
livestock units shown in the second column:
First Column Second Column
Category of Stock Livestock Units
Cattle under the age of 2 years 0,5
Cattle over the age of 2 years 1,0
Sheep and goats under the age of 1 year 0,1
Sheep and goats under the age of 1 year 0,2
This permit is subject to the following terms and 
conditions:
1. In the event of there being any dispute as to the total 
number of livestock units equivalent to the stock being 
depastured in terms of this permit the decision of the 
MINISTER shall be final.
2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time 
during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, 
without notice, replace it with some other form of
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agreement on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine.
3. This permit may be revoked at any time, if, at his sole
discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has
filed to comply with any of its terms or conditions or 
has depastured stock in excess of the number permitted.
4. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall
comply in all respects with the provisions of, and 
regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act 
(Chapter 150), the Animal Health Act (Chapter 121) and 
all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming 
practices and livestock management and shall further 
comply with all instructions in respect of the said 
scheme which the MINISTER may issue for:
(a) the prevention of damage to the sources or courses 
of public steams?
(b) the prevention and control of animal pests and 
diseases;
(c) the control or eradication of any plants harmful 
to livestock;
(d) the maintenance of livestock carrying capacity 
through grazing and livestock management?
(e) the protection of the soil against erosion.
5. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall 
permanently and personally reside on the residential 
site allocated to him by the MINISTER.
6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall 
renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate land or 
depasture stock in any communal land.
7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall not 
without the prior writen consent of the MINISTER, engage 
in any other employment or occupation.
8. The HOLDER shall not without the prior written consent 
of the MINISTER, construct or erect any building or
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other structure on the said Scheme.
9. The HOLDER shall not carry on any trading, commercial 
or industrial operation on the said Scheme.
10. The HOLDER shall not by any act prevent or attempt to 
prevent any other person from exercising any right to 
depasture stock on the said Scheme.
11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written 
permission of the MINISTER, cultivte, cut any trees on, 
or remove any timber, grass or other vegetation from the 
said Scheme.
12. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the 
MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on 
behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public 
service as he may designate.
13. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER 
permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or reside on the said 
Scheme is revoked, the MINISTER may in his sole 
discretion immediately revoke this permit.
Issued at............................ this.............day
of............ 19...
(Designated Official) 
on behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rural Development, in terms of Statutory 
Instrument of 247 of 1980.
Source: DERUDE 1983
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APPENDIX (6)
CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE TAKE OVER OF GOVERNMENT SCHEME BY
LOCAL IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
1. A local community organisation wishing to take over the 
running of an irrigation scheme must satisfy the 
following conditions
(a) That they are in a position to carry out meaningful 
maintenance for the continued uninterrupted running 
of the Scheme.
(b) That they can generate sufficient funds to run the 
Scheme.
(c) That they can generate funds for major replacement 
works, and effect such works expeditiously in 
consultation with Government.
(d) That a take over of a Scheme will not necessarily 
lead to domination by a few greedy individuals to 
the detriment of the rest of the irrigators or 
potential irrigators.
(e) That effective discipline, including the collection 
of any service charges are carried out in the 
proper manner.
(f) That the scheme is looked after properly in 
accordance with the rules governing correct 
agronomic, conservation and irrigation practices 
as advised by a competent authority.
2. It is realised that an appraisal of these conditions 
will require time. Therefore, the handover will be 
phased over a number of years of which three shall be a 
minimum and five a maximum during which the Government 
will shed some of its responsibilities to popular 
organisations. During the course of this process, the 
Government may be given sufficient justification to
317
withdraw the process completely if it is in the 
interests of the continued survival of the scheme and 
its people.
3. Notwithstanding any take over agreements, all buildings 
and other capital items associated with the irrigation 
scheme/schemes will remain the property of the state and 
cannot be bought, sold, destroyed or renovated without 
the appropriate approval having been obtained from the 
relevant authority.
4. Ministerial intervention can take place where there is 
a threat of collapse in the use of national resources.
Source: DERUDE 1983
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3 Jib
INTERVIEWS
Below is a list of interviews conducted during fieldwork between 19 84 and 
1986.
Year
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
Place
Harare, Ministry of Energy and 
Water Resources Development
Harare, Regional Water Authority 
Head Office
Harare, Department of Rural 
Development
Harare, Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA)
Harare, Ministry of Health
Harare, Faculty of Agriculture 
University of Zimbabwe
Blair Research Centre Harare
Harare, Ministry of Lands.- 
Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement
Harare, Agricultural Marketing 
Authority
Harare, Ministry of Finance 
Economic Planning and 
Development
Mashonaland Province, Mwenje dam
People Interviewed
The Minister, Chief 
Water Engineer and 
engineers in charge of the 
provinces
Director of the 
Authority
Director of Agritex and 
Senior Officials
Director of ARDA and 
Senior Officials
Director of Health 
Services and Senior 
Officials in charge 
of malaria and bilharzia 
programmes
The dean of the faculty 
and lecturers involved in 
agricultural economics, 
soils and irrigation 
development
Director of the Centre, 
S e n i o r  r e s e a r c h  
specialists in charge of 
malaria and bilharzia 
programmes
Director of the 
Resettlement Programme 
and Senior field 
officers
Managing Director and 
officials responsible for 
all controlled crops
Fellow officers in 
charge of the
disbursement of recurrent 
budgets for Ministry of 
Agriculture
Resident Water bailiff 
and engineers for the 
Gulliver Construction 
Company on site
3X1r
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
Harare, Mashonaland Provincial 
Office
The Provincial Water 
E n g i n e e r ,  t h e  
documentalist and senior 
officials.
Bulawayo, Matabeleland 
Provincial Office
The Matabeleland 
Provincial water engineer, 
the documentalist and 
senior officials.
Gweru, Midland Provincial The Midland Provincial 
W a t e r  E n g i n e e r ,  
documentalist and senior 
officers.
Mazvikadei Dam, Mashonaland 
Province
Hippo Valley/Chiredzi Irrigation 
Schemes Masvingo Province
Hippo Valley/Chiredzi Commercial 
Schemes
Mid-Sabi,
Province
Chisumanje, Manicaland
Mutare, Manicaland Province
Masvingo, Masvingo Province
Harare, Anglo-American Corp­
oration Head Office 
(Chisumbanje - Hippo Valley)
Resident Water bailiff, 
and on-site engineers
for t he I t a l i a n  
Construction Company.
Water bailiffs for Lake 
Kyle, Bangala Dam 
M a n j i r e n j i a n d  the 
Esquelingwe Weir. Toured 
the main canals and lakes. 
Resident Water engineer 
for the Lowveld.
The Estate managers of 
the Anglo-American 
Corporation and Hullets 
companies
Flew over the estates, 
met about 6 commercial 
growers of wheat. At 
^4a&'aodzi met eight small 
scale producers. Met the 
resident irrigation 
officer and other 
government officers 
including pump attendant 
at Chisumbanje.
Provincial Water engineer 
and senior officers.
Provincial Water Engineer 
and senior officers.
The Managing Director 
(Zimbabwe)
1985
1985
1985
1986 
1986
1986
1986
1986
3Z%
Gwenoro Dam/Scheme, Midlands 
Province
Water bailiff, resident 
irrigation officer, five 
small scale farmers.
Ngesi Pick-up Weir Midlands 
Province
Mondi Mataga Weir Midlands 
Province
Tsholotsho Irrigation Scheme, 
Matabeleland Province
Mayfair Dam, Matabeleland 
Province
Silverstroom Dam, Manicaland 
Province.
Exchange Block, Scheme, Midlands 
Province
Harare, Donor Agencies
Resident Water 
bailiff
6 small scale
irrigation farmers and the 
Mataga based irrigation 
officer.
Irrigation Officer and 
three small scale farmers.
Resident Water bailiff 
and two commercial 
farmers.
Water bailiff.
Four Agritex officials, 
resident water bailiff, 
eight small scale farmers
Met with agencies 
representing Britain, USA, 
Denmark, Germany, Norway, 
Japan and the World Bank.
